

Routledge Studies on African and Black Diaspora

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION

Edited by
Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith



African Perspectives on South-South Migration

This book investigates the diverse and dynamic forms of migration within Africa. Centring themes of agency, resource flows, and transnational networks, the book examines the enduring appeal of the Global South as a place of origin, transit, and destination.

Popular media, government pronouncements, and much of the global research discourse continue to be oriented towards migration from the Global South to the Global North, despite the fact that the vast majority of migration is South-South. This book moves beyond these mischaracterisations and instead distinctly focuses on the agency of African migrants and the creative strategies they employ while planning their routes within and across the African continent. Case studies explore the flow of resources such as people, money, skills, and knowledge throughout the continent, while also casting a light on the lived experiences of migrants as they negotiate their sometimes precarious and vulnerable positions. Underpinned by intensive empirical studies, this book challenges prevailing narratives and provides a new way of thinking about South-South Migration.

Composed by a majority of scholars from the Global South, the book will be crucial reading for researchers, students, and policy makers with a focus on South-South Migration, Migration and Inequalities, Migration and Development, and Refugee and Humanitarian Studies.

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Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith**

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Part I

Introduction



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1 Introduction

Intra-Continental Migration Dynamics in Africa and the Importance of South-South Migration (SSM)

Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith

Introduction

It is better understood in some spaces that most migration happens within the so-called Global South, but the specter of the African migrant crossing the Mediterranean to Europe and the related discourse of the “migration crisis” haunts both the popular and the scholarly imaginary so much that reasonable analysis is often almost impossible. This is particularly important for Africans who migrate, who are portrayed in exaggerated numbers and with a decidedly negative impact on economies and social and political life, despite all evidence to the contrary. Empirical data point to the fact that the vast majority of migrants in Africa stay within the African continent, whether these are so-called ‘forced migrants’ in refugee camps or asylum situations, or the much more common and widely diverse categories of other ‘voluntary migrants.’ This latter group is a mix of seasonal and circular migrants, laborers, adventurers, business persons, students, and families reuniting, all complex and multifaceted motivations and categories of migrants. In all of this, the motivations and the pathways of movement within the Global South remain understudied as they continue to be situated within discursive frames of illegality, criminality, and undeservingness (Willen 2012; Andersson 2014; Yarris & Castañeda 2015; Flahaux & De Haas 2016; Hamlin 2021; McAuliffe & Triandafylidou 2022).

Despite the scale and importance of intra-continental migration, the dominant academic and policy discourse on migration in Africa also tends to focus on irregular migrants and those group of migrants aiming to reach the Global North (Asfawossen 2018; Loftsdóttir 2021). This has contributed to a focus in scholarly research on migration trends from the Global South to the Global North, to the detriment of research that can conceptualize and analyze trends focused on South-South Migration (SSM). The paucity of data, coupled with the lack of research on intra-regional migration, and the inattention to theorizing these patterns of migration, has resulted in very limited knowledge about the forms and patterns of international migration occurring within the continent and the evolution and drivers of migration within, toward and from Africa.

Furthermore, a general tendency to focus particularly on financial remittances and economic motivations obscures the complex experiences of social networks

and other ways that migrants are motivated and sustained and struggle in their journeys and at their destination. Such an orientation has obscured the flow of financial resources within the global South due to the underlying assumption of global resource inequality between the North and South, whereby the flows of resources are always presumed to move primarily and largely from the Global North to the South.

By some estimates, there are at least 25 million international migrants in Africa (Saifaddin 2023). One estimation of South–South international migration puts its significance at between 33–45% of total global migration trends (Campillo-Carrette 2013: 12). Cross-border, intra-regional migration flows are a key feature of South-South Migration whereby millions migrate in search for work and livelihoods. Intra-regional migration in the Global South is multi-directional and complex in terms of categories of migrants, drivers and outcomes (Maruja et al. 2019). However, South-South Migration is not limited to intra-regional migration patterns as there are cross-continental migratory flows in the Global South as is the case in point of West African migrants in Brazil (Heil 2020) and African migrants in India (Kohnert 2021).

In Africa, SSM migration is a story that is largely about intra-African migration (IOM 2020). Hujo and Piper note that “in three developing regions, South-South migration flows are greater than South-North flows” (Hujo & Piper 2007: 19). In 2015, about 33 million Africans were living outside their home countries, and more than half of these international migrants moved within Africa (UNDESA 2015). In fact, an important study of SSM found that 80% of Africans who were thinking about migration had no interest in leaving the African continent (IOM 2020). The large majority of international migrants migrate within the same region (UNCTAD 2018). A similar pattern can be observed in the intra-continental refugee flows. Two of the East African countries of Uganda and Ethiopia are some of the largest refugee-hosting countries, respectively, over a million and 800,000 refugees (UN 2018). There is more cross-national, aggregate data now being compiled by international organizations and think tanks such as the IOM (2020) and Afrobarometer about African citizens’ migration patterns, including the drivers, intentions, and challenges of African migration patterns indicating the intra-continental migratory flows (Sanny et al. 2019).

The authors in this collaborative volume aim to highlight these neglected themes of South-South Migration (SSM) through qualitative and in-depth case studies from across Africa. Although the aim of this volume is not to provide an exhaustive accounting of the research on the topic, it is worth noting that some of the themes of prior studies on migration patterns within and from Africa include: addressing the trends of intra-African migration and challenges and prospects of integration (Nyamnjoh 2007); the growing number of sub-Saharan African migrants moving to the west (RMMS 2014); African perspectives on migration and cultures of migration (Hahn & Klute 2007); factors that shape and influence lives of Africans before, during, and after their migration (Triulzi & McKenzie 2013); the interplay between migration and development (Fokkema & De Haas 2011; RMMS 2015), and more. However, there remain a relatively few qualitative studies of intra-Africa

migration that explore South-South Migration dynamics in Africa (notable exceptions include Bakewell and Landau (2018), Flahaux and De Haas (2016), Moyo et al. (2021), and Hugo and Piper (2010)). The under-researched intra-regional migration dynamics in Africa is identified as a theme that calls for the attention of cross-disciplinary research (Adepoju 2008).

In this introductory chapter, we outline the intellectual stakes of the empirical focus on SSM, with a focus on three core themes of inquiry: the flows and distinct types of resources within the Global South, the agency and limitations of the agency of migrants within the Global South, and the appeal of the ‘Global South’ as a place of origin, transit, and destination.

Conceptualizing South-South Migration

The rise of an empirical focus on South-South Migration in the last decade or more follows a near-hysteria in Europe and America about migration from the Global South. The need to draw attention to the ways in which African migrations are not always or even often out of the countries in developing regions and into the so-called ‘developed’ or Global North countries led to the development of the term ‘South-South Migration’ to capture this phenomenon. Campillo-Carrette noted that while the term is fairly new, it is rarely problematized, and what constitutes the Global South and migration are contentious and substantively distinct (Campillo-Carrette 2013). The contentions surrounding the concept of South-South Migration is not in any way related to semantics. They are rather related to framing issues, and the underlying assumptions behind the concept. One of the key problems is lack of clarity in the definition of the North-South divide which is best reflected in the different ways the term is used by various institutions and actors (Bakewell et al. 2009). Bakewell, in what is the key study to critique meaningfully the term “South–South-Migration,” notes that it is impossible to really characterize any location of a “global South” because there are as many differences among the countries of the “South” as there are similarities. Still, he finds some useful patterns among the regions, such as the fact that Africa is the region of the world with the highest percentages of South-South migrants, at 64% remaining in the region (Bakewell 2009).

The notion of the Global South is often used in a descriptive manner among scholars and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), whereby the ‘Global South’ signifies countries of low or middle income (LMICs). The South is often equated with “developing countries” and hence, South-South Migration is often understood and studied as migration between and among developing countries or LMICs (Ratha & Shaw 2007; Castles & Delgado Wise 2008). Ratha and Shaw estimate that 74 million, or nearly half, of all migrants from developing countries live and work in other developing countries (2007). In fact, the analytical field of the ‘Global South’ can indicate very different categories of people and communities.

Furthermore, the general use of the term in the context of migration, as in the case of South-South and South-North Migration, obscures the fact that migration systems are not contained in a given space. South-South migrants’ trajectories

might have an intended destination in the Global North and but also end up quite differently. The discourse about South-South Migration should be conceptualized in such a way that the mobility happening at intra-regional levels might have a prospect of extending to inter-regional South-South Migration patterns happening across continents (ACP 2013; De Lombaerde et al. 2014). Human movements are complex and multi-directional, rarely predictable, and are rarely planned in advance. An additional critique of the term relates to the trend in which the concept is appropriated to show the invidious contrast with South-North Migration patterns. By going beyond such a mere contrast to the South-North migratory flows, there is a need to examine patterns in South-South Migration in a given context (De Lombaerde et al. 2014: 104).

The other problematic surrounding the term is the underlying assumption in the homogeneity of countries located in the “North” and “South” (Bakewell et al. 2009). Crucial here is how and in what ways (if at all) movements within the South, and in this case, within Africa, differ from movement out of the South, that is, out of the continent of Africa. While it may be true as Bakewell and others suggest, that there are reasons to question that distinction, and to point to the similarities that exist in movements out of the Global South, as well as the differences within the Global South (surely our cases in this volume point to that rich diversity of experience), it is also the case that there is a qualitative difference in moving within the region/Continent than moving to Europe. Shared experiences of contact with the slave trade, European colonialism, and relatively low levels of human and economic development shape patterns of migration, among many other factors (Bakewell 2009; Pierre 2012; Campillo-Carrette 2013; Achiume 2019). The diverse socio-economic and political developments and historical contexts highly shape the differences in the migration trends and trajectories of different nations located in the Global South. South-South Migrations have a number of distinctive features related to the role of borders, the structure of the migration flows, the nexus between migration and conflict, the migration governance structures, and so on (De Lombaerde et al. 2014: 103). For instance, recent work by anthropologists like Hagan’s work in West Africa draws from the argument that in contemporary African societies, communities are thoroughly structured through processes of racialization and global white supremacy as a result of slavery and colonialism (Hagan 2019). In making a legal case, Achiume argues that “legal scholarship, however, has insufficiently grappled with the implications of colonial and neocolonial subordination for how we should think about the ethics of international migration and the theory of territorial nation-state sovereignty that structures it” (Achiume 2019: 1519).

Despite these similarities of history, as Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Carella note, there is so much variety within the Global South, and South-South migratory flows are so diverse, that one should be aware that these expressions are “inevitably oversimplifications at best, or sweeping generalizations at worst” (2020: 203–204). For this work, it may be less important to measure or define what that difference is because our concern is the experiences of migrants and others who travel across and remain within Africa. Such an African Continental grounding of the discussion challenges the prior trend of viewing the Global South as if it were a homogenized entity.

Elements of geography and shared history interact to incentivize sub-regional and continental migration in ways that are themselves patterned. Southern Africa, for instance, has long histories of male-labor migration that structure and reinforce contemporary migrations within the sub-region (Lubkemann 2009). These tend to encourage the growth of labor migration into South Africa in the post-apartheid period, despite the challenges and response from both the state and larger society (Landau & Segatti 2009; Facchini, Mayda & Mendola 2013). The Sahel has formed a geographic, religious and trade corridor that predates the arrival of European colonialists in ways that similarly shape and structure contemporary migration corridors (Raineri 2018; Hagan 2019). Likewise, the migration trend observed in the Northwestern and Eastern routes from Ethiopia to the Sudan and through Djibouti to the Gulf States are highly impacted by the historical developments in the corridor related to the caravan trade and long-existing trade ties (Haile Michael 2014). One of the new trends in intra-regional migration is the longer distance between places of origin and destination unlike earlier trends of intra-regional migration often happening between countries sharing borders (Adepoju 2008).

Thus, South-South Migration is both a lens for study and a site of interrogation. What makes each of the cases in this volume “the South” is something we have asked the contributors to consider, even as their inclusion assumes their location in that space, but in a circulating sense. Migrants in those spaces (presumably) do not desire or are not able somehow to get out of “the South,” at least not yet. However, it is also worth asking this question about temporality. For some set of migrants, it may be that there is an eventual goal of getting to Europe or North America, but moving within Africa is a first step in their plan, to accumulate more funds or other resources like connections or other support for the onward journey. Others embark on South-South Migration because of the ease of getting a visa for a destination in the Global North outside of places of origin, as the case of some Ethiopian migrants in South Africa indicates. Still for others, they may become “stuck” in a transit country and not have intended to stay there. Nonetheless, we argue that while there is analytical value to theorizing “transit countries” as distinct spaces (Collyer 2007; Zeleke 2019), there is also reason to think of those who are in these countries as South-South migrants, not merely transit migrants. Often, they stay there for long periods of time and contribute resources to the places they are, remit financial resources home, and even become more settled than they intended. In these spaces, they develop religious and social connections that shape and transform their own migration journeys and the communities in which they are resident.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Carella (2020: 205) suggest that the use of the concept of South-South Migration is helpful not just as a conceptual tool to dissect and understand migration flows but also to offset the rhetoric of portraying migrants from the Global South as groups “invading global North.” As a volume focusing on examining the South-South Migration dynamics in a given geographical space, this work takes a Continental approach that allows a thorough analysis. Below we describe more of those themes that are highlighted by the various contributors.

Intra-Regional Migration Dynamics: Agency, Resource Flows, and Diverse Patterns of Movement

This book addresses four important lacunae in migration research in Africa. The first and most crucial aim is to contribute to the effort of changing the Eurocentric narrative that continues to marginalize SSM, where the largest amount of migration is occurring. Because so much scholarship and policy analysis focus on South-North Migration (SNM), it skews the presentation of the scale and dynamics of the African migration context (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2022). Far more empirical studies on SSM are needed to redress this imbalance and contribute to a diverse, balanced, and theorized consideration of what these forms and patterns of migration are. Although it is well known that the greatest proportion of migrants from the Global South is destined for other countries in the region, we do not have a commensurate scholarly understanding of the phenomena. The few existing works are anchored thematically in a discussion of particular and specific themes such as border and migration management (Moyo et al. 2021), child migration within the continent (Thorsen & Hashim 2011), the patterns of cross-border, rural–rural mobility (Van Dijk et al. 2001) or the nexus between migration and development (Castles & Delgado Wise 2008). Because the histories of slavery, colonialism, and white supremacy are shared by African countries in particular, and evident in the anti-Blackness represented by European and American anti-immigrant sentiments toward migrants from African countries, theorizing SSM in Africa necessarily also advances a critical approach to race and power in the Global North as well.

Two significant comparative research projects on migration – the Migrating out of Poverty (MOOP) and the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) have a primary focus on intra-regional mobility in Africa. The MOOP Research Programme Consortium is focused on the relationship between internal and regional migration and poverty in Africa and Asia, and two of the six migration corridors in the ongoing UKRI/GCRF MIDEQ research project, the world’s largest comparative migration research project, are located in Africa.¹ However, much more work could and must be done to theorize the patterns and impacts of migration within the Global South, in this case within and across Africa. This edited volume is one such endeavor aiming to contribute to the production of knowledge on the patterns and impacts of migration within the Global South.

A second contribution of this volume is to add to the crucial discussions focused on the agency of migrants in the context of SSM, a theme that is often under-addressed or overshadowed by the victimhood discourse. By going beyond the normative victimization narrative of migrants often emphasized in prior research (e.g. Triulzi & McKenzie 2013; Hoffman & Abidde 2021) or in policy texts (e.g., AU 2018), the contributors in this volume pay more careful attention to the agency of the migrants, including the creative strategies they employ while planning their migration, negotiating their precarious and vulnerable positions and in their lived experiences in the destination countries in the Global South. The discussions of mobility in Africa often portray migrants as individuals incapable of making a reasoned decision. As De Haas argues, such a view is “devoid of any real sense of agency, as individual choices are supposed to be entirely predictable outcomes of

individual cost–benefit analyses based on fixed, static sets of assumed preference” (De Haas 2021: 30). We argue that such over-generalization often conceals the agency of migrants who tend to make informed decisions at different stages of their journey, as presented in Part II of this edited volume.

Prior studies have indicated that the composition of South-South Migration is different from the North–South Migration flows, as South-South Migration is typically conceived as the movement of migrants with lower skills and education levels (Hujo & Piper 2007) and those at younger ages (McKenzie 2008). The vulnerability discourse is also highlighted in the conflict–migration nexus, in which migrants in a south-south context are portrayed to be affected more by wars and conflict than in the context of North-North or North-South Migration (De Lombaerde et al. 2014). The contributions here focus on an understanding of the agency of migrants which builds on De Haas’s classical concept of the Aspiration-Capability Framework (ACF), which is framed as a meta-theory for migration. De Haas appraised that neoclassical migration theory presumed people’s perceptions and preferences are driven by individual utility maximization and rather asserted the need to pay attention to the role of other factors such as culture, education and exposure to media in shaping people’s preferences and notions of the ‘good life’, personal life aspirations and more (De Haas 2021). By building on his critique of the liberal individualist outlook in migration decision-making research, we ask if migration decision-making should be analyzed with a mere focus on economic push and pull factors of migration. Furthermore, we also build on Zeleke (2023) who argues that migration decision-making in the African context should be analyzed as a communal decision-making process rather than as a decision made at an atomized individual unit level, especially in many African contexts.

De Haas’s definition of *human mobility* as “people’s capability (freedom) to choose where to live – including the option to stay – instead of a more or less automated, passive and ‘cause-and-effect’ response to a set of static push and pull factors,” accents the need to pay attention to mobility and immobility in migration discourse (De Haas 2021: 2). Some literature on African migration pays more attention to the multifaceted factors and trajectories affecting migrants’ decision-making and portrays migrants as actors who cannot make a reasoned decision. We argue such over-generalization often conceals the agency of migrants, who tend to make informed decisions at different stages of their journey and the contributions made in this volume clearly exhibit the agency of migrants in making informed decisions about their further mobility/immobility.

While there has been some critical work to challenge the passivity of migrants in their subjectivity to smugglers or traffickers by scholars (Raineri 2018; Belloni 2019; Zeleke 2019; Carruth & Smith 2022), the practitioner and policy literature, and especially the popular media portrayal of migrants in the Global South continues to suggest that their agency is so severely limited that migrants are often in need of rescue (IOM 2020). New research ought to simultaneously engage with the demand and supply side of migration brokerage and the various intermediaries that enable the translation of aspiration into capability, making migration a reality and understand the different mechanisms migrants use to overcome the challenges they

face and their different pathways of incorporation at the place of destinations and transit within Africa. Very often, migrants make informed decisions about mobility and immobility, by identifying the migratory routes and their final destinations and other decisions they must make on a daily basis. While paying attention to the structural constraints that can be very real, it is important to engage with the agency and creativity of the migrants in coping with and overcoming the challenges in the processes of sustaining their lives and making a living in both transit and destination countries across Africa. Hence, the discussions raised in the contributions here emphasize South-South Migration as a source of vitality, expressions of agency and instances of resilience, even as migrants face enormous challenges at times, from the state, from economic circumstances, and from social and political circumstances.

Multiple cases in this volume expound the theme of migrant agency. Joseph Mujere's contribution underscores the agency of the migrant workers in informal settlements in South Africa on the margins of mining operations. These migrants have been remarkably successful at negotiating for jobs and basic amenities through the establishment of community leadership structures and engagement with formal political institutions. Leander Kandilige, Joseph Awetori Yaro, and Joseph Mensah explore the ways in which Ghanaian migrants to China use their social networks, both in Ghana and in China, to make complex and risky migration journeys successful. This contribution further alludes to the creative strategies the Ghanaian migrants use to get employed, such as teaching/tutoring children of their professors, showing the agency of Ghanaian migrants, how they use different mechanisms to overcome the structural immigration challenge pertaining to the regulation that bans students from working. Through a focus on Ethiopian migrants to South Africa and the Middle East, the contribution by Fana Gebresenbet points as well to the agency of migrants in choice-making in the process of deciding on the different destinations within the Global South. The Hadiya in Ethiopia in particular have increasingly more information about the different migration routes available, the risks and benefits of each and they make calculated and agentic choices about migration journeys. Similarly, the contribution by Tirsit Sahldengil challenges the dominant argument in the forced migration literature portraying the refugee movement as an arbitrary movement in which forced migrants lack the agency in choosing their migration routes, and their respective destinations. The chapter demonstrates that refugees from the Great Lakes regions living in the Sherkole refugee camp in northwestern Ethiopia construct social relatedness with host communities based on historical narratives of a 'common origin' and a desire to live peacefully in Ethiopia. The advantage of these disparate cases is that they not only highlight the central role that migrants play in choice-making and strategizing, but these are cases of both so-called 'economic/voluntary' migrants and refugees and other 'forced/involuntary' migrants. The empirical evidence points to the ways in which individuals and communities on the move can shape their own destiny outside of the binaries and constraints assumed by the literature and policymakers alike.

The third key contribution of the cases presented in this volume is to help better theorize how the flows of resources from migrations contribute to the lives and

livelihoods of the migrants, their home communities, and their social milieu. This discussion of resource flows challenges two mainstream lines of thinking. First, it questions the existing bias that emphasizes an unequal and unidirectional flow of resources from the Global North to the South as the former is considered to offer migrants a ‘greener pasture.’ The cases here point to the resource contributions *within* SSM and the vitality of these flows. Secondly, financial remittances have for long been at the center of the discussion of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2009; Smith & Saper 2019). Our perspective goes beyond this important focus on remittances that pays exclusive attention to financial resource flow including monetary remittances and diaspora investment (De Haas 2005; Van Hear 2014). The latest changing migration dynamics calls for a closer look at new actors involved and new types of intermediaries, as well as cross-national businesses (Muenstermann 2017). It is only recently that studies have started foregrounding the role of South-South Migration in economic development and poverty reduction (Bakewell & Landau 2018). By going beyond a mere focus on the flow of financial resource and remittances, and looking at human, social and community resource remittances, the contributions in this volume underscore the flow of knowledge, skills, capabilities, information as well as financial resources. In their latest work, Gelb et al. (2021) note that the flow of knowledge is a theme that is often overlooked as a diaspora investment category. Diasporas provide knowledge and skills to their country of origin together with finance, through: skills and knowledge networks, skills and human capital exchanges, and returning diaspora entrepreneurs. As Levitt argues, migrants send home so much more than money, including social remittances such as new or revised social norms, practices, identities, and social capital (Levitt 2001).

The contributions here expand the boundaries and content of transnational flows in the context of SSM. The flows of resources are hence widely conceptualized in this work as involving not only financial resources and goods but also knowledge-related resources, such as skills, networks, or information. This becomes very interesting in that the cases consider migrants who are considered to be in transit, those who are located within particular countries, and those who journey on and send this “capital” home, resources understood to be varied and sometimes vast. For example, in his contribution Dereje Feyissa addresses ideational resource flows within the African continent by paying attention to the experiences of returned Ethiopian migrants from South Africa. His analysis of the knowledge flow explicates the diffusion of liberal ideas within the continent and how such ideas are used to critique Ethiopia’s historically entrenched statist conception of development, as well as build local community development projects. Lauren Carruth expounds on how the case of local aid workers in the humanitarian aid industry reveals a limited form of “flexible citizenship” within the Global South by exhibiting the significant labor migrations of Somalis and other Ethiopians for aid work in East Africa. Local conceptions of citizenship and hospitality shape mobilities in these contexts. Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré examine the flow of valuable agricultural skills carried back to their home communities by migrants in the Burkina Faso - Côte d’Ivoire migration corridor. Furthermore,

the contribution by Tirsit Sahldengil shows how refugees from the Great Lakes region bring in new sets of mining skills to their refugee areas in Ethiopia. The language training young Ghanaian migrants offer in China vividly shows the flow of resources in the form of knowledge and language skill within countries in the Global South. The flow of social remittances in the region entails the circulation of knowledge, ideas, practices, skills, and social capital between diverse sending and receiving communities located in the Global South.

People are themselves resources, and migrants are resources, and indeed provide knowledge and skills along the journey, particularly when journeys are interrupted, stalled, or blocked. Such a broader approach to flow of resources builds on the notion of social remittances that focuses on the circulation of non-financial items in the context of migration including flow of ideas, diffusion of practices, identities, and social capital (Levitt 1998). By grounding the discussion within the African continent, the different contributions presented in Part II drive forward research on social remittances and intra-continental flows.

A fourth and final contribution of this volume is to home in on the local and the specific. Much of the available literature on migration research in Africa is primarily focused on macro-explanations, and on the destination-country perspective (e.g., Driss El Ghazouani 2019). This book is rather focused on places of origin, transit, and destination, and examines the migration dynamics from multi-spatial perspectives and holistically. Existing evidence indicate heterogeneous and complex patterns of mobility and migration in the south (Tacoli 2001; Mafukidze 2006), requiring a closer, local, and contextualized look and a nuanced analysis to these migration trajectories. By challenging the mainstream discourse in migration research that focuses on the North as a destination, the contributions in this volume posit the Global South fluidly and dynamically as arenas of origin, transit, and destination. The latest trend indicates the diversification of migration destinations on the continent (Mafukidze 2006). One of the major limitations in the conceptualization of transit migration relates to the Eurocentric undertones of the term, informed by an underlying assumption describing EU countries as intended destinations of transit migrants (Düvell 2012). Such presumption recognizes countries at the fringes of Europe as main transit countries while paying lesser attention to countries located further away (Suter 2012). Some of the contributions included in the volume explore the SSM dynamics by paying attention to the pre-departure phases, such as Fana Gebresenbet's study of Ethiopian migrants' choices between intra-Africa migration over migration to the Middle East. Other contributors pay closer attention to the migration phase of the journey and transit experiences, reflecting on issues of migration route patterns and dynamics. Amina Saïd Chiré and Géraldine Pinaudt consider the complexities of the concept of "transit" by considering the case of migrants in and through Djibouti. Some of these migrants are "transiting" in the classic sense of the term, but many more of these migrants stay, either by intention or by accident. It is imperative to consider the ways in which transit becomes multiple things to different migrants. Similarly, Johara Berriane focuses on migrants in Morocco, another country often conceptualized as a "transit" space. In fact, the ethnographic accounts suggest some migrants come for

religious and historical reasons, and some establish deep roots, in this case often linked to religious pilgrimage and community. Each of these contributors points to the complexity of the notion of “transit” and a “transit country,” when in fact many of these countries are destinations in fact and in outcome.

Some of the contributions address the lived experiences of migrants upon arrival and in their day-to-day lives at different destinations across the African continent. Mohamed Bakhit explores the rich opportunities for building citizenship among South Sudanese living in the informal settlements in Khartoum, Sudan. Joseph Mujere’s work in the platinum mines of South Africa also suggests creative and effective forms of sociability that link migrants with local governance and community life. Tirsit Sahldengil’s work in refugee camps also demonstrates the integration, even without formal recognition, of refugees and forced migrants, particularly when they have skills such as mining.

Discussions on the destination addressed by authors in this volume include themes revolving around employment, living conditions, and the social well-being of migrants. Such a critical appraisal of migration governing regimes links to Carling’s argument on the need to pay attention to forced/involuntary immobility in migration research in Africa where much of the emphasis has for long been on mobility (Carling 2002). As Schewel (2020) argues, such a focus on mobility in migration theories tends to overlook the countervailing forces that restrict or resist them. The contributions herein exclusively expound on intra-regional/Continental mobility, hinting at immobility beyond the defined geographic space, Africa. Hence, we go beyond the dominant discourse in migration research that portrays mobility and immobility as binary forces. We argue that one of the major limitations in the conceptualization of transit migration is the Eurocentric connotations of the term, which are highly informed by an underlying assumption that considers EU countries as intended destinations of transit migrants, and pays little or no attention to countries located further away (Düvell 2012; Zeleke 2018). Return migration in the context of South-South Migration, especially in intra-continental migration unlike the migration to remote destinations, needs to be addressed with a reference to how much proximity between places of origin and destination impacts the trend in return migration dynamics.

Each contribution in this volume is based on an intensive empirical study undertaken by the respective authors. The themes raised by the contributors are also cross-cutting. Furthermore, the discussion goes beyond the dominant discourse of politicized migration narratives in Africa that often focus on “migration management” and with a Eurocentric focus. Using an explicitly Global South-focused set of case materials, these contributions re-focus academic inquiry on the trends and patterns of South-South Migration within and across the African continent. It is also important to note, as many scholars do, the gendered nature of migration, and to that end, several contributors pay particular attention to the ways in which women’s motivations and experiences of migration may be distinct. Amina Saïd Chiré and Géraldine Pinauldt consider the gendered experiences of Ethiopian migrants who stay in Djibouti, as well as those who migrate onward. Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré also consider the reasons for lower female

migration in the Burkina Faso - Côte d'Ivoire migration corridor and the experiences of those few women who migrate for agricultural work. Tirsit Sahldengil's contribution also shows the gendered experience in the forced migration context in the Global South in which male migrants tend to be involved more in longer migration journeys that involve crossing several different transit countries

The term "migrants" in this edited volume draws on a broader definition of terms that encompasses different categories of people on the move, whereby a migrant is conceptualized as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of the person's legal status (regular/irregular); whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; what the causes for the movement are or what the length of the stay is. Such a broader conceptualization of a migrant and migration deviates from the simplistic binaries of forced versus voluntary, refugee versus economic migrant, etc. Such an approach involves a form of 'categorical fetishism' (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Hamlin 2021; Carruth & Smith 2022). Hence, this volume presents cases drawn from empirical studies addressing the lived experiences of African migrants from different walks of life and migration experiences and identities, ranging from skilled and unskilled labor migrants to refugees and others forcibly displaced as reflected in the contributions. The volume examines the aforementioned themes through empirically grounded and theoretically rich case studies in migrants' countries of origin, along the zones of transit, and in their new and established destinations. Through these diverse and empirically exciting case studies, this volume problematizes the racialized and ahistorical basis for the focus on South-North Migration, and centers African experiences and African contexts in migration journeys.

Note

- 1 These migration corridors are Ethiopia – South Africa and Burkina Faso – Cote d'Ivoire.

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Part II

**Agency in South-South
Migration**



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2 **Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation in Informal Settlements in Rustenburg, South Africa, 1994–2018**

Joseph Mujere

Introduction

The repeal of apartheid-era spatial controls in the 1980s, labour migration, and the platinum mining boom in the early 2000s engendered the rapid growth of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations in South Africa. Just like the gold mining industry preceding it, which relied on the labour recruitment agreements in the region and used labour recruitment agencies such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), platinum mining also relied mainly on both migrant labour from other provinces as well as countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique. With the end of the compound system, migrant workers and job-seekers increasingly settled in informal settlements that emerged on the margins of mining settlements. While extant literature on labour migrancy in southern Africa exists, there is a dearth of studies examining everyday life in informal settlements on the margins of mining operations and how denizens of these settlements struggle for recognition and access to social amenities and mining jobs. Informal settlements or shanty towns as seen in the empirical data presented in this contribution, can be defined as unplanned residential settlements that are usually built from poor quality material and lack basic amenities such as roads, water reticulation, electricity, and health facilities. Such settlements are characterized by low state presence and everyday struggles for access to basic amenities.

This chapter examines the everyday struggles of labour migrants living in informal settlements on the margins of platinum mining operations around Rustenburg Town in South Africa's North West Province. Rustenburg has an estimated population of 574,000 in 2023. However, the population fluctuates due to labour migration. The chapter argues that the end of apartheid and the platinum mining boom of the early 2000s resulted in the rapid increase in labour migration within the region of Southern Africa and the establishment of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations. The chapter argues that citizenship, land ownership regimes, and politics of belonging have shaped the strategies deployed by residents of these informal settlements to construct their belonging and demand access to services and jobs. The contribution analyses strategies such as self-provisioning or what Chatterjee (2004) calls quiet encroachment and community protests. In addition, it examines how residents of these settlements, who are mostly migrants

from other provinces and other countries in the region such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, construct and negotiate their belonging in these settlements. The chapter also discusses residents' use of grassroots structures to organize themselves, demand recognition, access to amenities, and job opportunities. Overall, the chapter draws on the everyday struggles of residents of informal settlements in South Africa's platinum belt to ask broader questions about labour migration, belonging, access to jobs and the place of informal settlements in the political economy of mining in South Africa.

Brief Overview of Research Methodology and Conceptual Framework

The study is mainly based on ethnographic research conducted between 2012 and 2018 in the Ikemeleng Informal

settlement within the framework of the author's Research Associateship in the Society Work and Politics Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, and the VW Foundation Knowledge for Tomorrow Postdoctoral Fellowships in the Humanities. Follow-up interviews were conducted with the support of the Society Work and Politics Institute, University of the Witwatersrand. Interviews were conducted with people belonging to different sections of the communities: members of the Community Policing Forums (CPFs), mine workers, vendors, *spaza* shop owners, job seekers, and councillors, among others. Although some of the interviews were structured or semi-structured, most were in the form of personal reminiscences and life histories. Apart from this, the chapter also draws on Rustenburg Municipality records (from the Department of Human Settlements) relating to land acquisitions by the municipality and the process of upgrading informal settlements to formal ones and newspaper reports. These methodological approaches were useful in theorising the nature of the everyday struggles of people living in informal settlements close to platinum mines.

Conceptually, the chapter draws on Chatterjee (2004)'s concept of "political society" and Bayat's (1997) concept of the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary." Chatterjee uses the concept of "political society" to distinguish between formally organized politics and the politics of people living in informal settlements. Political society is characterized by the urban poor's subversive acts such as the occupation of land and illicit electricity, and water connections. Bayat (2010) describes such actions as "quiet encroachment of the ordinary." This is a practice in which the urban poor occupy open areas in urban areas, get together to demand amenities such as electricity, health centres, and water, and organize themselves to defend their gains (Bayat 2010). Bayat (2010) uses this concept to unravel the agency of the urban poor in their struggles for recognition and access to services. In the case of Rustenburg, residents of informal settlements operate on the margins of the formal structures of the state and develop their own grassroots structures. The absence of the state (effective policing and provision of services) in these settlements forces residents to develop organic structures which they use to provision themselves through 'quiet encroachment' and more overt methods such as service

delivery protests. The absence of the state in these places is mainly a result of the settlement's lack of official recognition within the local municipality and the fact that the settlements are dominated by migrants, most of whom are undocumented.

Writing about informal settlements in India, Chatterjee argues that community leaders in informal settlements are often keen to emphasize unity in the community at the expense of shared interests and describe their communities, in kinship terms, as a family (Chatterjee 2004). This is something that is common in informal settlements in Rustenburg and is often reflected in the names that residents give to these settlements such as Ikemeleng (stand on your own feet), Sondela (let us gather here), and Freedom Park, among other emotive names. Despite the prevalence of the use of the kinship idiom in informal settlements, Chatterjee (2004, 57–58) argues that it is neither kinship ties nor cultural affinity that binds these people together but “rather, it’s a collective occupation of a piece of land – a territory defined in time and space and one that is under threat.” There are layers of inclusion and exclusion depending on social location and economic and political changes. These layers impact one’s ability to make claims or access resources that may become available to those considered legitimate members of the community.

Although the experiences of residents of informal settlements across the globe are generally similar, local circumstances shape the experiences of residents and frame the trajectories of development the settlements take (Bayat 1997; 2000). In the case of Ikemeleng Informal settlements, which is the subject of this chapter, platinum mining, labour migration, land ownership regimes, and politics of belonging shape the strategies residents deploy in their everyday struggles for recognition and access to services and mining jobs.

Labour Migration and Informal Settlements in South Africa: A Brief Overview

Since the mineral revolution in the late 19th century, industrial mining in South Africa has relied on migrant labour sourced both within South Africa and from other countries in the region (see Crush, Jeeves & Yudelman 1991; Jeeves 1985; Trimikliniotis, Gordon & Zondo 2008). The demand for labour in South Africa’s diamond, gold, and platinum, among other mines, resulted in the establishment of labour recruitment agreements between South Africa and several countries within Southern Africa, Central Africa, and parts of East Africa. Labour recruitment agencies such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), popularly known as Wenela, recruited labour for South Africa’s gold mines from the 1940s (Crush, Jeeves & Yudelman 1991). In the 1970s, WNLA and the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC) were merged to form The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA).

Similarly, the platinum mining industry also relied on both local labour (especially from the Eastern Cape Province) and regional labour from countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique. The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) began to recruit labour for the platinum mining sector in the 1960s, growing to become the major recruiter for the sector sourcing labour for platinum

companies such as Amplats (Anglo American Platinum Ltd), Implats (Imapala Platinum Ltd), and Lonmin Plc operating in South Africa's Bushveld Complex (Forrest 2015, 512). TEBA recruited labour across southern Africa, especially in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique, and within South African provinces (Forrest 2015, 511). However, spatial controls during the apartheid era limited the movement of African workers and largely restricted them from being recruited by the official labour recruitment agencies. African workers both from within South Africa and regional migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Malawi, among other countries were also restricted mainly to informal settlements (shanty towns).

Although informal settlements characterized the development of urban and mining centres in South Africa since the 1890s, the repeal of apartheid-era spatial controls in the 1980s was the major impulse in their rapid increase and expansion (Bonner 1990, 89; Murray 1987, 311). After the repeal of laws that restricted the movement of Africans in 1986, the apartheid regime implemented the policy of 'orderly urbanization' with the idea of allowing Africans to settle in urban areas as long as they could secure a job and housing (Murray 1987, 311). This saw African urban influx control being dependent upon one's ability to get employment and housing which engendered what Colin Murray described as "displaced urbanization" which was characterized by a lack of access to housing and formal employment (Murray 1987, 311). As Murray aptly puts it,

on the one hand, the rapidly 'urbanized' inhabitants of the rural slums have been integrated, to a degree, into metropolitan labour markets. On the other hand, they are kept at arm's length, as it were, from major 'white' industrial and residential areas.

(Murray 1987, 316)

Residents of these informal settlements were, thus, integrated into the urban political economies whilst at the same time they remained on the urban periphery in terms of access to amenities and their legitimacy.

It was within the context of these policies in the twilight years of apartheid that informal settlements rapidly increased and expanded. This was more pronounced in mining towns such as Rustenburg, which attracted migrant labour from across South Africa and the southern African region. The platinum mining boom in the early 2000s especially attracted many jobseekers in several provinces in South Africa and other countries in the region to the platinum mines around Rustenburg. Jobseekers took advantage of the freedom of movement enshrined in the new constitution to bypass TEBA and use labour brokers (labour contractors) to get access to jobs or directly contact the mining companies (see Forrest 2015, 512). Local communities also took advantage of the fact that South Africa's "Mining Chapter called for mines to promote employment and advance the economic welfare of South African mining communities" to demand services and preferential access to jobs (Forrest 2015, 512). This encouraged the rapid growth of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations.

As jobseekers coalesced around platinum mining operations, several of them could not find formal accommodation, and they had to settle in numerous informal settlements emerging on the margins of mining operations. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2015, 539) argued that while the national average of people living in informal settlements was 15%, that of Rustenburg was 41%. This was a result of platinum mines that attracted migrant labour that then coalesced in informal settlements on the margins of mining operations around Rustenburg. In 2012, Rajak contended that the informal settlements in Rustenburg accounted for between 15 and 30% of the total population of the municipality (Rajak 2012, 256). Most of these informal settlements do not have basic services such as tap water, electricity, or health centres, among other amenities (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2015, 539).

The fact that the residents of informal settlements hail from different provinces, ethnic groups and nationalities often generates the development of discourses of inclusion and exclusion. This usually resulted in internal schisms and tensions within communities. Thus, although residents of informal settlements seem to be united by their shared experiences, beneath this veneer of social cohesion are internal struggles and social differentiation based on citizenship, ethnicity, and length of stay in the settlement. In addition, although residents of informal settlements show a great sense of attachment to their communities, they also continue to maintain networks based on kinship, friendship, religion, and home-boy associations which go beyond the informal settlement. For instance, residents established associations such as burial societies, social clubs, and home-boy associations that brought migrants coming from the same province or district into close networks.

The Setting: Labour Migration, Informal Settlements, and Platinum Mining in Rustenburg

The end of apartheid and the phasing out of the compound system (a housing system used to control African migrant workers in which they were kept in securitized single-sex accommodation) saw an attendant increase in the number and size of informal settlements around the mines (see Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011). Mining companies were expected to convert single-sex hostels into decent family accommodation units and smaller multiple-occupant units. Mining companies also supported workers through home ownership schemes and gave ‘living out allowances’ to individuals who could not be accommodated in the remodelled former mine hostels (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011, 252). However, instead of using the benefits to rent in the suburbs, most employees chose to stay in informal settlements where they rented shacks or built their shacks out of corrugated sheets, timber, scrap metals, and plastics (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011, 252). By doing this, they saved on accommodation and transport since most informal settlements are close to or even between mining shafts. As Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu aptly put it, “rather than spending the whole [living-out] allowance on accommodation at their places of work, they [mine workers] cut their costs to the bone so as to save up money to return to their rural homestead” (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011, 252). Thus, the phasing out of the

compound system coupled with the “living out” allowances system had a significant impact on the growth of informal settlements in the post-apartheid era.

Most informal settlements around Rustenburg are located on privately owned land or land belonging to customary authorities. Ikemeleng informal settlement (formally Matebeleng) started as a squatter camp for farm workers working on Kroondal Farm in the late 1970s (Marie 2009). The settlement, therefore, predates the post-apartheid era platinum mining boom. However, only a few families were living in the settlement before the end of the apartheid era (Interview with Jane Khumalo, Ikemeleng, 1 August 2015). Aquarius Platinum Limited (one of the largest platinum mining companies operating in Rustenburg during the period) later bought one of the portions of the farms and began its platinum mining operations in Kroondal. The other portions remained in the hands of farmers who continued with their farming activities. However, the settlement grew rapidly after 1994 and neither Aquarius nor the farmers could stop the influx of people or evict them from the land.

While the first people to settle in Ikemeleng informal settlement were mostly farm workers, in the 1990s most residents became mine workers, job seekers, and vendors. People became attracted to Ikemeleng by the possibility of getting employed by platinum and chrome mining companies in the area or engaging in vending and other forms of livelihood. Although the name Matebeleng’s etymology is unclear, residents loathed this name because they understood it to mean a community composed of people from different ethnic backgrounds. The uncertainty regarding the name’s origins fed into the settlement’s identity as a community composed of people from different ethnic backgrounds. The community is composed of both local and regional migrants. The name, therefore, reflects the politics of exclusion in the North West Province as it is a euphemism for a community of migrants and people who do not belong to the area. Residents of this informal settlement loathed this name and changed it to Ikemeleng, a Setswana name that means ‘stand on your own feet’ (Interview with Evelyn Dube, Ikemeleng, 5 July 2012).

Although Tswana farm workers established Ikemeleng informal settlement, and despite it being one of the most ethnically diverse settlements around Rustenburg, the Xhosa and Sotho are the most dominant groups. Thus, although Tswana dominates the North West province, informal settlements around mining operations tend to be dominated by labour migrants from outside the province. Furthermore, although the shacks are not arranged in a particularly orderly manner, often people of the same ethnic group tend to stay with each other. Similarly, migrants from other countries tend to coalesce around specific enclaves within the informal settlement. This was one of the strategies used by regional migrants from Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, among other countries, to create a sense of belonging in the area. Thus, like many other informal settlements in the platinum belt, Ikemeleng was a melting pot of different ethnic groups, languages, and nationalities. The creation of ethnic enclaves within mining settlements is one of the legacies of the apartheid-era management of workers in the mine hostels in which “as a form of control, migrants were separated in hostels based on ethnicity. Continuity of this segmentation is reflected in the new informal settlements emerging across the Rustenburg platinum district” (Chinguno 2013, 641).

Informal settlements bring together different ethnic groups and nationalities which occasionally generates tensions among different groups. It is not unusual for violent clashes to occur between members of different ethnic groups in informal settlements over anything from petty jealousies to serious issues such as murders. As indicated by research participants, when any member of the community is murdered, other members of the community usually want to know the ethnicity of the victim and that of the perpetrator, which then usually triggers inter-ethnic violence (Interview with Jane Moyo, Ikemeleng, 4 August 2015). Ethnic stereotypes also play a role in fanning ethnic tensions and discourses of inclusion. For instance, the presence of Sotho criminal gangs in both Ikemeleng informal settlements fed into the stereotype that Sothos are violent. Dunbar Moodie describes how, during the 2012 strike at Impala platinum, Xhosa-speaking rock driller operators living in informal settlements “used strategically effective violence to ensure solidarity from the wider workforce” (Moodie 2016, 842). They characterized themselves as “beef eating stalwarts” and “*madoda*” while pejoratively referring to the National Union of Mineworkers shaft stewards as “mutton eaters” – a term which was associated with lesser men doing “less strenuous and dangerous jobs” (Moodie 2016, 842). This reveals the complex nature of workplace organizing and the contexts which engendered ethnic violence.

Migrant Labour, Informal Settlements, and Local Communities

Although the definition of who is local and who is not, especially for migrant workers, is contentious, the situation is even more tenuous for residents of informal settlements. For their part, residents of informal settlements use myriad ways to claim to belong and get recognition. This includes lobbying the local municipality to formalize the informal settlement, using their South African citizenship to make the argument that everyone who is a citizen can enjoy that right anywhere in the country as well as claiming that they have been living in the community for a long period. Such strategies, of course, exclude foreign migrants who cannot claim belonging based on citizenship. Some of them, however, get married to locals to claim citizenship and belonging. However, in most instances, residents of informal settlements carry the tag of being migrants who have weak claims to belonging in the area. As Rajak (2012, 261) puts it, the categorization of residents of informal settlements by municipalities and mining companies as migrants “underpins the representation of the informal settlements as transitory, impermanent, and usually illegal, and in so doing rejects claims to entitlement by casting their inhabitants – many of whom have lived in the area for many years – as, in effect, ‘non-stakeholders’.” Informal settlements are, thus, viewed by officials as places of “non-belonging” because they are characterized by illegality. This is the complex context in which residents of both Ikemeleng informal settlements engage and negotiate with both the Rustenburg Local Municipality and mining companies to provide services.

One way through which belonging is articulated in informal settlements and other areas around the mines is through the issuing of proof of residence documents

and access to employment opportunities at the mines. These proof of residence documents are usually a one-page document bearing details such as the number of the ward, name of the bearer and their address. The document is then signed and stamped by either a Ward Councillor or the Headman. The proof of residence document is an essential document because it is used for various purposes including opening bank accounts, accessing services such as health and water, and accessing jobs reserved for locals. Migrants are ordinarily required to produce a passport with a valid permit before they can be issued with the proof of residence document by the Ward Councillor. Without a proof of residence document, opening a bank account or getting a formal job would be impossible.

However, a proof of residence document alone is usually insufficient to secure a job. There is often a need for one to be linked to local patronage networks. For example, in the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) areas, apart from obtaining proof of residence document from a Headman (Kgosana), one must also have a good relationship with the Headman to get the chance to get employed by a company operating in the area. Those outside the royal patronage networks would usually find it difficult to secure jobs. This demonstrates how labour migrants get excluded from the definition of “local” despite the length of their stay in the area.

Informal settlements in mining areas are motley collections of labour migrants and job seekers from within South Africa and from other countries in the region. Despite the social differentiation within informal settlements, the popularity of community-organized jobseeker and service-delivery protests demonstrate that residents of these settlements have common grievances and largely identify municipalities and mining companies as having a critical role to play in alleviating their suffering. Consequently, they use their residence in informal settlements to craft a sense of belonging. Community leaders, who can be councillors, members of Community Policing Forums, or founding members of the community, help in articulating the discourses of social cohesion by using the metaphor of a family and imagined kinship. For example, community leaders described their communities as “one family” and members of the community as brothers and sisters. Whilst this was meant to show that there was cohesion in the community, such descriptions masked the internal contradictions and hierarchies within residents of the informal settlements.

While residents of informal settlements build solidarities and a sense of unity based on their shared experience of living in an impoverished informal settlement, it is important to note that many of these residents maintain strong ties with their places of origin. They send remittances to support their families in their home provinces in South Africa or their countries of origin if they are foreign nationals. As one Somali operating a *spaza* shop in Freedom Park (Number 9) observed, most residents of informal settlements travel to their rural homes during the Christmas holidays which affects business to the extent that most *spaza* shops close during this period (Interview with Abdikadir Ali Hassan, Number Nine Informal settlement, 25 July 2015). Nkomo (2018) has demonstrated how homeboy networks are crucial in the everyday lives of residents of informal settlements as both mine workers and job seekers maintain strong ties based on where they come from.

In August 2009, Ikemeleng informal settlement engaged in a community protest targeting the surrounding mines. Residents barricaded roads and burnt tyres. The main objective of the protest was to force mining companies with operations in the area to recognize the community as a 'local community' deserving to be supported through Corporate Social Responsibility programs. The community also wanted the mines to employ 'local labour', in this case, members of the settlement. One of the positive outcomes of the protest was that members of the community were given an audience by most of the managers of the mines.

In 2011, the community entered an arrangement with Aquarius Platinum Limited and other mines that when a mine had vacancies, especially for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs it would inform the councillor who would in turn forward names to the mines' human resources managers. This gave birth in 2012 to the Unemployment Forum, a grassroots structure aimed at securing jobs at the mines for residents of the community, as well as ensuring that mining companies gave preferential treatment to job seekers from the community. The Unemployment Forum is one of the most critical grassroots structures in the community. Residents used this structure to get access to both contract and permanent positions at the mines.

This type of grassroots structure is quite common in communities located close to mining areas. What is interesting about Ikemeleng's Unemployment Forum is how residents understand the problem of unemployment and the strategies they employ to alleviate it. When I first arrived in the community in 2012, I quickly observed how job seekers would mill around the community office all day, waiting for the councillor to give them proof of residence documents, enter them in the job seekers' database or bring some good news about their job search at the mines. When I inquired about why job seekers camped at the community office all day long, the councillor explained:

Our community is very organized. We have an Unemployment Forum which I chair. It is this forum that engages the mines and gets jobs or 'learnerships' for our people. For example, when a mine tells us that they have 20 vacancies for unskilled labour we just take the names of 20 people who would be in our database and forward their names for interviews. This is a very transparent system. We follow the list in our database, and no one jumps the queue. Some companies allow us to attend interviews as observers to ensure that there is transparency.

(Interview with Jeffrey Putu, Ikemeleng Councillor,
Ikemeleng Informal settlement, 22 July 2016)

Many residents interviewed testified that this system was working since several of them got employment through this process. Mining companies would also engage unskilled job seekers and train them for different trades and, if there were vacancies, also employ them.

However, this system was fraught with its uncertainties. For example, job seekers had no way of knowing whether the job seekers' database list was transparent

or when their turn to be interviewed for a job would arrive. Some research participants indicated that some job seekers paid members of the Unemployment Forum money to ‘jump the queue’ and reduce the waiting period. Connie, a single mother and hair salon operator who has been living in the settlement for ten years, stated that councilors and members of the unemployment committee solicit ‘money for drinks’ from job seekers so that they quickly get jobs ahead of those who would be unable to pay (Interview with Connie, Ikemeleng Informal settlement, 22 July 2016). Thus, despite a dominant discourse of cohesion, a close analysis of the everyday dynamics of access to opportunities and services in the informal settlements reveals complex tensions and internal contradictions, apparently between the locals and migrant workers. While mining companies prefer to recruit labour based on their skills and experience, national laws pressure them to consider South African citizens first. In addition, mining companies are expected to employ local labour, especially for casual labour and provide them with skills training. Jobseekers, however, often devise strategies to use personal networks, ethnicity, nepotism, and bribery to get access to jobs. Thus, although the hierarchy of labour that placed South Africans at the top is often disrupted by migrant jobseekers’ use of myriad strategies to access jobs, such as social networks and bribes.

To keep jobseekers and the community at large happy, the councillor and the Unemployment Forum constantly requested the mining companies to give them preferential treatment when recruiting labour. The councillor and his committee would constantly engage mine management requesting them to recruit workers from Ikemeleng arguing that they live close to the mining operations. As he put it,

Usually, when I hear a rumour about job vacancies at any of the surrounding mining companies, I call the human resources manager of the particular mine and request him to consider people from my community. I spend most of my time at the mines talking to the mine management and asking them to do something to support the community. If they fail to do anything we engage in community protests against them. We just close all the roads leading to the mines to express our anger at the mines’ reluctance to employ them. The policy is that the mines should recruit first from within a 50 km radius but they keep on recruiting people from very far away. One of the managers even tried to bribe me when I kept complaining about the mining company’s reluctance to recruit local labour. It is a big challenge being a councillor here because people can also suspect you of being corrupt.

(Interview with Jeffery Putu, Ward 34 Councillor,
Ikemeleng, 10 July 15)

For their part, mining companies claimed that they recognized these settlements as ‘local communities’ but they could not employ everybody. Furthermore, some of the so-called locals were foreign undocumented migrants with either expired work permits or without official documents. The locals, especially the Tswana, were also viewed by mining companies as people who were reluctant to work underground, preferring office work on the surface.

Community Leadership Structures in Informal Migrant Settlements and Politics

One feature that characterizes settlements of the urban margins is the emergence of community leadership structures that may or may not be related to formal local government structures. Community leadership structures are often organic and are shaped by the needs of the members of the community. Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014, 1815) argue that “community leaders seek legitimation from the bottom (their constituencies), to get an informal mandate from them – or ‘consent’ – as a condition of political legitimacy.” Community leaders establish personal relationships with their constituencies and try to assume the position of a bridge between the community’s residents and the outside political powers. Thus, “community leaders also seek legitimation from the top, from the state, party or other institutions” which give them legitimacy in their communities (Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014, 1815)). Despite this, in informal settlements, some leaders emerge not through elections but through leading social movements and community protests, resulting in them assuming leadership roles (Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014, 1815)). Therefore, there is no neat distinction between leaders of informal grassroots structures and leaders of local government structures such as councillors. However, as informal settlements are always in the process of transformation, it is essential to understand how their grassroots leadership structures are established and how they relate to formal local government structures, as this invariably affects how communities engage with the local state and mining companies.

Like political leaders, community leaders sometimes establish clientelist relations between themselves and the people they lead. Such patronage relationships are sustained by leaders’ abilities to distribute resources such as food, money, alcohol, and loan facilities. More significantly for informal settlements around Rustenburg, the community leaders are expected to help residents secure jobs at the surrounding platinum and chrome mines. Community leaders, therefore, also operate as brokers who assist members of their communities in securing jobs whilst at the same time benefitting from the relationship through bribes, they solicit from the jobseekers which are colloquially referred to as “money for drinks.” Thus, as conduits between residents and the state, community leaders also manipulate their positions and exploit community members.

Although there was a difference between leaders of social movements and leaders of local government structures, these roles intersected. In addition, some leaders of social movements end up being elected ward councillors. This was because whilst being a member of a grassroots structure was voluntary work, being a ward councillor came with perks including a monthly allowance. For instance, the councillor of Ikemeleng (Ward 35) started as a leader of a social movement fighting for informal settlements’ access to services and jobs. As will be discussed in greater detail below, through constant engagement with the mines and the Rustenburg Local Municipality, as well as community protests against the former, the councillor was able to reach an agreement that would allow him to forward names of jobseekers from the community to mining companies operating in the area each time

they had job vacancies. Thus, although he was an elected political leader, the councillor also assumed the position of a social movement leader. The councillor could lobby the mining companies to recruit jobseekers from his ward. This also included regional especially those that allowed them to work. For instance, from 2010, the South African government issued thousands of undocumented Zimbabweans special permits (visas) that allowed them to stay in the country and work that they regularly renewed (see Nyakabawu 2021). Against this background, the councillor could assist migrants in this category to get jobs if they lived in the settlement.

The blurring of the roles of community leaders, social movement leaders, and political leaders in informal settlements also creates tensions among these different figures. For example, in Ikemeleng the councillor and his ward committee accused the CPF of being corrupt and of trying to establish an alternative centre of power in the community. Furthermore, the fact that after 2013 the CPF in Ikemeleng became dominated by members of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters party (EFF) set the CPF on a collision course with the African National Congress (ANC) councillor and his committee. On the one hand, the councillor and his ward committee would accuse the CPF of being corrupt and taking bribes from criminals. On the other, the CPF would also accuse the councillor and his committee of taking bribes from job seekers and of selling stands for *shacks* (*mikhukhu*) in the informal settlement, as well as forcing people operating businesses in the community to regularly “donate” to the community through the councillor. The positions of community leaders and political leaders in informal communities are never guaranteed – leaders could quickly be deposed on accusations of corruption or any other crime. This shows the uncertainties surrounding community leadership in informal settlements and the contexts in which leaders of grassroots structures sometimes clash with those of local government structures. As former leaders of social movements themselves, councillors often worry about the popularity of social movement leaders, which they can tap into if they decide to contest in the local government elections.

Place-Making in Informal Settlements

Urban place-making is a multifaceted process that often reveals the agency of residents. One way residents of these settlements engage in place-making is by naming their settlements, often motivated by nostalgic memories. Several informal settlements have emotive names that describe the history of the settlement, ethnic identities, connectedness, and the violent nature of the community or celebrate the community’s settlement on that land. Names of informal settlements such as Nkaneng (Xhosa for ‘taking by force’), Sondela (isiXhosa for ‘come closer’ or ‘let’s gather’), Freedom Park (referring to the 1994 attainment of democracy), and Ikemeleng (Setswana for “stand up for oneself”) among others reflect the respective community’s struggles and aspirations. As Nkomo puts it, ‘these are names that suggest a lot about how the residents view their position on that space vis-à-vis other claimants, how they established themselves and so on’ (Nkomo 2018, 4). Names reveal so much about how certain informal settlements were established,

the ethnic composition of the settlements as well as the everyday struggles of the residents. Residents tend to use their vernacular languages in naming these settlements which points to both the origin and ethnicity of the members of the settlement.

However, it is not only through naming that residents of these settlements inscribe themselves. They also do so through constructing their homes, tuck shops, and *spaza* shops, as well as vending carrying out traditional ceremonies. Residents engage in several economic and social activities, which make these settlements vibrant. Ikemeleng has many tuck shops (selling groceries), taverns (selling liquor), and *spaza* shops (small shops bigger than tuck shops selling various groceries) which are very important forms of livelihood for its residents. As a result of widespread South-South Migration since the minerals revolution, the informal settlements have become a regional melting pot. The names that regional migrants give to their taverns, tuck shops, and *spaza* shops often reveal their places of origin, ethnic groups, and languages. This makes it easy to identify the ethnic identity or place of origin of the owner from the names of the shop and even the music they play. In addition, barbershops, salons, and churches create spaces where residents engage in different social and economic activities. This resonates with Mususa's observation that there is a need to think of mining areas not as places of resource extraction but also as places where residents engage with the everyday realities of losing jobs and trying to earn a livelihood (Mususa 2012, 572). Informal settlements around Rustenburg can thus be viewed as places not merely conditioned by the rhythms of platinum mining but are settlements with particular affordances for labour migrants, job seekers, and people seeking different kinds of livelihoods. The residents can construct a sense of belonging, stake claims, and demand access to jobs and social amenities.

Conclusion

Since South Africa's minerals revolution in the late 19th century, mining has continued to generate South-South Migrations in the Southern African region. Whilst the compound system was the centre of interaction for labour migrants at gold and diamond mines during the apartheid period, informal settlements grew in significance in the post-apartheid period. The platinum mining boom in the early 2000s and the phasing out of apartheid-era spatial controls in the late 1980s and the post-apartheid period engendered labour migrations that drew migrants from as far afield as Ethiopia and Eritrea together with neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia to the rapidly expanding Rustenburg Town. Rustenburg became the epicentre of platinum mining operations in the North West province, earning itself the Platinum City moniker. The platinum mining boom, thus, saw an attendant increase in the number and size of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations where both local and regional migrants coalesced. This chapter has demonstrated the entanglement between platinum mining and South-South Migrations in the sub-region. This is most evident in the development and growth of informal settlements on the margins of

mining operations. Migrants inscribed themselves onto the informal settlements by naming the settlements and establishing networks based on ethnicity, hometowns, language, and citizenship. The chapter also highlighted how social differentiation and discourses of exclusion are often part and parcel of the everyday experiences of residents of the informal settlements in their struggles for recognition, services, and preferential access to mining jobs. The sense of collective identity based on residency in the same settlement is often broken by tensions over belonging and access to employment and other livelihoods. In addition, residents of informal settlements continue to maintain strong networks based on kinship, friendship, and other connections beyond the workplace and the informal settlements. Although these informal settlements emerged because of platinum mining and are affected by it in various ways, local peculiarities have shaped the myriad ways residents of these communities organize themselves and articulate a sense of belonging within the informal settlements. Yet the most enduring image of the informal settlements is that of communities composed of local and regional migrants of diverse ethnic identities, whose everyday lives are framed by their desire to get access to mining jobs and other forms of livelihoods as well as the myriad strategies they use to inscribe themselves onto the settlements and to construct a sense of belonging.

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3 Unpacking the Reasons for Dominance of South-South Migration

The Ethiopian Case

Fana Gebresenbet

Introduction

It is not uncommon to read the three routes international irregular migrants from Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa, take: the Eastern, the Southern, and the Northern. The Eastern route takes migrants from various corners of the country – primarily originating from central and eastern parts of Tigray (before the onset of the war in Northern Ethiopia in November 2020), northeastern parts of Amhara region, and more recently from parts of Oromia – to crossing points to Somali territories (the Issa in Djibouti, the Isaaq in Somaliland, and also Puntland) before crossing to the Gulf countries through Yemen. The Southern route takes Ethiopians, primarily from Hadiya and Kambatta Zones of southern highlands, through Moyale to Kenya heading towards South Africa. The Northern route is taken by migrants – with no specific core sending area – intending to reach Israel or Western Europe by passing through Sudan (see Asnake & Fana 2021; Fasil 2017; Meron 2020).

Broadly speaking, the Eastern and Southern routes have destinations in the Global South, Gulf states, and South Africa, respectively, thus constituting cases of South-South Migration (SSM), while the Northern route is a form of South-North Migration (SNM). As such, Ethiopian international irregular migration is very helpful to examine the intrinsic differences between SSM and SNM, and explain the reasons for the more pervasive nature of SSM. IOM figures from 2020 (cited in ACAPS 2021) for example indicate that some 11,500 individuals cross from the Horn to the Gulf irregularly every month, making up close to two-thirds of mobility in the Horn region (IOM 14/02/2020; IOM 05/05/2020). More specifically, according to Africa Renewal (2020 cited in ACAPS 2021), some 400,000 Ethiopians took the eastern route between 2017 and 2020 alone. IOM (2022) figures from 2021 estimate that about 10,243 Ethiopians cross Moyale annually aiming to reach South Africa. Even fewer Ethiopian migrants take the northern route. The northern route is used “only in rare cases,” and the total number of irregular migrants reaching Europe from the Horn decreased to less than 4,000 in 2018 (a quarter of the figures from 2016) due to various risks and restrictions (Girmachew 2021).

This chapter – by focusing on history and geographic proximity, capability requirements, geographic barriers, cultural enablers, and host societies’ socio-economic and legal arrangements – illustrates why SSM evolves into the

concentration of migrants in some localities and the eventual formation of ‘migration system’ (Bakewell, de Haas & Kubal 2011; de Haas 2009). The intention therefore is to depict the major structural explanations for the relatively lower extent of SNM, compared to SSM, at global levels too (Ratha 2016, 11).

This argument is made by using the aspiration-capability approach as an analytical framework (de Haas 2021). All individuals are considered agents, conscious actors weighing among viable options before making the decision to migrate (or not) within the constraints and opportunities of the extant structural conditions. As such, structural macro-level factors only provide the context within which agency is enacted, not replacing the latter (on structuration see Giddens 1984; Stones 2005). A focus on structural, macro-level factors alone will not in and by itself sufficiently explain the differentiated decision of prospective migrants to reach different destinations, in our case southern destinations being preferred more than northern destinations.

While aspiring is a necessary initial step for irregular migration, it is not sufficient. It needs to be backed up with the capability to realize the aspiration. Capability could come in the form of having the physical capacity to brave the harsh routes, the skills, and predisposition to succeed in the jobs migrants will be joining in the destination country, the financial means to cover required expenses as well as the social relations to access information as well as to enable migration and settlement in the destination country.

In more recent years, international migration is conceived as one strategy of many young Ethiopians charting a decent future (see for example Fana 2021). Drawing on Appadurai (2013), future-making is depicted in the chapter as a socio-cultural process¹ within which individuals draw on past experiences/archives of the community and what they are ‘taught’ to imagine and aspire in choosing the track one would adopt towards the future. This chapter will argue that SSM is more likely to emerge as a very strong alternative to a ‘viable future’ in core sending areas.

This view of migration as a communal, collective, and shared future-making project of youth (and the community at large) in core sending areas calls for the utilization of a revised Aspiration Capability Framework. The theoretical roots of the ACF, particularly as it relates to capability and rights, are anchored in the liberal, individualist academic tradition (see Dean 2009; Ibrahim 2021). Such conceptions do not fully capture African realities which are primarily entrenched in collectivist notions, norms, and values (see Kuhumba 2016; Metz 2016), and as argued elsewhere (Dereje, Meron & Fana 2023), there is a need to re-conceptualize and apply the ACF with a ‘collectivist turn’.

This chapter is based on extensive research the author conducted on Ethiopian migration since early 2017.² The remaining part of this chapter is structured in seven sections. The first offers a brief context on Ethiopian international migration. The coming five sections provide the different factors explaining the entrenched and concentrated nature of SSM in Ethiopia. The second section covers historical factors which underlie the entrenched nature of SSM in Ethiopia. The third section further builds on the first and illustrates how different processes help in the building of capabilities of individuals, households, and sending communities to enable

sustained migration. The fourth section compares geographic barriers between the three routes international migrants from Ethiopia take. The following section focuses on culture, in its very broad definition, as an enabler and constraint of migration to different destinations. The sixth section changes the focus to the destination country and the implications of socio-economic and legal conditions for migration dynamics. The last section concludes the chapter.

Core Sending Areas for SSM: History Matters

Core sending areas are defined, for the purpose of this chapter, as localities with more than a decade-long experience of migration to a particular destination. Characteristically, this experience of core sending areas builds a large presence of migrants from the locality in the destination country, social networks between those in the destination, the origin area, and in transit, and a significant impact on consumption and other aspects of socio-economic life of the sending community. The presence of such a core sending area, it is argued here, is realized through historical dynamics, and will provide the momentum for continued large-scale migration.

The past weighs heavily on the migration decision-making of potential migrants. The decisions and success of previous migrants help build aspirations of prospective migrants among other things through remittance-based consumption and investment in the sending areas, as well as by creating networks that ease migrations of followers. In Ethiopia's case (as well as most of Sub-Saharan Africa), historic relationships with some important destinations have cultural, religious, socio-economic, and political undercurrents, and are generally speaking geographically closer to the sending areas.

The political economy of Gulf countries experienced major changes in the 1970s with the increasing revenue from fossil fuels. This led to the creation and consolidation of a social pact in which the government's guaranteed cheap domestic labour, among others through the Kafalla labour system (see Asnake & Zerihun 2015; Wearing 2014) in return for public acquiescence to the monarchy and authoritarian governments of the region. The neoliberal shift since the late 1980s had differentiated impacts on gendered labour arrangements in the Middle East and Northern Africa (see Moghadam 2005), but did not significantly affect the gendered nature of major destination areas, particularly Saudi Arabia, of female labour force from Ethiopia, let alone in the domestic sphere (see Ennis 2019, 62; Jawhar et al. 2022). This system continued unabated until the demands for reform grew louder including demands for Saudization of the labour force in Saudi Arabia (Looney 2004), and more particularly since the early 2010s when the 'Arab Spring' movement shocked things a bit more (Wearing 2014).

By the 1980s, the migration of pioneers from eastern parts of Tigray (and possibly northeastern Amhara) appears to have started (Kiros 2021, 225). This period was a time of consecutive failure of rains leading to famine and famine-like conditions particularly affecting this part of the country (Kiros 2021). On top of this, the late 1970s also witnessed political violence by the Derg regime in response to urban-based youth political movements in the late 1970s and later on the activities

of the anti-Derg Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray's rural areas. As such, there was a significant socio-economic and political push for early migration. This desire was also enabled by the relatively smaller distance to reach the coastlines of the Red Sea in Eritrea from parts of eastern Tigray and northern Wollo. As such, the very start of the Eastern route was informal, and was an attempt to cope with challenges in the home area by tapping into the emerging opportunity structures in the destination countries.

This is also the case with the Southern route. The earliest Ethiopian migrants reached South Africa as the latter was transitioning out of the Apartheid system of governance. At the time, Black South Africans did not have the entrepreneurial and business skills (see Republic of South Africa 1994), while their consumption increased following the commencement of cash assistance programme to a wide range of social groups – war veterans, child support, disability support, and care dependency grant – created regular financial support to poor households by the South African state (James 2015; Torkelson 2020).³ On top of this, in the 1990s, South Africa had a very liberal asylum policy which made it easier for migrants to get asylum permits and over time residence papers. Moreover, many migrants also benefitted from the sympathies of South African women⁴ who had positive views towards Ethiopia and Ethiopians thanks to their support to ANC during the liberation struggle (e.g., the military training offered to Nelson Mandela just before his imprisonment, and the active memory of the images of poor famine-stricken Ethiopians from about a decade ago at the time).⁵ The following quote from an FGD (Hossanna, August 2021) illustrates this point very well:

Our migration to South Africa was a miracle. Most of us even did not know Hosanna, let alone South Africa. We went to South Africa crossing 7 countries. We started making a lot of money by selling to South African women. We did that without knowing their language nor English. While South Africans lived in marvelous houses, we would enter with our dirt and mud and tap our shoes on their carpets. They were very friendly, especially the women. They like the goods that we bring them. We used to put signs so that we would not lose direction. The first Hadiya who started the location business was Shikuto. He would simply say “Sawabona” (greeting) and “collect money” (I came to collect the money). He didn't speak any of the languages of South Africa. He would simply say “Sawabona” (Zulu word for greeting) and “collect money”. That was all he could to say and we followed suit—Sawabona and collect money. We managed to do business only with these two words. If this is not a miracle, what else? Our main partners are South African women. The men who get money from the government use it for alcohol.

As such, when Ethiopians reached the destination areas they were received by an opportune combination of factors – a more favourable asylum system and cash transfer schemes which created purchasing power and liberalized asylum policies which enabled ease of movement and work.

The Hadiya (and Kambatta) dominated the cohort of Ethiopian migrants since the 1990s due to a range of factors. The strong political opposition against the then ruling party the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Hadiya, unlike other parts of the country, was met with repression and political violence (Tronvoll 2001), justifying the intention of some to migrate. In response, some decided to migrate. Later in the early 2000s, the assignment of Tesfaye Habisso, native to the Hadiya-Kambatta area, as Ethiopia's Ambassador to South Africa and a prophecy by Pastor Peter Youngren, a Canadian Christian evangelist, gave the additional impulse to the migration. It is reported that Ambassador Tesfaye facilitated the migration of a few individuals, while it is also likely that his very presence in Pretoria gave prospective migrants from Hadiya and Kambatta an additional moral boost. The prophecy has it that God spoke to Pastor Youngren and the message was that a 'new door to the South' will be opened to those from Hadiya. Many remember him as saying "I saw a vision of God opening a Southern route for the Hadiya through which people will go and bring back prosperity to Hosanna" at the festival held in 2001. This door is blessed, and through the fortunes gathered through it Hosanna, the capital of Hadiya administrative zone, will be filled with buildings and vehicles (various interviews, see also Dereje 2022 and in this volume). The place of belief and the prophecy in migration decision-making can be illustrated in the following quote from an informant who came from Johannesburg for a family visit to Hosanna:

Peter's prophecy made the journey a lot easier than one would have expected. I migrated to South Africa in 2004, three years after Peter came. I was a student at that time. I talked to my friends about the idea of going to South Africa. They all readily agreed. When we decided to travel it felt as if we were already in South Africa. I remember the enthusiasm and the confidence we had. We never thought of the risks we might encounter during the journey and the language difficulties we might encounter. In fact, it felt like as if we were moving from one house to another within Hadiya.

(Pastor Birhanu, interviewed in Hosanna, November 12, 2020)

In both the eastern and southern routes, Ethiopians of particular localities were pushed by particular factors from their home areas, while they were received by an opportune mix of conditions that allowed them to flourish and enabled further migration of followers in the coming years. In both cases, the pioneer migrants – the earliest migrants who took the risk and developed the linkages between areas of origin and the destination country, thereby facilitating higher rates of migration in later years (Bakewell, de Haas & Kubal 2011) – benefitted from particular historical conjectures to settle and form a community in the destination areas. As will be discussed below, the sectors they joined in the destination countries enabled them to facilitate jobs to follower migrants as well.

The historical factors underpinning Ethiopian migration to the northern destination countries are very different from those detailed above. The earliest migrants travelled to Europe and North America as students during the imperial times and

overstayed following the 1974 revolution and ensuing violence. They were later joined by young men and women who were fleeing terror campaigns of the military government. This later group would first become refugees in immediate neighbouring countries before benefiting from resettlement programs to northern countries (Lyons 2007). The composition of new migrants changed after the 1991 regime change, as those favouring ethno-linguistic political organization had their heydays and those anchoring their politics on pan-Ethiopian nationalism were marginalized. The leaders were persecuted, with some finding their refuge in northern countries. Graduate study-related migration of those with university degrees increased too. As such, economic reasons are the primary factors for about a third of migrants taking the northern route (compared to more than 90% in the eastern and southern routes), while education (15%), family reunification (11%), and security/political factors (9%) together make a comparable justification for those taking the northern route (Kuschminder, Andersson & Siegel 2012).

What we therefore see is the ‘dispersed origin’ of the earliest as well as more recent migrants taking the northern route. On top of this, the nature of the economies and stronger state regulatory powers in northern destination countries (see Section “Socio-Economic Situation and Legal Arrangements of the Destination Country”) narrow down the possibilities of excessively benefiting from some informal economic engagements and creating the social networks to continue attracting new migrants to join the sector.

Therefore, what we see is SSM from Ethiopia being constituted by and evolving under particular historical factors which favour the concentration of migrants from particular parts of the country. On the other side, SNM attracted those with diverse backgrounds but with some academic achievements and those facing political persecution. There is no legitimate reason to argue that the later conditions of educational achievement and political persecution lead to the concentration of migrants from particular areas. As such, there is no core sending area for SNM from Ethiopia, and as such there are limited capabilities coming with that when it comes to enabling further migration, which the next section focuses on.

Building the Capability to Migrate

Historical trends and the creation of core sending areas in the case of SSM help consolidate the aspiration to migrate. This does not automatically translate into continued migration of people unless combined with a commensurate increase in the capability to do so. Two factors are important to explain the relatively higher flows of people using the eastern and southern route (thus SSM), than the northern (SNM): the relative cost and the relevance of social networks.

At least in the SSM routes for irregular migration from Ethiopia, the destinations are much closer to the sending areas than destinations in the Global North. On top of this, the border regulatory capacities of Southern destinations are relatively weaker than those of Northern destinations. While this comes with the possibility of evading border regulatory authorities⁶ or bribing one’s way into a Southern destination at a relatively cheaper rate, there is the accompanying higher risk of

inhumane treatment and human rights violations if captured by border authorities of the Southern destinations.

Northern countries use various attempts to control migration, ranging from using economic incentives to keep young potential migrants in their home country to externalization of their border regimes (Clemens & Postel 2018; Saferworld 2019). Stricter border regimes and control mechanisms will mainly push the cost of migration as well as the associated risks upwards. While such policies are generally shown to fail in terms of meeting the targets of stemming migratory flows (Castles 2004), what is clear is that the possibilities of migration increasingly become limited to high-capability groups. Thus, such policies further entrench how inequality shapes migration processes, by further reducing the abilities of the powerless to realize their migration ambitions.

High capability in this case could mean individuals with higher ‘budget allocations’ trying to realize their migration project or individuals who are more likely to secure a visa (be it as a student, family visit, or re-union). Both of these capabilities could be better met in more urban areas than rural areas, and are less likely to be concentrated in particular localities. This form of migration is therefore more appealing to potential migrants of a certain social standing, be it literacy and/or wealth status, than a place of residence. Moreover, if a prior migrant is going to sponsor anyone, the choice will not be necessarily geographically focused (i.e., friendship, family,...), but rather focus more on the competencies mentioned above.

On the contrary, the eastern and southern routes are relatively cheaper. The eastern route is the cheapest, as low as 795 USD, leading to the labeling of this route as a ‘budget route’ by some (IOM 2021). The southern route, which could cost as much as 5,000 USD, is more expensive than the eastern route.⁷ However, this cost is not prohibitively high as the likelihood of getting one’s migration expenses covered by a sibling/relative is higher among the Hadiya. Moreover, the likelihood of reimbursing this money is made easier by an arrangement, which could be dubbed ‘indentured labour’ for about two years (Meron 2020).

Under this arrangement, a prior migrant will open and stock a new Tuck Shop to the sponsored migrant, with the latter being expected to fully give all revenue to the sponsor for a period of two years or so until the full expenses of the migration are repaid. On top of this, the expected differential in pay of about 1,300 USD per month (IOM 2021) justifies the higher cost of the southern route. This arrangement – called Boss-Border relationship by migrants – enables earlier migrants (Bosses) to sponsor new migrants who will hold the Border position when the Boss opens a new Tuck Shop. As such, chain migration and business expansion of bosses continue to further consolidate the SSM to South Africa.

On the northern route, costs to migrate from Ethiopia to Europe or North America are much higher than the southern route. Unlike the eastern and southern routes where employment is the most important reason for migrating (more than 90%), education, security/political considerations, and family reunion are important reasons as employment in the northern route. As such, the means of financing migration also differs with gifts from family/friends being the main one to more than half of respondents taking the northern route (about a third in the other routes),

and selling assets (0.64% compared to about 5% in the other routes) and savings (8.28% compared to 20.59% and 12.45% in southern and eastern routes, accordingly) making negligible contribution (Kuschminder, Andersson & Siegel 2012). Moreover, if one wants to sponsor a migrant, there is no clear mechanism to arrange for the migrant to join a certain economic sector, and then repay the loan. Therefore, there are severely limited possibilities of creating a core sending area.

The consequences of the above-listed two factors work towards the entrenchment of the ‘culture of migration’ (see Fana 2021; Meron 2020) in relatively confined localities, particularly in rural areas in the case of SSM and within families in cases of SNM. This will have the immediate consequence of the concentration of financial remittances and related increased consumption and a degree of higher material development (primarily in the housing sector) in core sending areas in SSM and particular households in SNM. The impact of migration and remittances on consumption could be felt in Hosanna, where migrant families do not engage in any bargaining for the items they buy, unlike other families. This has created a new class of consumers, dubbed *Yehune* (‘Let it be’) by traders. This market behaviour is pushing the prices of daily consumables above neighbouring towns outside Hadiya, to the disadvantage of non-migrant households who invested in education and joined the civil service early on. Migrants have also increased land market dynamics and prices, as well as promoting a local-level housing construction boom. The latter is also visible in Atsbi Endasselassie and Wukro towns of Tigray, but more impressively in Hosanna and Bonosha towns of Hadiya.

In Hadiya, returnees often get surprised by the ease their families spend money, while the family that stayed behind calls the returnee ‘*Kuralew*’,⁸ and there is a distinction between ‘ye-lake’ and ‘ya-lake’ families (migrant and non-migrant families). The former profusely consume and buy without bargaining (the ‘*yehune*’ (Let it be)), while the latter bargain. As one returnee surmised:

When I first visited Hosanna upon return from South Africa, I was shocked when I heard the price that I was hearing from the shops. Nearly all goods are much more expensive in Hosanna than in Addis. When I asked people why is it that goods are very expensive in Hosanna, they told me about the *yihunes*. The hard-won money that we sent to support families is wasted here as if we dig money; thus endless. I also realised that shopkeepers, especially those who come outside of Hadiya, take advantage of this irresponsible consumption. If you haggle over a price they would say, ‘are you a *mengist serategnal* civil servant?’, as if being a civil servant is something that one has to be ashamed of. Implicitly they are referring to the difference between migrant and non-migrant families and their different spending behavior.

(Informant: returnee migrant, Male, Hosanna, 12 August 2022)

Although not comparable to the Hadiya, returnees from Saudi Arabia are recognized for higher consumption too. There was a locality in Atsbi Wenberta called ‘Riyadh neighbourhood’ (implying that the owners are those in the Gulf or with families there), and returnees were criticized for a higher degree of consumption,

including travel to nearby towns for entertainment. One returnee explained in the following words:

In Saudi, buying coca and juice (soda and beverages) is trivial. Here you have to think twice before buying a bottle of coca, leave alone packed juice. We are sitting on dirt floors here, and we always think of the day we will re-migrate to Saudi. The case is the same with buying clothes, modern mobile phone apparatus and the like. What is life if you cannot buy what you want, and enjoy it while you can!

(Informant: Returnee Migrant, Female, Alamata, 23 January 2017)

Moreover, migration-related discussions – on progress and fate of recently departed migrants, work conditions of those already in the destination country, remittances made and other socio-economic life of migrants – will be a routine part of community discussions at local levels in core sending areas (Teferi 2021). Such discussions will also have a significant bearing on the choices by placing migration among the important paths to a decent future. As such, migration strongly features among the leading viable alternatives to a future in such localities than others. This will create a cyclical process that reinforces the ‘culture of migration’ and adds further impetus to the drive.

Geographic Barriers

Migration – particularly irregular migration – is a risky endeavour. The risks involved in migration have increased in recent decades as destination countries, especially in the Global North, started implementing stricter border and immigration policies. In northern destination countries of Europe and North America, regressive populist political positions started gaining traction since the mid-2000s (Lazaridis & Wadia 2015). This has led to policy options that attempt to close borders off to irregular migrants and reduce the chances of legal migration, thereby intending to contain migrants in their origin areas including by economic incentives (Duffield 2007). The refugee crisis following the war in Yemen and Syria, and the dissolution of Libya further exacerbated public opinion and policy positions in Europe. Moreover, Europe attempted to export its border management to outside its territorial limits by cooperating with North African countries (Adamson & Tsourapas 2019; Norman & Micinski 2022). Stricter control over the Mediterranean Sea, which is crossed by African migrants into mainland Europe, had its share of adding manmade barriers to aspiring migrants.

These political and policy-generated barriers came into effect only after the migrant reaches closer to the coastlines. Further south to the coastlines of the Mediterranean migrants from Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in general would have to pass through the Sahara Desert. The Sahara Desert with its natural and human-made risks, even with the services of skilled facilitators of migration, ends up being the burial ground of many migrants (Reitano & Tinti 2015). The natural

challenges arising out of extreme desiccation are further intensified by the insecurity and rebel and criminal activities in parts of north-western Sudan, eastern Chad, and Libya. All these interacting natural and manmade risks necessitate the services of smugglers/facilitators, which do not come cheap. With increased fees, the number of Ethiopian migrants taking this route will be (relative to the eastern and southern routes) be lower (Ibid.).

It is imperative to compare the risks involved in the northern route with that of SSM. In the eastern route, the risks involved cover shorter distances involved in crossing Somalia's or Djibouti's deserts, and then crossing a narrow strip of the Red Sea. There is the additional risk brought by the war in Yemen in the past few years, while the breakdown of order also allowed greater room for traffickers to manoeuvre (Wilson-Smith 2019). The southern route is riskier, among others, as it involves crossing longer distances traversing at least four countries (but higher if a migrant passes through Zambia and Zimbabwe) or long trips (often from near Mombasa to the southern coasts of Mozambique) on shaky boats on the Indian Ocean for days.

The above discussion aimed to illustrate the different geographic barriers migrants face in the three routes. Stiffer geographic barriers – including both natural and political/manmade – will necessitate the role of situated brokers/facilitators whose service fees increase with the increase in the level of risks. For the majority of potential migrants, the risks involved in the eastern and southern routes are more tolerable and somehow manageable. Although the rewards are perceived to be higher in northern destinations, the lack of capabilities to migrate legally or the much higher risks of engaging in irregular migration reduces the number of migrants braving this route.

Cultural En/Dis-ables

Culture – in the broader sense, including religion – affects migration in general, and SSM in particular.⁹ An illustrative example here is the Hadiya term for explaining migration to South Africa as *Darifirma*, which takes male seasonal labour migration as a rite of passage among the Hadiya. According to Dereje, Hagen-Zanker and Mazzilli (forthcoming):

For Hadiya, migration has now become part of the natural order of things, in which both long-standing cultural norms of society and new trends converge. Concerning cultural norms, Hadiya perceive migration to South Africa as one – perhaps the ultimate – expression of *darifirma*. While the literal meaning of this word is 'to stroll', *darifirma* commonly symbolises the physical mobility that Hadiya have experienced and enjoyed since the beginning of time. As Dereje (2022) points out, in this context migration is not only seen as such, but also as an expression of the human disposition to move, thus perfectly natural (p. 37). The egalitarian but competitive nature of the Hadiya society, together with the guiding principles of *darifirma*, provided a fertile cultural ground where the migration trend could grow strong.

While this might be a reflection of the pastoral undercurrents in Hadiya culture, more recent episodes of labour migration to the sugar estates, Dire Dawa and Assab created the immediate impetus to keep migration as a commonsensical option to a future (Dereje 2022). As such, even the earliest Hadiya migrants were not discouraged from their decisions, but South Africa was in essence only a newer edition of an old phenomenon. The culture of migration in Hadiya zone partly relates to the long tradition of internal migration and mobility such as the cultural practice in the area known as Darebacha; a seasonal migration of people and their cattle at times of environmental crisis. The strong culture of migration in the area can be further referred from the 1960s to 1970s labour migration to work in sugar factories in Eastern Ethiopia, specifically in Metehara and Wenji; the resettlement of the local population to some parts of the country related to the growing population pressure and scarcity of farmland have all contributed to the ingrained culture of migration in the area.

In the eastern route, religion and religious pilgrimage created the conditions for the very first migrants to justify and enable their migration (Meron 2019). Haji travels to Saudi Arabia since much earlier periods created the context for migrants to make the trips (Kiya 2021). Although this is much easier in the case of predominantly Muslim sending areas, the relative ease of learning Islamic rituals in parts of North-East Amhara meant that the door was not closed for Christians (Ibid.). Without this religious affinity, the migration from these parts of the Amhara region (and possibly Tigray) could have been more constrained from maturing.

Religion plays an important role in the southern route too, though in a different manner. A prophecy by Pastor Peter Youngren is crucial in the buildup and consolidation of the aspiration to migrate to South Africa. Combined with the stronghold of Protestantism in Hadiya, his prophecy provided a divine justification to the intentions of potential migrants and enabled them to persist through the risks they faced *en route*.

For the northern route, there are no cultural enablers to fast-track large-scale international migration. The earliest migrants were students and politically persecuted elite (students, bureaucrats, and members of the royal family after the revolution of 1974), which made large-scale migration to these destinations unrealistic. Somehow being path-dependent, we continue to see educated and individuals from relatively higher income backgrounds migrating to the north. The average years of schooling for migrants taking the northern route is higher than those taking the eastern and southern routes by nearly five and four years. When it comes to occupation, those taking up education as their mainstay in the destination country are very few in all cases: less than 4% on average, but 8.64% in the northern route, and less than 1% in the eastern (see Tables 2 in Kuschminder, Andersson & Siegel 2012). Moreover, according to the survey by Kuschminder, Andersson, and Siegel (2012) more than three-quarters of migrants in the northern route are from urban areas, with less than a quarter and about 40% for the southern and eastern routes (see Table 3). Subjective determination of household wealth status shows that some 40.25% and 6.92% of migrants in the northern route assess their household condition as living comfortably and living very comfortably. If we take these as above

average, then close to 50% of migrants in the northern route are from relatively better households compared to less than a third in the other two (see Table 3 in Kuschminder, Andersson & Siegel 2012).

In terms of concentration, therefore what we can expect at best, is the aggregation of migrants within certain families in the case of the northern route, while a geographically centred concentration is visible in the case of the eastern and southern routes.

Cultural factors seem to favour geographically closer destinations, sending communities with an established migration culture, as well as the religious affinity between sending and destination areas. This makes the concentration of migrants from certain areas more likely for the case of SSM, in Ethiopia's case, than SNM.

Socio-Economic Situation and Legal Arrangements of the Destination Country

The very presence of a large population of migrant community to the intended destination country essentially presumes the conception of the destination as having better freedoms, be it economic or socio-political, than the origin. However, not all destination countries are equally attractive to all possible migrant groups. The 'desirability' of a certain destination will be highly dependent on the socio-economic condition of the destination country as well as the law enforcement capabilities of the destination country.

The socio-economic status of a destination country determines the lines of work open for a potential migrant, often with a lower skill base and questionable legal status. The Gulf countries' political economy, while having restrictive social and political regimes for women citizens (see Shah, Al-Kazi & Husain 2018), has given them greater powers and time-freedom in the domestic sphere by availing Saudi families of cheap female labour from elsewhere. What is perceived as cheap in the destination country is attractive pay to migrant women from many parts of the developing world. Unlike the northern countries or other regions of the world with similar per capita income levels, the cultural and politico-economic factors enabled large-scale labour migration to the Middle East. A returnee in Atsbi Wenberta made the following comparison in October 2017:

The lowest paying job one gets after reaching Saudi is tending animals in the deserts, until you learn enough of the language and build relationships to make your next move. This position gets you about 5,000 Birr per month, which is the salary of an MA holder in Ethiopia. Thus, I don't regret my decision to opt for migration leaving my job in the district government office.

(Interview: returnee informant, female, 13 October 2017, Atsbi)

Domestic work is minimal in Europe and North America, while pervasive in the Middle East (as well as South America and the Caribbean, as well as Africa; see ILO 2013, 20–21). Within Europe itself there are differences in cultural predilection towards domestic labour (of particularly women), with Spain, Italy, and France

having higher rates. The extent of domestic labour is maintained low in the developed world partly due to the provision of child and elderly care, which women migrants often take up in the Middle East. In cases where the public sector provides these care services, as in the Scandinavian countries, the demand for domestic labour will even be lower (ILO 2013, 35–38).

South Africa has a different labour demand. Many Ethiopian (and other) migrants benefitted from the political changes in the mid-1990s in South Africa, which brought more disposable income to the hands of black South Africans without the prior preparation to engage them in a range of businesses. The poor development of the townships and the relative distance of the townships from major urban centres coupled with the low entrepreneurship of black South Africans created the perfect conditions for the flourishing of door-to-door business. This business requires young men who could withstand the hours of carrying commodities on one's shoulders, hands, or head, and walking tens of kilometers. Rural Hadiya men, with the laborious farming skills met this demand. Urban youth were ill-suited to this business (as well as the journey). As a returnee migrant originally from Addis Ababa explained:

The most profitable location business was trade in curtain. It was mainly done by *Hosanna lijoch* (people from Hosanna). They kept it as secret. I got to know about it because I worked with a Hadiya guy and I joined them. They called it *Kitin* business. Previously it was belt – used as a generic name for all kinds of goods delivered door to door. *Hosanna lijoch* used to take *kitin* directly from Chinese suppliers and took it to location (door-to-door selling). That is why many of us did not know about this business and how profitable it was. The profit was more than double. First, they were selling the raw *kitin* and gradually they started sewing and selling it even more expensive. They are more daring and protective of the *Kitin* business. They penetrated locations and villages which migrants from Addis would not dare.

(Interview: returnee informant, male, 18 August 2020, Hosanna)

Similarly, the government's/laws in the Middle East and South Africa also encourage (at least tolerate) the types of business the migrants tend to dominate. The Kafala system of Middle Eastern countries permits relatively abusive domestic working conditions (Kerbage-Hariri 2017). In South Africa's case, the high government earnings from the high-income earner sections of the economy essentially make the informal door-to-door and Tuck-shop businesses many Hadiya engage in as not significant enough to tax or seriously govern (Gastrow 2018). Therefore, there is no strict and timely enforcement of the laws and regulations in certain countries, which creates the conditions for problems for migrants down the line.

That moment came in early 2010s for Saudi Arabia, as an effect of the Arab Spring (De Bel-Air 2014), as it got governments on their toes initiating strategies to better address social issues, including the constructed challenge of migrants as social problems. The Saudi government took the decision to regularize the status

of some informal migrant workers, and deport close to a million, while promoting the recruitment of Saudi Arabian nationals in the labour force (De Bel-Air 2014). The consequence was the mass deportation of more than 160,000 undocumented Ethiopian migrants, under abusive and inhumane conditions from Saudi Arabia (de Regt & Medareshaw 2016). The deportations were not followed by stricter control of the borders and/or the trafficking networks, leading to a comparably aggressive deportation as of the late 2010s again. Since 2017, more than half a million Ethiopians were deported from Saudi Arabia often making daily news in Ethiopia of the arrival of hundreds of deported citizens (Girmachew 2022). In South Africa, the actions to delayed/absent state regulation do not emanate from public actors. These are distressed young black South Africans taking their frustrations on migrant bodies and businesses. Such violence and xenophobic attacks started becoming more common since the late 2000s in different South African cities, which also led to more restrictive conditions for migrants already in South Africa. The cycles of deportation from Saudi Arabia for about a decade now and repeated xenophobic attacks in South Africa indicate the difficulties of sealing borders to keep irregular migrants out, and also failures to have more creative policies to handle the social issues underpinning these actions.

On the other hand, northern countries have stronger border regulation powers and enforcement capacities to significantly reduce the number of migrants reaching their territory, not stop it. Even after entry, the scope of making economic returns on the migration is limited until asylum cases are finalized, as the economy is largely regulated. As such, northern countries have better chances of reducing the scale of migration and the economic success of the average migrant, especially unskilled/semi-skilled ones.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that there are inherent differences in the nature of South-South and South-North irregular migration from Ethiopia. The historical roots of the current migration trends in the case of SSM created the fertile conditions for the creation of core sending areas, as the push factors were specifically shared to particular localities. On the other hand, the historical factors undergirding SNM created conditions for a more individualized/family level migration dynamic. These historical factors have differing implications for capability-building. In the case of SSM, aspirations and capabilities are shared at community level, with a shared repertoire and network to enable information flow and provision of support by former migrants. On the contrary, the SNM dynamics again are limited to potential migrants with higher capabilities (material, education, etc.), and are more individualized. A dialectic and iterative process of migration over decades has led to the building of a 'culture of migration' in core sending areas to southern destinations. In such areas, irregular migration is a commonsensical aspect of planning about the future of the youth. This future-making project, and the conception of irregular migration to a southern destination as one of few viable options, is collective. As such, in cases of SSM from Ethiopia the aspiration and capability are collective.

Moreover, the comparatively lower risk involved in the eastern and southern routes justify the preference of many migrants along these routes. On top of this, once in the destination country a migrant will receive different supports from prior migrants to start their informal engagement in the economy, partly taking advantage of the lower state capacity of the destination countries.

The collective aspiration and capability build an immense inertia which at the least maintains a high level of irregular migration, while interventions primarily aimed at containing migration tend to be informed by liberal conceptions. Here we have a major reason for the stubbornly high rates of irregular migration in the eastern and southern routes despite state attempts to clamp down on irregular migration.

Notes

- 1 In addition to economics, Appadurai's (2013) argument is to make the production of the future a socio-cultural process and anthropology as a discipline to understand how the future is produced. The socio-cultural processes in making migration a viable option to making one's/a community's future will align with what is known as 'culture of migration'. However, the 'culture of migration' will be consolidated and perceptible in areas with strong and extended periods of experience of migration, while the socio-cultural processes of future-making through migration exists in other contexts as well. The concluding section will detail this better.
- 2 My first research experience on migration-related fieldwork was in January 2017 in Atsbi Endaselassie, Alamata, and Abi Adi areas of Tigray (Fana and Beyene, 2017). In October 2017, I had the opportunity to do a second round of fieldwork in Atsbi Endaselassie. I am currently a researcher in MIDEQ (since late 2019) which examines South-South migration from Hadiya, south Ethiopia to South Africa. MIDEQ allowed extended fieldwork in various parts of Hadiya, and to rely on more than 100 formal interviews and focus group discussions conducted by the team of researchers. In mid-2020 I did fieldwork in Wurko, Tigray, and North Wollo of Amhara region (Mesfin et al., 2021). I also rely on the experience of the panel I organized with Asnake Kefale at the ICES 20 and later of the book we co-edited *Youth on the Move: Views from Below on Ethiopian International Migration* (Asnake and Fana 2021). Over the past five years, I have had the chance to physically stay in core sending areas to the Eastern and Southern Routes and gather data on decision-making and impacts of migration in these areas.
- 3 With 3.3% of its GDP dedicated to cash transfer programmes, South Africa has one of the largest and most comprehensive schemes in the world (see Torkelson 2020).
- 4 Despite the 'gender neutral design of the scheme, except the War Veterans' Grant (20.8% female), women make the largest proportion of recipients of other grant schemes: Old Age Pension (66%), disability grant (54.6%), Child Support Grant (98.1%), Foster Child Grant (94%), and Care Dependency Grant (96.8%) (Dianne Dunkerley, SASSA, 11–12 June 2013 Cited in Plagerson and Ulriksen 2015).
- 5 Various interviews with returnees as part of the MIDEQ research in Hosanna, Hadiya.
- 6 For example, Saudi border control becomes reportedly weaker during Islam's holy month of Ramadan, making this month the perfect time to attempt to cross into Saudi Arabia (Interviews with returnees, Atsbi Wenberta, October 2017).
- 7 Consecutive IOM reports show the increasing cost of migration from the Horn of Africa, partly due to increasing surveillance, along the southern route: between 1,750 and 2,000 USD in 2009; 2,500 USD in 2015-2-16; 3,400-5,000 in 2022 (IOM 2022).
- 8 A generic name for a line of work where an individual goes house to house to buy used kitchen utensils and others, often bottles and metal scraps at cheap rates, to be sold at higher rates. In this case, the labelling is to refer to migrants collecting cents and changes from purchases and exchanges (Interview, July 2021, Bonosha).

- 9 In the context of this chapter, culture is defined following Taylor (1871) as the “complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”

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4 Exploring the Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants along the Ghana-China Migration Corridor

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Introduction

In contemporary times, China–African relations have blossomed due to mutual economic interests, with China seeking trading and investment opportunities, access to cheap sources of raw materials, and externalisation of domestic unemployment pressures while African countries seek heavily subsidised loans with fewer conditionalities compared with loans from the Bretton Woods Institutions (Xiang, 2016). As Park (2009) notes, China positions itself very well with anti-colonial as well as post-colonial narratives in its relations with Africa, and this foreign policy positioning is very attractive to the leadership of most African governments. As such, China projects itself as a less patronising and less condescending alternative to the European and North American development partners of Africa, albeit others view the relationship as rather neo-colonialist in nature (Batchelor & Zhang, 2017). China strategically used aid as soft power during the Cold War period to win over friendly African countries at the expense of the then superpowers (Brautigam, 2003). The relations between China and Africa crystallised with time, and they became known as the Sino-African relations that encompassed historical, political, economic, military, social, and cultural connections between China and Africa (Felbo-Kolding, Leschke & Spreckelsen, 2019). Nonetheless, China is included in the nebulous categorisation of the global South, which tends to refer to countries that are underdeveloped and poor, in spite of China’s superior wealth of over 17 trillion USD in 2021 (as the second largest economy globally) (Morrison, 2019). Low per capita income, excessive unemployment and lack of valuable capital are often used as criteria for categorising these countries (World Population Review, 2023). South-South Migration, especially to wealthier southern destination countries such as China, has also not been the focus of most extant literature.

The most apparent form in the Sino-African relations has been economic, with investment in infrastructure dominating the Chinese portfolio in Africa. According to the World Bank, China’s finances have been the bedrock of several large- as well as medium-size infrastructural projects in Africa and the value of these packages has risen sharply between the early 2000s and 2018 (Obeng, 2019). Beyond the financing of infrastructure, China has sustained a trading relationship with Africa, the volume of which has increased exponentially from US\$1 billion to US\$163

billion within just 32 years, between 1980 and 2012 (Leslie, 2018). As a result of supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, trade values reduced to US\$176 billion in 2020 from the 2019 value of US\$192 billion (China-Africa Trade Institute, 2022).

Ghana is emblematic of the expanding interest of China in Africa. The extant literature records substantial Sino-Ghana relations, including waves of Chinese migration to Ghana from the 1950s (Hodzi, 2019; Jinpu & Ning, 2019). Earlier Chinese migrants in Ghana predominantly featured in the textile industry (Xiaoyang, 2018). The sectoral focus of Chinese migrants shifted to the construction and engineering sectors championed mostly by Chinese state-owned enterprises between the late 1980s and early 1990s (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). From the 1990s to date, a considerable number of Chinese have migrated to Ghana to operate as traders of imported Chinese goods (such as electrical equipment and electronic appliances, textiles, solar-powered appliances, and everyday used goods), owners of Chinese restaurants, clinics, fish farms, and small and large-scale gold mining (Jinpu & Ning, 2019). Chinese trade with Ghana and investments in a variety of sectors have seen a significant increase since the early 2000s (China-Africa Trade Institute, 2022; Haugen, 2018). According to Pilling (2018), between 2000 and 2014, the value of Chinese investment rose sharply from US\$4.4 million to US\$1.6 billion and China became Ghana's leading trading partner with bilateral trade increasing from less than US\$100 million in 2000 to US\$6.7 billion in 2017.

The sustained relations between China and Ghana have informed a rise in the migration of Ghanaians to China for multiple reasons, including for education, commerce, and tourism (Kandilige & Yaro, 2020). As noted by Obeng (2019), Ghanaian migrants to China could be broadly divided into transient migrants (comprising transnational traders and business executives of Chinese companies) and semi-permanent migrants (including entrepreneurs, diplomats, teachers of the English language, and tertiary students). The contemporary flows invariably have considerable effects on the economic dimensions of the lives of migrants, migrant households, and the broader communities, especially in the areas of poverty reduction.

While there is a burgeoning literature on the activities of Chinese migrants to Ghana and their attendant positive and negative impacts on Ghana (Dobler 2008; Gyedu, 2018; McNamee et al., 2012), very little is known about the factors undergirding the perpetuation of Ghanaian migration to China, and even lesser still is understood regarding the experiences of Ghanaian immigrants in China. The chapter contributes to the literature by broadening our insights into the Ghanaian component of the Ghana-China migration corridor. The extant literature on social networks focuses on how such networks have the potential to facilitate as well as perpetuate migration journeys. Our application of the social network theory extends the discourses to cover how migrants' lived experiences, even at the destination, are equally shaped by social networks.

We will explore the key drivers of migration from Ghana to China and how social networks mediate the lived experiences of Ghanaian migrations to China. This is essential as the lived experiences of migrants within the global southern

context are often missing in the migration literature. In our view, even though all the initiation and perpetuation models are important in migration analysis, the *primacy* belongs to the dynamics of social network – and to some extent, institutional factors, when it comes to our understanding of South-South Migration, especially as epitomised by migration along the Ghana-China corridor.

Data for this chapter were collected mainly using qualitative research methods (Bryman, 2012; Castro et al., 2010). A detailed semi-structured interview guide was designed to aid in-depth interviews with Ghanaian return migrants from China. The in-depth interviews were conducted with 39 returnees: 31 males and 8 females. Interviewees were between the ages of 21 and 45 years. Returnees were recruited mainly through purposive and snowball sampling techniques. We purposively sampled returnees who were at least 18 years old and had at least Junior High School qualifications. This is consistent with extant literature that suggests that most Ghanaian migrants to China are literate (Obeng, 2019; Teye et al., 2022). We used key gatekeepers in the trading, education, and tourism sectors to gain access to Ghanaian migrants who returned from China in the last ten years. We relied on different entry nodes in order to avoid sampling the views of close-knit groups that might provide biased views on their experiences of migration. As such, we limited referrals from each group to a maximum of three participants. The main themes covered in the interviews included reasons for migration, migration decision-making, the roles of intermediaries, migration experiences in China, remittance-sending behaviour, and changes to the living standards of migrant households. Each interview was about an hour long. The interviews were conducted from May to July 2021. To protect the identity of our research participants, we use pseudonyms in place of their names.

The Primacy of Social Networks in South-South Migration

There has been a remarkable increase in South-South Migration, with both China and Ghana deeply implicated as both migrant-sending and -receiving countries. This trend has changed the socio-economic and cultural dynamics of many countries in the Global South, prompting many citizens in the region to learn how to live with different people in close quarters – e.g., as neighbours or co-workers. Yet, the theoretical base for our understanding of South-South Migration has remained woefully underdeveloped. As it stands now, there is no coherent set of theories to facilitate a sustained analysis of the emerging trends in South-South Migration. Moreover, while there are some studies (e.g. Agadjanian, 2008; Malatji, 2021) dealing with intra-African migration, research on the migration of Africans to other Southern regions is particularly lacking. Meanwhile, there are some features that make a typical South-South Migration somewhat different from its south-north counterpart, as we shall soon see from our exploration of the qualitative data on the Ghana-China migration corridor.

Massey et al. (1997) categorised international migration theories into migration *initiation* and *perpetuation* theories. The former focus on the factors that compel people to migrate in the first place, while the latter concern the variables that sustain

the migration process once it is started. Examples of the initiation theories are the neoclassical economics theory, the new economics of labour migration (NELM), and the world-systems theory, while the network and institutional theories are examples of the perpetuation models. As noted by Newland (2009), migration could also be circular – repeated temporal movements across borders, either formally or informally, usually for work, and involving the same migrants.

What motivates Ghanaians to migrate to China, and *vice versa*, considering that both countries are in the global South (i.e., outside the group of Western Advanced Nations), even though China is ranked higher, in 2021, along the spectrum of development by most yardsticks, including the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2022)? There is no simple reason why Ghanaians migrate to China; still, one can plausibly posit that the move is prompted mainly by economics. For one thing, most Southern destinations (e.g., China or Ghana) do not have the necessary social institutions that foster the settlement of a large number of migrants from different ethno-cultural backgrounds, as is the case of Canada, Australia, or the United States.

If, then, economics is the key to this South-South Migration, the neoclassical economics and the NELM theories are not useful as explanatory heuristics. From the former, we know that people initiate migration mostly to take advantage of wage differentials between the origin and destination. This model is based on assumptions of rationality, perfect knowledge, and *ceteris paribus*. However, from behavioural economics, we know that everything is never equal; and, in this particular case, institutional constraints concerning the acquisition of visa and work permits are always at play, not to mention the problems of racism. How applicable is the NELM, by which migration decisions are made by households, rather than individual migrants, to diversify the sources of their household income (de Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007)? While the NELM has some veracity, it is also inadequate, since in Ghana, as in many African countries, it is an “open secret” that migrants do not mostly disclose their migration plans to friends and family. Many in Africa have the superstitious belief that one’s enemies could sabotage one’s travel plans, either materially or spiritually, when they get to know about these plans prior to the journey (Nyavor, 2019).

Of the perpetuation models, we give primacy to the network theory and, to some extent, the institutional theory, in our analysis of South-South Migration. According to network theory, international migration is sustained through interpersonal connections among migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in both the origin and the destination (Massey et al., 1993: 448). Network theorists regard migrants as actors who are capable of drawing on both tangible and intangible resources for their benefit. From the standpoint of this theory, once the number of network connections reaches a critical mass, migration becomes self-perpetuating, by way of cumulative causation-*a-la*-Gunnar Myrdal (1957). Network connections are a form of social capital that migrants use to gain access to employment, accommodation, and other services abroad. Social capital in this sense refers to the “ability factors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (Portes, 1998: 6). For social capital to be accessible and beneficial, a person

must relate to others, and these other persons are the actual source of the capital or advantage. To be useful, social networks, and their attendant social capital, must be maintained, nourished, and strengthened through multiple interactions between members. Thus, the acquisition of social capital that undergirds the network theory of migration requires a deliberate investment of resources (e.g., time) towards enabling and inspiring people to migrate. As we shall soon see, social networks play a crucial role in a South-South Migration context to foster the procurement of commodities, housing, employment, local and foreign currencies, business partners, employees, and translators—just as one would expect in most South-North Migration contexts.

The institutional theory, as presented by Massey et al. (1997), places its emphasis on the activities of private and non-profit (im)migration organisations that aim to “satisfy the demand created by the imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into capital-rich countries and the limited number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer” (p. 265). These institutional actors include immigration consultants, travel agents, and employment agencies, which assist in the acquisition of travel, immigration, and employment documents for the migrant. Even though migration along the Ghana-China corridor requires a visa at both ends, the visa application is, arguably, nowhere as uncertain and onerous as one would find in applying for a visa from Ghana or China to a Northern country, such as the United States, Canada, Germany, or Britain. It is with this in mind that we do not place much emphasis on the institutional theory, relative to the network theory, at least as the two theories apply to migration along the Ghana-China corridor. In fact, in both Ghana and China, most of the functions performed by such migration institutions are often maintained through social networks.

Obeng-Odoom, in his recent work, *Global Migration beyond Limits* (2022), broadens the conception of “institution” to include class, gender, religion, race, and land, placing his emphasis on the latter. As he rightly notes, the importance of land in the theorisation of migration goes beyond its role in rural–urban migration or its status as a mere epiphenomenon of capital (as often portrayed in Marxist analysis of migration). Issues of land are implicated in nearly all types of migration, because of their ability to produce and sustain inequality and stratification of income, wealth, and race. Expectedly, we acknowledge the importance of racism in understanding migration in a south-south context in general, and in the Ghana-China corridor in particular. Indeed, any slight acquaintance with the lived experience of Chinese in Ghana and of Ghanaians in China would readily show that racism is a major social problem for migrants at both ends of this corridor. At the same time, since the labour markets of most southern destinations, including both China and Ghana, are, arguably, not as rigidly segmented along racial lines, as is often the case in Northern destinations (e.g., United States, Canada, and Britain), the impact of the racial factor is curtailed a bit in a South-South Migration context.

In fact, in most Northern countries, the social labelling, and the attendant segmentation, of some jobs as immigrant jobs or ethno-racial minority jobs is rather rigid, relative to what obtains in most Southern destinations. This is not hard to envisage, since employment opportunities and the diversity of jobs are generally

higher in the global North than in the South, and, consequently, citizens in the North tend to have the luxury of such negative tagging of jobs as “immigrant jobs,” than do citizens of the global South. Of course, we are only arguing in relative terms here; and we are by no means downplaying the impact of racism on its victims, be they in Northern or Southern destinations. Still since pull and push forces of migration are often sensitive to socio-economic disparities between origins and destinations, anytime the disparity is not that high, the impact of the pull or push factor involved is curtailed (Lee, 1966). Similarly, since the subjugation of females by males is, arguably, generally higher in most Southern countries (Aguilar, 2002; Halfacree, 1995), including both China and Ghana (relative to Northern countries), the influence of patriarchy as a pull or push factor in a South-South Migration context is not that strong. It bears stressing that our argument is not that these institutional factors (i.e., land, race, or gender) do not matter, but only that they are not as consequential in the South-South Migration context, as in the South-North Migration context – this is why we place our emphasis on the network factors.

Migration of Ghanaians to China and the Role of Social Networks

China has become a destination of choice for Ghanaian students looking for scholarships to support their postgraduate studies, especially in the natural sciences. Several funded postgraduate programmes and professional courses in life/biological sciences, such as medicine and physical sciences such as physics, chemistry, earth sciences, and astronomy have been made available to African students across different Chinese universities. The continuing over-subscription and exorbitant fees to European and North American universities have led to a sharp uptake of academic opportunities outside of the traditional centres of tertiary education, including China. Ghanaian students have embraced the novel postgraduate opportunities in China. There are specific scholarships targeting students from developing countries, especially African countries, and the tuition fees are relatively lower compared with those from European and North American Universities. As Pilling (2018) reported, an estimated 6,500 Ghanaian students studied in China in 2018 (making Ghana the top supplier of African students to China). In addition, migration for the purpose of working in the construction sector in China, the teaching of the English language as well as the purchase of manufactured goods for retail in Ghana have characterised international migration along the Ghana-China corridor. The overwhelming majority of these migration journeys are temporary and circular in nature. As such, return migration to Ghana is expected from the outset. This is partly because return is a core requirement of scholarships to Chinese universities, while businesspersons strategically access preferential markets in China to procure commodities that are in high demand in Ghana and then either supply retailers or stock their own shops in major cities and towns across the country.

Social networks facilitate a feedback loop of information that informs the decision of prospective Ghanaian students to China in targeting their applications to subjects and universities that provide generous scholarship funding. The majority of the interviewees went to China for educational purposes, with the conviction

that China provides students access to sophisticated technological equipment to carry out research and other academic work at the tertiary level. They also believe, based on prior information by social networks in China, that the funding package is quite generous to enable students who are on scholarships to focus on their academic work, without the need to look for paid employment. In line with this principle, China prohibits international students, especially those on scholarships, from working. The pursuit of a good education, in addition to an exploration of a different culture, including the language, the food, and the environment served as a key motivating factor for student migrations from Ghana to China. Over time, universities in some provinces have been exceptionally welcoming to international students, in spite of complaints of discrimination and racism experienced by students who worked on part-time basis outside of their university campuses. This is how one interviewee described his rationale for choosing China:

I chose China because of their advancement in engineering education...I also enjoyed the scholarship package I had as an international student. I had free accommodation, free tuition and a monthly stipend of about 3000 Cedis [equivalent to US\$508].¹

(Atawune, Male return migrant
from Senya Bireku in the Central Region of Ghana)

Similarly, some students who fail to gain admission into Ghanaian universities to complete their preferred courses apply and secure full scholarships in China. Serjua, for instance, was rejected admission to a Ghanaian university to complete a petroleum and technology-related programme, but he gained admission with a full scholarship to a Chinese University to study in the same programme. His success was enabled by information and practical support that were provided by a friend of his who was already studying in China. The ability of students who do not gain admission in Ghana procuring full scholarships points either to the lower entry requirements in China compared to in Ghana or simply greater opportunities in China. This leads to some contestation on the equivalence of the value of a degree obtained in China compared with one in Ghana, especially in the professional sectors.

Presently, an increasing number of universities in Ghana are establishing exchange programs with Chinese universities, including the hosting of Confucius Centres² for the study of Chinese culture. These collaborations allow for the enrolment of Ghanaian students on postgraduate studies on a “sandwich basis” where students are required to spend some time in both countries. Similarly, Ghanaian students who study medicine complete the first five years of their training in China and must return to Ghana to carry out their internship (housemanship) for a year before returning to China to complete their studies. This somewhat supports their insertion into the medical system in Ghana upon their return.

In line with the geopolitical realignment with China assuming a more prominent position globally, some Ghanaian migrants reported that they were drawn to China as a destination of choice because they find the country as the leading global power

in the future. For instance, Ananga, who is an unmarried self-employed male Ghanaian returnee, enrolled in a master's programme in the Jingju Province in China after his first degree in Ghana. He describes his decision to study in China as being anchored on his believe in "*the country's rising dominance on the global stage.*"

In addition, some Ghanaians migrate to China to work in the construction sector. Until recently, the building and construction sector in China was booming due to the scale of infrastructural developments prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, Azumah who is a male Ghanaian Construction Engineer migrated to the Shaanxi province in China to work with a Chinese construction company. He is married with three children, and he comes from Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana. He completed a degree in Construction engineering in Ghana prior to his migration. As part of his migration preparation, he learned the Chinese language and he communicated fluently in it. He had worked with a construction company in Ghana for several years, but the pay was bad and sometimes it was delayed for months. He concluded that since China was developing at a fast pace, there would definitely be the demand for his expertise in construction engineering.

Another reason for migrating to China has been to teach the English language either in schools or privately to the children of affluent Chinese. Though students are formally prohibited from working during their studies in China, almost all the former students we interviewed admitted to teaching on a part-time basis as a source of extra income. The deterrent measures against students include possible fines and even deportation if one is arrested for working. However, these do not deter most students from teaching. Some students were arrested, yet others still taught clandestinely. Students rely on both strong and weak social networks to mediate the effects of the stringent regulations in China. A case in point is that of Aweniga who was arrested on one occasion but later freed after his Ghanaian colleague used his social network contact (a Chinese national) to intervene on his behalf. This is how he recounts his experience:

As a student, working is illegal in China. You can be dismissed or deported if you are caught but we were able to find jobs. To find a job, I had to use my networks. Sometimes, the police visit the schools to make sure that we were not there working illegally. One day, I jumped through a window to escape from the police when they visited the school I was working at.

(Aweniga, Male return migrant from Kumasi)

Apart from students who teach despite their scholarship regulations, some trained teachers from Ghana migrate purposely to teach English as a form of employment in China. Again, social networks are critical to this form of labour migration. Apuri, for instance, is a male return migrant and a business owner from Nkwatia in the Eastern Region of Ghana who migrated to Guangzhou in China with the support of his social networks. He is married and has children. He targeted Guangzhou because of the existence of several factories and multinational companies and a large labour migrant population. His friends were all working in the Guangzhou Province; thus he leveraged their presence to secure employment. He had only

obtained a diploma qualification from a polytechnic in Ghana, but he stated that this qualification was sufficient for his migration ambitions. He had taught in a private school in Dansoman, Accra, prior to his migration. He relied on his teaching experience to obtain a job as an English Teacher in Guangzhou.

As noted by Obeng (2019), some Ghanaian traders also migrate to China to purchase an eclectic mix of trading wares at wholesale prices and ship them to Ghana to supply either retailers or local wholesale companies. This is a profitable endeavour, which accounts for a large volume of migration along the Ghana–China corridor. Students also double up as opportunistic traders by serving as intermediaries between Ghanaian businesspersons and Chinese suppliers. Scholarship funds are occasionally used to purchase goods to sell in Ghana as a form of investment. Other students transact in currency trading by buying up dollars from Ghanaian traders in exchange for Chinese Yuan and they make a profit from the exchange rate deferential. Azumah recounted his currency trading experiences:

I normally buy US Dollars from Ghanaians who visit China to buy goods and I save the physical money at home. So, I looked for a secured place in my room and saved my money.

(Azumah, from Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana)

The literature on the role of migration intermediaries is gaining considerable traction. Migration intermediaries such as travel agents, ‘connection men’, money lenders, and immigration lawyers are part of what Granovetter (1973) refers to as ‘weak ties’ that are instrumental in facilitating migration journeys. Whereas older literature (Kyle, 2000; Salt & Stein, 1997) focused more on the exploitative nature of their role, more contemporary literature is beginning to nuance the discussion by offering a broader perspective on the positive role of intermediaries (Awumbila et al., 2019; Deshingkar, 2019). Intermediaries sometimes provide information on the requirements for travel, acquisition of visas, mapping of migration routes, information on the *dos* and *don'ts* in the destination, access to employment opportunities, workers’ rights, and negotiation for better remuneration. We found that the use of migration intermediaries varies according to the reason for migrating to China. Our study found that whereas students hardly used the services of any migration intermediaries to process their visas, businesspersons and English Teachers tended to rely on travel agents to assist in the acquisition of visas at a fee. Students indicated that the application processes are self-evident and once an aspiring student applies and secures admission and a scholarship, all the necessary documentation is provided by the Chinese university for the acquisition of the visa. The account of Atawune is quite instructive:

I did everything on my own. I did not involve any agency or anybody in that. I just read on the internet on how to do the application and I think their portal was self-explanatory, very simple, easy to use so I just did it on my own.

(Atawune, Male return migrant from Senya Bireku
in the Central Region of Ghana)

Conversely, those who migrate to transact business or to work in China tend to use the services of travel agents to process their migration documentation and visa clearance:

I contacted a travel agent who assisted me with a visa but in terms of work, my friends in China helped me with the job. The travel agency after acquiring the visa purchased a ticket for me and I paid for their service. I paid them cash and they provided me with a receipt. I spent almost 12,000 Ghana Cedis [equivalent to US\$2,034] because I had to buy a return ticket although I knew I was not coming back any time soon.

(Apuri, male return migrant and a business owner from Nkwatia in the Eastern Region of Ghana)

The following is how another interviewee puts it:

I used a travel agent in Ghana. I went to China as a tourist but my friends promised me to get me a job there. All I needed to do was to get into the country. We also have many Chinese who come to this country as tourist and the end up doing illegal mining. So, I also did that. I know it was not good, but I needed a little breathing space from our harsh economic situation at the time. But nowhere cool.

(Azumah, from Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana)

The cost of migration varies quite widely depending on whether migrants used migration intermediaries or not. Those who processed the requirements themselves reported spending between 5,500 [equivalent to US\$932] and 10,000 Ghana Cedis [equivalent to US\$1,695] on their ticket, visa application cost, and the cost of medical examination, while those who used the services of travel agents spent between 15,000 [equivalent to US\$2,542] to 20,000 Ghana Cedis [equivalent to US\$3,390].

Ghanaian migrants adopt different decision-making approaches ranging from personal decisions to joint decisions by migrants and family members (strong social ties) to consultations with friends and colleagues (weak social ties). Also, the migration journeys are funded from a variety of sources from personal savings to gifts by family members to loans from both individuals and financial institutions. Whereas social capital is mostly drawn from strong social network connections such as kinship relations, there is also 'strength in weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973). Weaker social ties sometimes unleash more beneficial support than strong ties. Migrants recounted support received from friends who are already based in China as well as former business associates. The account of Apuri portrays the extensive support migrants draw upon from friends in addition to minimal familial support. Ada relied on foreign acquaintances to secure job opportunities while Azumah reported being accommodated for free by his friends until he became employed. These social capital resources point to the utility of weak social ties in unleashing vital migration support. As one interviewee points out:

The decision was made by myself but my friends in China assisted me with the necessary information I needed to embark on the journey. My friends in China picked me at the train station and accommodated me throughout my stay in China but we shared the cost at the end of every month when I started earning money. Prior to that, I stayed with them for free. They are very helpful.

(Azumah, from Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana)

In Box 1, we highlight the role of social networks in the migration experience of a Ghanaian “footballer” who moved to China to pursue a career.

Box 4.1: South-South Migration: The Case of a Ghanaian “Footballer” (Kambasi)

Kambasi is a male business owner of a computer and accessories shop at Alojo in Accra, Ghana. He comes from Osino in the Eastern Region of Ghana. He stays alone in a rented house at Achimota and he is responsible for all household chores such as washing, cooking, and sweeping as well as paying the rent and other utility bills. Prior to his migration to China in 2007, he lived with his parents who provided for all his needs and he completed assigned household chores. He obtained a Senior High School qualification. He was a skillful footballer who joined a local team at Labadi, Accra, but without any remuneration. He was recruited by a football agent to travel to China in 2007. He migrated with five other footballers to the city of Jinhua in the Zhejiang Province of China. He was excited to have boarded a flight for the first time in his life. While his mother approved of his migration, his father opposed it but Kambasi migrated without his father’s approval. The owners of the local football club funded the cost of their migration. Kambasi was unsuccessful in the selection process after trials and three out of the five were signed with a Chinese football club. He faced a return to Ghana but he relied on a friend of his who was based in Guangzhou to secure a job with a pharmaceutical company in Guangzhou as a labourer. He sorted and packed drugs into boxes for shipment. Later, he began taking newly arrived Ghanaian businesspersons around to buy their goods at a fee to supplement his income from his main work.

Kambasi experienced intimidation, shouting, and racial slurs from his Chinese colleagues anytime he made a mistake at work. He earned the equivalent of 1,500 Ghana Cedis [equivalent to US\$254] from the pharmaceutical company and he was paid cash as an irregular migrant. He sent remittances to his mother through Western Union Money Transfer. He eventually returned from China in 2015 after staying there for more than seven years. He says that he was sick and tired of hiding in China. He saved enough money to establish his own company and then decided to return to Ghana. He chose to

establish his own company because he knew that he lacked the qualifications to compete for a job in Ghana.

Kambasi considers his migration a success because he managed to send remittances to his mother for her upkeep and for the expansion of her business, plus he owns a company that has employed others, including his cousin. He also owns a parcel of land at Nsawam in the Eastern Region which he hopes to develop soon. There are expectations on Kambasi to solve family problems due to his elevated social status upon return. He plans to migrate after five years preferably to New Zealand because his social networks have informed him about job opportunities there.

As noted earlier, for Ghanaian migrants who went to China to study, their student visas either did not allow them to work at all or they were only allowed to work part-time hours. Regardless of the category, all those who were interviewed reported working on a part-time basis. Some worked with their academic supervisors while others carried out light tasks within their universities. Those who worked with their supervisors on research projects or with related academic institutions were paid an additional stipend to complement their scholarship funds.

In the case of Akolgo, he saved a percentage of his salary each month which was transferred to his Ghana account. He used the funds to buy treasury bills which were rolled over to earn him higher interest. He indicated that it was not necessary for him to send remittances to his parents because they were already wealthy, and he had no dependants in Ghana. However, he occasionally sent remittances during festive periods such as Christmas or Easter and in cases where the family in Ghana needed to make a funeral contribution. The savings served as tangible resources or investment capital to support Akolgo's return migration. His constant communication with his parents reinforced the social capital needed to have a successful return. His willingness as well as readiness to return, therefore, interfaced well with the circumstances in China and Ghana to facilitate a successful return.

In addition, return migrants reported the teaching of the English language to kids of affluent Chinese as the quickest and easiest way to earn money. Some migrants went to China purposely to teach English whereas others did home tuition on a part-time basis during their free time from their academic work. A typical example of a student who benefited immensely from teaching English in China is Serjua who used teaching as a resource to accumulate tangible resources such as money and tradeable goods to support his return plans. He taught English at a primary school in Jiangxi on a part-time basis for two hours a day for three days a week. He did so for a period of one year. He was later recruited as a translator with a branch in Jiangxi. Other branches were opened in Guangzhou, United Kingdom, and in Rwanda. After a year as a translator and learning on the job, he was made a project manager of the new branch in Guangzhou. He was issued with a work permit. He earned about US\$1,600 per month. He remitted to his family in Ghana on a regular monthly basis and later funded a four-year programme for his younger brother to

study in China. At this point, he suspended the sending of remittances to Ghana and rather focused on supporting his brother. This arrangement was approved by his family in Ghana. However, he continued to send in-kind remittances such as clothing and mobile phones through returning migrants. These actions constituted his return preparedness process which secured a successful return at the end of his migration cycle. Nonetheless, Serjua reported challenges with discrimination and racism during his working experience in China. Similar experiences were recounted by other returnees, but they reported that they rationalised these experiences as “a price you pay for being in another person’s country.”

Well, being the only foreigner among almost 135 employees is not easy because all eyes are on you...The only problem has to do with the kind of words some Chinese colleagues use when you have any issue with them and those words are demeaning. For instance, they say things like a black monkey, go to your country among others. They make you overwork after the close of work without any allowance just for the fact that you belong to a project team.

(Serjua, Business owner, Male from Aburi in the Eastern Region)

Through teaching of English for two hours a day, three days a week, Aweniga reported making about 6,000 [equivalent to US\$923] or 7,000 Yuan [US\$1,077]³ per month. He saved his extra earnings and then remitted to his family and friends in Ghana. He never asked what the remittance funds were used for by his family because he reckoned that this was his opportunity to give back to his family which was paying his university fees from Ghana. He even recounted losing about 8,000 Ghana Cedis [equivalent to US\$1,356] in 2017 to a friend who was supposed to help him buy a vehicle. He also sent in-kind remittances to his family members.

As a female English teacher in the Hubei Province in China, Kapiu who describes herself as a middle-class Ghanaian before her migration reported earning a higher salary as a part-time teacher in China compared with amounts earned by professional teachers in Ghana. She earned about 5,000 Yuan [equivalent to US\$770] every month from the teaching, in addition to her scholarship funds. She remitted her mother about 2,000 Yuan [equivalent to US\$308] every three months for her upkeep. In addition, she saved a lot of money monthly and bought products from China which were shipped to her sister in Ghana for sale. This generated additional profits for Kapiu. Just as in the case of the other migrants, these actions ensured a favourable return condition for Kapiu as she mobilised tangible resources towards her return. By maintaining good relations with her family members, this created favourable conditions in Ghana to support a successful return migration.

Azumah did not migrate to China as a student but rather to work with a construction company. Since he was a target earner, he was strategic in planning the accumulation of resources (both tangible and intangible) as well as maintaining social networks towards establishing his own business upon return. He reported earning about 6,000 Yuan [equivalent to US\$923] per month and he saved the bulk of his earnings. Unlike the other migrants, Azumah refused to send remittances to

anyone in Ghana because he was worried that people might take advantage of him. He paid off all his loans and only bought mobile phones for key persons in his family during his return trip to Ghana.

I had to save enough to come and establish my own firm here. I could have sent a few Yuan periodically to some people here but if did so, they would think I was picking the money from the streets in China, and they would keep telling me about their problems. Some would even lie to me to get my money and waste it. I did not want that to happen to me. So, from the word go, I told them I was an illegal migrant in China, and I was not getting a good job to even pay my bills. Some of them even had pity for me.

(Azumah, Male, Construction Engineer, from Cape Coast
in the Central Region)

Another return migrant (Atawune), who worked as a structural engineer set up a joint business together with his colleagues and they provided services to clients in Ghana even prior to his return:

I started a business with my friends. We are a team of structural engineers so we set up a company that looked into structural engineering. For example, when a client contacts me for a structural design of a building, myself and my team here, we work on it and then we give the person the price and negotiate. If we agree on the price, then we do the work and send it to him in Ghana.

(Atawune, Male return migrant from Senya Bireku
in the Central Region of Ghana)

Akin to Azumah, Ananga did not send any remittances to Ghana. Instead, he had an existing business in Ghana from where he extended support to family members who were in need. He stated that whatever he earned in China was used to provide for his personal expenses.

Conclusion

As our data show, most of the Ghanaians who go to China go for educational purposes, mostly as international scholarship students, by which they take advantage of teaching English as a second language to mid- and upper-income Chinese families. Since their scholarships often prohibit them from working, these students routinely seek such English-teaching job opportunities from their own supervisors and professors (to teach the latter's children at their homes), and thereby escape the surveillance of law enforcement agents. Another significant cohort of Ghanaian immigrants in China are businesspersons who come to (work and) purchase commodities for sale back home. While some Ghanaian immigrants in China work in construction, manufacturing, services, and other sectors of the economy, these workers are not that many, not only because of the limited job opportunities in China, given their own massive population, but

also because of institutional barriers having to do with the acquisition of employment and resident permits and anti-Black racism. Our findings indicate that regardless of the social class, gender, education, or age of Ghanaian immigrants in China, social networks play a crucial role in their immigration and settlement processes – in fact, more so than any other impetus, as far as our findings are concerned. Ghanaian migrants also display both individual and collective agency by adopting ways and means of evading the strict regulatory regime in China, relying on their social networks. We argue that this allows migrants to better negotiate their vulnerabilities and precarity within China. We also argue that the global South is not an undifferentiated collection of countries but that opportunities exist in richer global southern countries [such as China] that constitute similar pull factors to aspiring migrants, as those that exist in so-called global northern countries.

Our application of the social network theory within a South-South Migration context has helped to expand the theory's scope to include facilitating the realisation of migration aspirations, negotiating complex lived experiences at destinations, return preparedness planning and enhancing the likelihood of sustainable reintegration upon return. Anti-Black racism and discrimination in China are partly endured and/or resisted through network members.

Since many of the Ghanaian students readily find employment as English tutors in China, our study recommends further studies on how the two countries can develop bilateral arrangements to facilitate the teaching of English by Ghanaians in China for their mutual benefit. If China can exchange loans for resources in Africa, perhaps Ghana can exchange the teaching of English for loans – this is certainly worth exploring in the grand scheme of international development along this particular migration corridor. Secondly, our study found that Ghanaian students get reasonably good technical and practical scientific training in China, relative to what comparable students get in Ghana. At the same time, most of these Ghanaian students are unable to put their technical training into practice upon their return. Thus, the need to find out what factors in the home environment undermine the use of such practical expertise cannot be over-emphasised, if Ghana is to move forward with any meaningful import substitution industrialisation program. Finally, the renowned Marxist geographer David Harvey long talked about the tendency for capitalists to use “spatial fix,” or spatial manoeuvres, such as moving plants from one place to another, to facilitate capital accumulation. Relatedly, it would be interesting to examine whether Ghana and China are using, or can use, some form of “migration fix” (Bird & Schmid, 2021) along this south-south corridor to assuage their respective youth employment challenges and, thereby, boost their capital accumulation.

Notes

- 1 1 US dollar = 5.9 Ghana Cedis at the time of the research in 2021.
- 2 Cultural centres focused on the promotion of Chinese culture, language, and interests.
- 3 1 US dollar = 6.5 Chinese Yuan at the time of the fieldwork in 2021.

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5 Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse

The Case of Forced Migrants in the Global South

Tirsit Sahldengil

Introduction

The spatial and social displacement of people is becoming a global phenomenon. Particularly since the early 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase in the movement of people around the globe. By 2014, the figure of refugees in the world had surpassed the largest number of people who were displaced during WWII (UNHCR 2016). Humanitarian donors and the host countries have been increasingly overwhelmed by the extended demand of supporting refugees and multidimensional and complicated problems of uprootedness.

As countries in the Global North are increasingly fencing their borders in fear of the refugee influx from the Global South, the data shows that the majority of refugees end up in low-income countries. According to UNHCR, in mid-2022, there were 32.5 million refugees (UNHCR 2022a). The report also shows that 74% of these refugees reside in low- and middle-income countries and 69% of the refugees reside in neighboring countries. Ethiopia is a good example of the case that the Global South is a significant destination for refugees. Despite the fact that currently there are about 4,509,081 Internally Displaced people IDPs in Ethiopia (IOM 2022), the country is also hosting 837,533 registered refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring and non-neighboring countries (UNHCR 2022b). Among 103 million displaced people in the world, more than 5 million of them reside in Ethiopia.

Forced migration literature mostly portrays the refugee movement as an arbitrary movement in which forced migrants lack the agency to choose their respective destinations. Moreover, the refugee movement in Africa is mainly characterized by the fact that refugees' destination choices are limited by geographical proximity. This chapter challenges this dominant view and explores the agency of refugees in making a choice among hosting camps in Africa. Sherkole refugee camp is among the five refugee camps found in Western Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State. As in the case of other camps in different African countries, the camp was originally established to serve refugees crossing the border from Sudan and South Sudan. Practically, it is hosting refugees from other parts of Africa, including those coming from Cameroon, Liberia, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda. Though Ethiopia doesn't share a direct border with the Great Lakes countries, Sherkole refugee camp is predominantly

occupied by refugees from the Great Lakes Region. These refugees arrive at the camp by crossing and transiting through several countries in Eastern Africa. This chapter explores the agency of forced migrants in making informed decisions and their agency in place-making. By drawing on an ethnographic study conducted in this camp over a period of five years, this contribution shows how the migrants capitalize on oral history, particularly those who claim to be Banyamulenge Tutsi, believing in the ethnic ties they claim with the Ethiopian people. The chapter will demonstrate how refugees from the Great Lakes regions living in Sherkole refugee camp construct their historical narratives to integrate and build a harmonious relationship with the host community.

The data used in this chapter draws on a qualitative study conducted as part of the author's PhD research between 2016 and 2021. During the first phase of the study in 2017, key informant interviews (KII), in-depth interviews (IDI), and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with refugees, the host community, UN-HCR, ARRA (the Ethiopian Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs), recently renamed as RRS (Refugees and Returnees Service), and other members of the government offices at Regional level in Ethiopia. In August 2019, the second major round of fieldwork was conducted, whereby 73 in-depth interviews with refugees from different countries were undertaken. During this fieldwork, refugees from different nationalities were interviewed with the purpose of understanding the factors informing their decision to leave their respective home countries, their migration trajectories as well as their reason to choose Ethiopia as their preferred destination. The open-ended questions and the follow-up interviews also provided the researcher an opportunity to explore the refugees' experience during their journey and their expectations from their destination. Refugees from different nationalities were incorporated into the study in order to tap into different experiences. Twenty-five key informant interviews were conducted with the host government representatives at regional and federal levels. The empirical data obtained from the fieldwork were supplemented by findings from the literature review. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also conducted with various refugee groups and host communities. The FGDs were organized in the way that considered the nationality of the refugees to allow open discussion about the factors for migration, their migration trajectories, and common reasons for choosing Ethiopia as a destination. The focus group discussions were conducted to triangulate the data obtained from individual informants.

There was also a continuous communication with informants through phone calls so as to update some developments, and also to make clear any ambiguous information that is gathered during the main course of the fieldwork. All the informants' names used in this study are pseudonyms in order to protect the research participants.

This chapter is intended to show the agency of refugees in making choices about their destination and the ways in which they create a narrative to integrate with others at their destination. The section "Reflections on Agency of Refugees and Forced Migrants" in this chapter presents a brief review of key literature on the agency of refugees to choose their destination. The section "Brief Overview of

Refugees Camps in Benishangul-Gumuz Region” provides basic background information about Sherkole refugee camp. The section “Discussing Agency of Refugees from the Great Lakes Region” presents empirical data about the reasons of refugees from the Great Lakes Regions and how they ended up in Ethiopia especially in Sherkole refugee camp, demonstrating the agency that is evident in their migration journeys and pathways to their goal. The section demonstrates how other factors, beyond geographical proximity, contribute to refugees’ choice-making of destinations. This section also shows how refugees capitalize on narratives to easily integrate with the host community in their destination. Refugees’ economic and social capital investment in their destination is discussed in the section “Discussing Agency of Refugees from the Great Lakes Region”. The last section of the chapter, “Conclusion,” presents brief concluding remarks.

Reflections on Agency of Refugees and Forced Migrants

The field of migration research has for long been interested in forced displacement, which treats it as both a result and a cause of social transformation in the Global South (Castles 2003). Jacobsen (2003) argued that most forced migration researchers seek to explain the behavior, impact, and problems of the displaced with the aim of urging agencies and governments to develop more operational responses (Jacobsen 2003). As a result, refugees are often portrayed by donors, policymakers, and researchers in the same way, as solely dependent on international aid, living in problematic situations, and as sources of problems for the host community and state. In contrast, anthropologists, with their fundamental interest in human experience and behavior were also interested to bring the migration experience, the memory of dispossession and displacement, and the lived experience of uprootedness into the core of a developing field of study (Malkki 1995; Chatty 2014).

More specifically on refugee–host interaction, social science studies have focused less on the agency of refugees in the host countries, as populations that can support themselves instead of merely being supported by the donors, and that can live peacefully with the host community for a better experience. There is also a neglect of a focus on the ways in which refugees are often deprived of personal rights, dreams, stories, and may be filled with fears or worries. This is clearly depicted in the programs of UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations as well (Amin 2017). Amin further argued how the victimization discourse was predominantly shared by donors and policymakers until recently. In addition to the focus on the victimization of refugees, empirical studies also focused on how refugees lack agency and they are mere opportunity grabbers to the host community in their destination. Particularly in studies in East Africa, refugees were portrayed as hostile combatants towards the host community and burdens for the host states. Many studies have looked at the economic competition between host and refugee communities for finite resources, as well as the resulting conflicts between the two groups (Martin 2005; Allen 2009; Grindheim 2013; Musielak 2016).

The fear of refugees as spreading violence to host countries and communities, according to Shaver and Zhou (2017) has acquired central emphasis in today’s

world politics. According to Milton et al. (2013), various factors can contribute to radicalization among refugees, including religious instruction, lack of jobs, lack of mobility, and lack of access to a well-rounded education. However, they were unable to locate any scholarly studies that demonstrated how refugees affect the security of host communities. These authors suggested that policymakers and scholars pay attention to the expanding demographic size of refugees, since the globe faces a serious humanitarian crisis as a result of large numbers of forced migrants. In this regard, the above argument looks reductionist and do not consider the positive contribution refugees to the host country, rather shows how the expansion of the refugee population can be a threat to the host.

Argued that refugees are humanitarian migrants who want to move to a country where they can work and stay safe until they can return home. They emphasized that refugees prioritize two things in selecting a destination. Refugees first look at the policy of the host state, for a state that easily provides asylum and job opportunities. In the second place, refugees are looking for social networks, religious similarities, and peace in the host state, and these affect refugees' choice of their destinations. However, case studies of asylum seekers find that the process of migration can change where asylum seekers go and that they do not always end up at their intended destination. But it is obvious that they strive to get to their ideal destination.

Ruegger and Bohnet (2018) also argued that no matter how refugees are understood to leave their homeland involuntarily, their decision to choose their direction of migration can be under their control. This can be seen from a significant number of refugees from the same country choosing different destinations. Refugees can still consider better opportunities to choose their destination. Ruegger and Bohnet underlined that vicinity alone does not resolve flight patterns to countries of first asylum. Furthermore, they identified four significant factors that are interwoven and determine the refugees' destination (Ruegger & Bohnet 2018). The first one is geographical proximity and accessibility of the destination. The second factor is networking and rationality, which includes smugglers, brokers, as well as refugees' connections and information about their destination. Further elaborating on this reason, Hein (1993) also argued that refugees use social networks in facilitating their flight and use their relation with friends and relatives to arrange their journeys. The third factor includes refugees' consideration of economic opportunities, including better life and job opportunities. The fourth one is ethnic linkage with neighboring countries and historical narratives about their destinations as important factors in choosing a destination. Potentially, the existing narratives help the refugees to establish peaceful interaction and rapid integration with the host community (e.g. Newland 1993; Schmeidl 1997; Moore & Shellman 2004).

According to Alessandro (2004), social networks, family ties, and economic links are crucial elements that attract more migrants to a certain location. These practices reveal the existence of social networks between distant locations. These networks have a significant impact on the region from which migrants originate; they underpin migration as a domestic group strategy; and, finally, they provide information about current opportunities and forecast future migration flows.

There are various perspectives on how refugees can participate in the host country. For example, Erel studies the topic of cultural capital in migration (Erel 2010).

He advocated a ‘rucksack approach’ to cultural capital, in which migrants are seen as bringing a package of cultural materials with them that may or may not mesh with the ‘culture’ of their new home nation. In migration studies, he recognizes the rucksack approach as a hidden but significant trend. Erel also shows how ethnic and human capital are formed in the motherland and transportation in his backpack approach. The ability of an individual who is a member of a social network to access numerous resources inside that social network is defined by researchers as social capital. It is a key notion in the economic lives of refugees and immigrants. To put it another way, social capital is a collection of benefits shared by a group of people (Bourdieu 1986). How refugees find work and the quality of the jobs they find are determined by social capital in their economic lives. This theory is predicated on social capital’s potential to act as a link between immigrants and jobs. Established immigrants, according to scholars in the broader immigration literature, use their social networks to efficiently disseminate information (Allen 2009).

Established immigrants, according to Allen (2009), reduce the costs of recruiting labor for employers and lessen informational asymmetries experienced by recent immigrants, benefiting both sides. As a result, immigrants who have access to social capital are more likely to obtain work and earn more than those who do not.

There is a recent paradigm shift from considering refugees as a burden to opportunities. As a result, arguments are being proposed to move beyond short-term emergency responses and focus on finding ways for longer-term solutions (Kaiser 2005). This idea was formalized when the UN agencies in 2015 approved Agenda 2030 for sustainable development goals which consists of 17 declarations and 169 associated targets. Agenda 2030 became a vital event in changing the gaze from containing refugees in camps solely based on aid to people who deserve out-of-camp life and potentially positive forces for the development of the host communities.

A further international initiative aimed at changing the status quo of refugees was the 2016 New York Declaration (UN 2018). The United Nations Summit on Refugees in September 2016 was held at New York in which 193 countries including Ethiopia participated and signed the Declaration. The Declaration put forth a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which focuses globally on measures to simplify pressure on countries that welcome and host refugees, supporting the self-reliance of refugees, expanding access to resettlement, and fostering conditions that enable refugees to return voluntarily to their home countries. Moreover, the CRRF aimed at improving rights and expanding services to benefit both refugees and the host communities. The CRRF had nine pledges which include, among other things, potential provisions to ease the refugees’ restrictions on matters of freedom of movement, labor rights, and access to services, livelihoods, and resources (World Bank 2018). Although the pledges were well crafted, there were many challenges to implement within a short period of time.

Brief Overview of Refugee Camps in Benishangul-Gumuz Region

There are about 60,000 refugees living in five refugee camps in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region in Ethiopia (UNHCR 2019). Most of the refugees came from Sudan

and South Sudan. However, there are refugees from the Great Lakes region such as from Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The oldest camp is Sherkole, followed by Tongo, Bambasi, Tsore, and Gure. Tongo is the biggest refugee camp with 20,000 refugees followed by Bambasi with more than 16,000.¹ Guré is the newest and the smallest camp with 8,000 refugees. James (2013) explained that the Benishangul-Gumuz Region was the first place in Ethiopia to host refugees in the sense of the 1951 UNHCR definition. Before the refugees first settled in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, people from Sudan and other neighboring countries crossed the immediate border and stayed in the host community periodically and then went back to their home country. According to James, from 1987 to 1989, Uduk ethnic groups were the first asylum seekers and settlers in the present-day Assosa where they lived with the host community. The first refugee camp, Sherkole, was formally established in 1997.² After setting up the camp, refugees who had lived in Assosa town area were moved to Sherkole camp.

The Study Setting: Sherkole Refugee Camp

Sherkole refugee camp is located in Assosa Zone of Benishangul-Gumuz Region. The Berta community is the dominant host, while highlanders from different parts of the country but mainly from Northern Ethiopia live around the camp. The first Sudanese civil war ended with the Addis Ababa Treaty, and many Sudanese migrated to Western Ethiopia to escape the war. Sherkole refugee camp is the oldest camp in the region and is composed of refugees from different countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Liberia. Currently, the camp shelters 2,855 households and 11,028 registered refugees and asylum seekers.

The refugee camp has 9 zones and 44 blocks, with the number of refugees fluctuating due to the continuous arrival and departure of refugees. The zoning of refugees is made based on their nationality and ethnic group to avoid inter-ethnic conflicts. The formal refugee camp administration is composed of refugee central committee (RCC) members at the top, zonal leaders that represent each zone, and block representatives called block chiefs. The informal structures serve more of the social, economic, and religious needs of the refugees, such as religious associations, women associations, youth associations, disability associations, market community, local police, or *Shorta* who manage the day-to-day activities in the camp.

Discussing Agency of Refugees from the Great Lakes Region

This section discusses the choices made by the refugees in Sherkole refugee camp, demonstrating the agency of the refugees, a point that goes against the dominant discourse which emphasizes their vulnerability. More specifically by focusing on refugees from the Great Lakes region, who arrived in Ethiopia by crossing more than one international border, the discussion focuses on three main aspects. First, it focuses on examining the informed choice-making of the refugees in choosing Ethiopia as their preferred destination among other places both in the Global North and in the neighboring countries. Secondly, this section also further examines how

refugees capitalize on narratives underlining shared socio-cultural values with the host. Furthermore, the agency of the refugees is also discussed and examined in reference to the different skills they bring with them in engaging in various economic activities beyond the camp settings.

Ethiopia's Appeal to Refugees from the Great Lakes

It is obvious that geographical proximity is the principal reason for refugees to choose a place as a destination while fleeing war and violence. That is why many African countries, including Ethiopia, were flooded by an influx of migrants whenever there was war and violence in their neighboring countries. However, the reasons for refugees to choose Ethiopia after crossing more than one international border demonstrate that the mainstream thought surrounding geographical proximity is not always tenable. Furthermore, this trend also shows that refugees and migrants' aspiration is not always to reach a destination in the Global North. Rather, they travel as far as they feel safe and relatively comfortable.

For refugees coming to Sherkole from Sudan and South Sudan, their primary reason to get into Ethiopia and specifically Sherkole refugee camp is its accessibility. Even though most of them cross the Ethiopian border for its geographical proximity, it is not always the single reason by itself. Refugees from Sudan and South Sudan provided three main reasons for their choice of Sherkole refugee camp. First, most refugees do not have legal documents, identity cards, and other facilities to go farther away. Second, most of them want to enjoy the seasonal movement to their homeland and in this regard, most of the refugees from Sudan and South Sudan are seasonal migrants with dual identities. In this regard, they go to their homeland for some farming seasons and come to Sherkole and reside as refugees. Third, pastoralists such as Nuer ethnic groups are not able to move with their large number of cattle to far areas. Hence, they prefer to reside in neighboring countries.

However, the extent to which the geographical proximity argument works for the Sudanese and South Sudanese does not work for refugees from the Great Lakes region. Meron (2019) argues that migrants make an informed decision about their direction after analyzing the different opportunities available for migrants at their final destinations, explaining why Ethiopian female migrants to the Gulf choose Djibouti as their transit destination than Sudan. The same is true for the Great Lakes refugees who used to stay in Kenya and Uganda as temporary destinations to continue their journey to Ethiopia. There are factors that encouraged the Great Lakes refugees to continue their journey and not to stay in their transit countries such as Kenya and Uganda. In the first place, the refugees perceived that their adversaries also live in the neighboring countries. As a result, they do not feel safe in the neighboring countries. In fact, the refugees first fled to neighboring countries and they tested how unsafe it was to stay for a long period of time. Consequently, they preferred to go farther. Besides the safety reason, as Lőrincz and Németh (2022) argues, mobility may create labor competition among migrants in the near destination. For instance, in Kenya and Tanzania, the number of forced migrants and refugees is higher than in Ethiopia. Therefore, whenever the refugees

are going far from their home area the probability of meeting people from their country decreases.

Refugees from the Great Lakes region neither stayed in a neighboring country nor had the intention to go back home permanently or to move back and forth. All interviewed refugees from this region strongly stated that they only wanted to resettle abroad or, if not possible, work and live in Ethiopia. Refugees even avoid other countries next to their neighbors. One of the informants, Isaac, came from North Kivu of Congo and by the time he escaped from North Kivu, he was only one mile away to get into South Sudan. However, he preferred not to go to South Sudan because he knew that South Sudan was in a worse condition than Congo. Thus, he moved to Uganda which was 17 kilometers far, where he stayed for six months before coming to Ethiopia.³ During the FGD discussion, many of the Great Lakes refugees underlined that staying in the immediate neighboring country is not preferable and they want to go far from the neighboring countries due to ethnic rivalries across ethnic groups dispersed across countries of the region.

.... we know that there is no way to get resettlement, especially for us who came from Great Lakes Region. We do not have a case to tell to the UNHCR and get our visa to America. So, we prefer working in Ethiopia. Still, we are struggling to get a full right to work.

(FGD, August 23, 2019, Sherkole refugee camp)

Networking and connectivity are other vital issues for refugees from Great Lakes Regions to come to Ethiopia, a network of brokers and human smugglers that work to transit refugees and migrants from central Africa to Arab countries especially to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, by considering Ethiopia as a transit country. Refugees aspiring to further migration to the Middle East or European countries use Ethiopian refugee camps as transit places. After reaching Ethiopia and spending some time in the camps, refugees continue their journey through different routes to different Arab countries via Djibouti, and some of them also try to go to different European countries by using the Sudan–Libya route.

A 33-year-old Congolese refugee living in Sherkole camp since 2013 described that he came to Ethiopia to go to Djibouti with his three friends. When he arrived at the Ethiopia-Kenyan border, his friends who had been in Sherkole refugee camp informed him about the routes and means to get to Sherkole. After joining his friends in Sherkole, they arranged a journey to Sudan via Metema with Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants. However, he could not get the money he was asked by the smugglers and he could not move away from Sherkole refugee camp, while his friends left him and moved to Sudan. Yet, he did not hear from his friends afterwards. Additionally, his wife also left him to try the sea route through Libya to Europe after she got financial support from her sister in Australia, and she was successful in getting into Italy.⁴

Another 25-year-old refugee from Congo came to Ethiopia to transit to Qatar after hearing about the job opportunities in Qatar in relation to the World Cup 2022. By the time he was in the Uganda refugee camp, his friends who had been in

Ethiopia told him about the job opportunities in Qatar and the route via Ethiopia. After arriving in Ethiopia, he and his friends left the camp and started their journey to Djibouti. However, they were unlucky. Before they reached Djibouti, they were arrested in Dire Dawa by the Ethiopian security forces. They were deported to Addis Ababa's RRS office. Fourteen of the thirty refugees caught on the journey were placed in Sherkole refugee camp, while the rest vanished and there was no information about them afterwards.⁵ Thus refugees, especially many Great Lakes refugees, use Ethiopia as the hub and transit to the Middle East and Europe. They also use the network of their friends who have arrived earlier as well as smugglers.

Family ties and social networks are also considered prominent forms of social capital for migration. Therefore, having family members at the destination positively affects the likelihood of moving there. Lőrincz and Németh (2022) underline that social capital has the special value that it can be used to decrease the risks and costs associated with migration and increase its benefits. Some Great Lakes refugees come to Ethiopia following their family members and relatives. Some refugees come to reunite with their families, whom they had been separated from in their home country. FGDs with the Great Lakes refugees suggested that some refugees are lonely and have no family members or relatives around them in the camp. This makes camp life even more distressful. During fieldwork interviews, there was one Cameroonian refugee in Zone G who came to Ethiopia in 2016. She used to work in an UN office in Cameroon and she sought to get asylum in Ethiopia due to some secret related to her French husband.⁶ Thus, for refugees like her who do not have any relatives or other refugees from their home country, life becomes more difficult and traumatic. Some refugees, thus encourage their family members to join them in the camp if life in their home country is not much better than life as a refugee.

Narrating his experience, one Congolese refugee said that when he came to Ethiopia 20 years ago, he didn't know any Congolese refugees in the country. He also remembered that first he was relocated to Gambella refugee camp. The refugee camp in Gambella was occupied by refugees from Nuer and Anuak and these refugees called him Habesha because of his physical resemblance to the highland Ethiopians. Even some of the refugees sought to attack him when there was a conflict between the host communities, particularly with Habesha. As a result, RRS protection officers isolated and gave him shelter inside the RRS compound. Moreover, he was the only refugee from Congo at that time. Thus, he was transferred to Addis Ababa as an urban refugee and finally joined Sherkole after many Congolese refugees had already been admitted to Sherkole refugee camp.⁷

In fact, refugees are attracted to countries where they have their relatives, families, or people they know. Because of the networks they have, it eases their lives when they live as refugees. Moreover, refugees feel safe when they live with their own ethnic group members. Most of the refugees live in groups, and the structure of the camp is also organized based on the refugees' ethnic and family connections in order to increase their feeling of safety. In this regard, the RRS program officer of the camps in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region said that refugees who do not have any family members or relatives are sent to Addis Ababa to live as urban refugees.

This is to protect refugees who have no relatives from any potential attack in the camp and to give them more security. In this regard, refugees are arranged to live with their own ethnic group or family members, and the refugees who have no relatives or family members may feel insecure. Hence, they get a chance to live as urban refugees.⁸

Making the Destination Safe: “We Are Ethiopian; That Is Why We Are Here”

The knowledge the refugees have about the culture and identity of a destination, as well as how the potential refugees share actual or putative history, culture or identity with the people in the destination, significantly influences the choice of a destination. Ruegger and Bohnet (2018) have argued that the ethnicity of refugees shapes how they examine the direction they should undertake.

Tutsi or Banyarwanda identity is a contested identity in Great Lakes regions. The Tutsi people originally lived in Rwanda. In post-colonial developments, these people scattered into the Great Lakes regions and developed different regional identities. For instance, Tutsi people in East Democratic Republic of Congo developed Banyamulenge identity since the 1960s. In DRC Banyamulenge were omitted in the national census of DRC in 1984 and their right to vote was denied in 1987 national election (Ndahinda & Mugabe 2022).

Regarding Great Lakes refugees’ affiliation with Ethiopia, refugees believed that their relations could be traced back to the Abyssinian highlands in historic Ethiopia. Their ancestors migrated southwards in search of water and grazing land, through Kenya and Uganda and then Rwanda where the Hutu people lived. Every Tutsi refugee in Sherkole would invoke this narrative to establish a historical relatedness with Ethiopians. Mopazi, 63, a Congolese refugee in Sherkole, probably the oldest from the Banyamulenge group in the camp, argued that all of the Banyamulenge, even those who are not literate, know the Tutsi origin is Ethiopia. Aldise, a Congolese female refugee, stated that she is a social science student and from her history class she learned that Ethiopia is a unique country in Africa and Ethiopians have a special relationship with the Tutsi people. As a refugee, choosing Ethiopia as a destination is also choosing their ancestral homeland.⁹ Mopazi added the following:

...we are Tutsi, Cushitic people. According to history, we are Oromo. We decided to come to Ethiopia as refugees because we know Ethiopia is our ancestors’ land. We are educated and we know history. We know the history of Ethiopia and Kenya. Our ancestors said that we are from Ethiopia. By the time they started killing us in 1994, they threw many bodies of dead Tutsis into Lake Kivu shouting ‘go back to Abyssinia where you came from’. That is why we decided to come to Ethiopia as refugees even though Ethiopia is far from Congo.

(Mopazi, August 29, 2019, Sherkole refugee camp)

In addition to the narratives of most of the Great Lakes refugees who related their history to Ethiopia, some of them also told about the speech of the late Prime

Minister Meles Zenawi in 2008. According to the interview held with the Great Lakes refugees in Sherkole refugee camp, who called themselves Tutsi, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi supported the Tutsi. Meles Zenawi condemned the genocide against Tutsi and sent peacekeepers to Rwanda in 1994. Tutsi refugees, regardless of which Great Lakes country they come from, share similar stories of Meles Zenawi's speech and the role of Ethiopian peacekeepers in Rwanda. Some informants even remarked that coming to Ethiopia as refugees is like coming to their second home.

Some informants tend to identify with a particular ethnic group that has a historical relation with the Tutsi. Jony is Banyamulenge from Congo and he observed different ethnic groups in Ethiopia. He realized that the Oromo people have the same culture with his ethnic group. He also added that the Tutsi dancing culture, social and economic practices, and their physical outlook resemble the Oromo people.

Generally, refugees from the Great Lakes region who entered Ethiopia through Kenya transit at least through Uganda and Kenya in order to reach Ethiopia. Most of them cross the border of Congo to Uganda on foot through the bush. Then from Uganda to Kenya they are told that there is road transportation with small payment. However, most of the refugees escaped from the war and they do not have enough money to pay for transport. The Congolese refugees may engage in different activities in Uganda, such as prostitution, daily labor, and other criminal activities to generate money for further travel to Kenya and Ethiopia.

Almost all refugees talked about the support they have got from Ethiopians upon arrival. In Moyale, all interviewed informants stressed Ethiopians' willingness to give them enough information about the IOM, UNHCR, and RRS offices. Most of the interviewed refugees also witnessed that they also received financial support from the Ethiopian people to reach Addis Ababa. There are also refugees who were sheltered in the private houses of Ethiopians in Moyale until they moved to Addis Ababa.

Moving with Skills

The economic interaction between the host community and the refugees in the area around Sherkole refugee camp has two elements: marketplaces inside the refugee camp serve as a meeting place to buy and sell goods, and refugees sell part of their rations to the host, such as oil, flour, pea, sorghum, wheat and soap, and other items such as plates, mattress, pans, and other materials they received as aid from the humanitarian organizations. Refugees also enjoy eating Injera in restaurants which are owned by the Habesha and there are petty trades by the local communities inside the camp such as potato, corn, onion, and spices. Some Congolese refugees also bring clothes from Kurmuk and Assosa and sell to their refugee fellows and to the host community informally. These activities are expanding due to the loose government control in the region.

The second aspect of economic interaction between refugees and the host community is outside the camp. Refugees typically find ways to get out of the refugee camp and into the host villages seeking economic exchange with the host community.

While some refugees do not go far away from their camps, others go to Kuburhamsa town, 10 kilometers from the camp and Homosha 15 kilometers from the camp for marketing activities.

Farming and mining are the major economic activities in which most of the refugees are involved. It is known that the Ethiopian government does not allow refugees to engage in any economic activity. Though the Ethiopian government does not allow refugees to be engaged in such activities, they are widely engaged in these activities informally. Refugees from different countries have different job preferences based on their economic networks and prior experience. Most of the refugees who came from Sudan prefer to open small shops and sell both food and non-food items for both the refugee communities and for the hosts. There are also some refugees who have butchery houses in the refugee camp. These merchants buy oxen from the local people and sell them to the refugees. Sometimes the merchants go on foot and bring oxen from Assosa. When refugee merchants bring oxen from Assosa, their friends from the host community support them to pass the checkpoints since refugees are not eligible to transport animals and other agricultural products into the camps unless they are allowed by the camp administration. These friends of the refugees who assist the refugees to pass the checkpoints may get rewards from the refugee merchants. However, the reward can be for example one kilogram of meat at one time. Most of the time the reward is in kind not in cash. Some Sudanese refugees also bring cattle from the bordering areas between Ethiopia and Sudan for sale and supply for the butchers both in the refugee camps and in the towns of the host community. Some of the refugees from Sudan and many refugees from South Sudan also prefer to engage in farming activities. The local farmers employ refugees as laborers. Sometimes, refugees are employed to cultivate the land, and finally to share the crops with the owner of the farm. Some of the local farmers also employ refugees on a daily rate.

On the other hand, refugees from the Great Lakes region predominantly engage in mining activities. Kuburhamsa (10 kilometers from the camp) and Homosha (15 kilometers) are the two towns that South Sudan and Sudanese refugees preferred to go to search for jobs especially, for labor work. These Great Lakes refugees go to Mänge Woreda (90 kilometers far from the camp) to engage in gold mining activities. Refugees from Great Lakes Regions generally have skills in mining and according to interviews and discussions with these refugees, most of them used to engage in the same activity in their home country. Hence they brought their skills to Ethiopia. After they reach an agreement, refugees move to the local cultivation land and may engage in different farming activities including sowing, plowing, cultivating, and preparing the land for the next harvest. The payment might be agreed based on the size of the farm and the duration of the activity.

The social network and connectivity with the host community and refugees in the business network is vital, especially to be involved in mining activities. Refugees who have a well-established relationship with the local people in Mänge have a better opportunity to get involved in the mining activity. As a result, refugees who go to the mining fields independently to try their luck without getting connected to a network of people may not be successful. A Burundian refugee shared his experience as follows:

The mining job is already held by some people and they do not allow other people to work. In February 2019, I went to the mining place with my friend to search for a job. However, let alone to get a job, we couldn't get a place to rent to spend a night. The local people are only willing to host the refugees they have acquaintance with for a long period of time and they do not welcome the newcomers. This is because the business is already dominated by some local people and some refugees in their network.

(Aldise, August 15, 2019, Sherkole refugee camp)

The mining network stretches up to Gambella region. There are brokers who create the business link from Assosa to Gambella. Legally speaking, the refugees are not allowed to move outside the camp without a pass permit. However, their business partners from the host community help them and facilitate the journey. The facilitation includes preparing fake pass permits and identity cards. Sometimes they bribe the gatekeepers of the camp to pass checkpoints. One of the informants was among the group of refugees who visited Gambella frequently for mining. He tells his Gambella experience as follows:

.... first we learned about going to Gambella from one South Sudanese refugee who had been in the Gambella refugee camp. He told us there is a better gold mining field in Gambella. I also heard field owners in Gambella need skillful people from refugees of the Great Lakes. Then I decided to go. The field owners facilitated my transportation and pass permit to pass the gate with the local people. We were three Congolese, two Burundian and two Sudanese. Then we arrived at a place called Rooma in Gambella. We stayed there for one month and each of us came back with about 10,000 birr. We mined twenty-five meters deep and the amount of gold we got was sixteen grams. There were also twelve local people with us, but the hardest part of the work was done by the refugees. However, the boss gave us the same amount of money for all of us. However, the local people who got the same amount of money as us were not happy because they knew we were refugees and that they are Ethiopian citizens. We suffered from lack of oxygen and faced every risk together digging the whole. I was not convinced that they should be paid better or even equal.

(Magozi, April 7, 2017, Sherkole refugee camp)

The refugees who participated in a focus group discussion disclosed there are businessmen in the gold mining area who have a mining machine. The machine owners recruited refugees for intensive labor to dig out the place where they suspected the presence of gold. The machine owners recruited refugees, especially Great Lakes refugees because these refugees have the mining skills. Once the gold is found, the machine owner is responsible for paying for the labor of digging. He is supposed to divide the money for refugees and local participants based on their labor contribution. A maximum of six people engage in a specific mining activity. However, they pay for the labor only if the laborers are lucky enough to find gold. Otherwise, the

owner of the machine only gives them food and shelter for their stay while digging. A refugee from Congo shared his experience in the mining area as follows:

For example, last month we were in the Mänge gold mining field. I was digging with my five friends. After two days of digging, we got 10 grams of gold. Then we brought it to the machine owner. He took seven gram and gave the remaining three gram to us. This was a great success for us. Our friends were digging for five or six months. However, they were not successful. But we were lucky. Moreover, some machine owners may deny you payment for your labor and chase you away after taking the gold. Since we work informally, we have nowhere to complain.

(Jony, August 27, 2019, Sherkole refugee camp)

Besides the low wages that refugees working in mining sites are suffering from, working informally in mining poses another risk for refugees. People who formally work in mining fields have life insurance because of the risk of the work. However, refugees working informally are not insured. This is because refugees do not pass through the formal employment process and they are not taxpayers. Hence, the employers and especially, the small mining organizations, do not provide insurance for refugees. Most of the employers are individuals who are not formally registered business owners. According to my discussion with informants who engaged in the mining, they lost their friends because of a landslide during excavation.

The above Congolese refugee who shared his experience claimed, “I am a mining expert in Mänge mining site”. However, he complained the benefit he gets from the mining is not worth his effort. Moreover, the digging activity has its own risk and they dig about 20 or 30 meters deep to get 8–10 grams of gold. They are also supposed to move inside the hole for 45 minutes to get the gold. With all risks and challenges, the share that refugees get from the gold is very small and the largest portion is taken by the local bosses. This includes 20% for the people who do the digging, 30% for the digging machine rent, 20% for the boss, and the remaining 30% distributed for the diggers no matter how many they are. Most of the refugees who are working in the mining area also change their activity and engage in other activities during the rainy season and resume their engagement in mining in the dry season. There are many Congolese refugees who have been engaged in mining activities for six to ten years.

Refugees also share the beliefs and superstitions of the local people about gold mining. According to informants, in the Mänge mining field, there is a big red and white snake which the local people believe that if it is seen in the place, that place is rich in gold and immediately it has to be excavated. In other words, it is a sign of good luck. Refugees who are working in the place also accepted this belief and according to informants who participated in the mining, they wait until they see a snake before they start digging for gold. Since they are told by the local people not to kill the snake, they are cautious to protect and obey the rule. A Congolese informant talked about the snake, that chasing the snake or talking bad things

about it is strictly forbidden. He also reiterated that the snake chased away some of his friends who ignored the rule and talked bad words about it. This shows that the refugees have close social relationships with the local community, including paying respect to the beliefs of the community and they are also influenced by it. Refugees who work with the locals in the mining area almost share the same beliefs regarding the snakes and many refugees testify that the community's belief in the snake is also their belief.¹⁰

Refugees from the Congo are also engaged in electric work installation. Refugees engage in electric installation and other skilled work because most of them bring their skills and they used to do the same thing in their home country. There are many refugees who repair generators, mobile phones, and stoves for both the host community and the refugees.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the agency of forced migrants in two different ways. First, it challenged the dominant discourse portraying refugees as migrants who cannot make any informed choice about their destination. By going beyond the dominant narrative, the chapter presented how refugees consider several factors in order to determine their destination. The South Sudanese and Sudanese prefer to take refuge in Sherkole camp because during their stay as refugees, they would, for example, navigate between the host camp and their place of origin for economic opportunities. Similarly, refugees from the Great Lakes have considered different reasons why they would join a camp in Ethiopia rather than staying in countries closer to their place of origin. At least within the limited options available, refugees have agency and may weigh the advantages and disadvantages of where to go. In addition to their agency of making a choice, refugees also anticipate the economic, cultural, and historical advantages they have in their destination. Hence, refugees from the Great Lakes regions come to Ethiopia considering all of the opportunities that they would get in Ethiopia. This finding supported the argument about refugees' agency and disproved refugees' movement as random movement.

A second key argument with respect to the agency of refugees presented in this contribution is in the way they are able to capitalize on their economic skills and make temporary or permanent living arrangements in their destinations in the Global South. The chapter showed how the Great Lakes refugees capitalize on the skill gaps at places of destination and make the best out of the skills they might have acquired at their places of origin. Moreover, Ethiopia appeals as a transit pathway to several other destinations in the Middle East and the Gulf region and beyond to the refugees from the Great Lakes. Finally, the chapter pointed to the purported historical and ethnic links as well as social networks that the refugees draw upon in making their choices about camp settlement. This contributes to the emerging argument that demonstrates refugees are not docile people who just sit and await opportunity, but rather have multiple forms of agency that they deploy to create and make use of opportunities within their range.

Notes

- 1 Information obtained from the RRS office of Bambasi refugee camp 2017.
- 2 KII with Tsore Camp Coordinator, April 2017 Tsore refugee camp.
- 3 IDI with Congolese refugee, Sherkole refugee camp, 2019.
- 4 IDI with Congolese refugee, August 2019, Sherkole refugee camp.
- 5 IDI with Congolese refugee, August 2019, Assosa town.
- 6 IDI with Cameroonian refugee, April 2017, Sherkole refugee camp.
- 7 IDI with Congolese refugee Sherkole refugee camp. August 2019
- 8 KII With regional RRS program officer, Assosa town. August 2019
- 9 IDI Congolese refugee, April 2017, Sherkole refugee camp.
- 10 IDI with Congolese refugee, Sherkole refugee camp, August 2019.

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Part III

**The Flows of Resources in
South-South Migration**



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6 Humanitarian Nomads

The Mobilities and Disjunctures Inherent to Aid Work in the Global South

Lauren Carruth

Introduction

The global humanitarian aid industry¹ has a workforce of around 630,000 people, mostly working in crisis- and disaster-affected countries in the Global South (ALNAP 2022). These aid workers² – the world’s humanitarians – are often portrayed in Hollywood movies and news media stories as “white saviors” (Cole 2012) parachuting into distant, crisis-affected, faraway places. However, this image of unidirectional movements of people as well as expertise and resources from places in the Global North to places in the Global South, misrepresents the reality of humanitarian response today.

A global network of relief agencies, donors, academics, and consultants called the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action, or ALNAP, finds that in 2020, over 90% of the humanitarian workforce were local and national staffers (ALNAP 2022, 63–64). In other words, the vast majority of aid workers are residents of the countries and communities where crises unfold and global relief agencies intervene. Most aid workers travel not from the Global North to the Global South, but within and between crisis-affected countries and communities in the Global South. The global humanitarian industry – still headquartered in and funded mostly by governments and institutions in North America and Europe – relies on the flexibility, mobility, and easy relocations of “local,” “subnational,” and “national” aid workers who can migrate, travel, and live within the Global South, in places where global humanitarian interventions recur.

However, even though they must travel and migrate regularly as part of their jobs, most humanitarian aid workers from the Global South remain stubbornly stuck, year after year, job after job, in parts of the world where emergencies and relief operations unfold. Their expertise is typically characterized as “local” in nature and their experience is discounted as being only in the “local” circumstances, cultures, and languages at hand. These aid workers’ citizenship, country of origin, and their geographic and professional locations in the bottom echelons of the hierarchical global aid industry limit their opportunities to move and work outside Global South localities. “One of the starkest divides falls between people who travel easily and people who do not,” Peter Redfield argues (2012, 358).

Materially heavy and socially light, the ex-patriate [aid worker] appears ever contingent, swept away by distant concerns. Materially light and socially heavy, the national staff member remains stolidly set, a repetitive actor in local history. ... unequal states of motion can trouble the dreams of slower aid workers, activists, and anthropologists alike.

(2012, 358–360)

This chapter, based on several years of ethnographic fieldwork in crisis-affected Somali communities and within humanitarian relief organizations in Ethiopia (Carruth 2018; 2021), examines the paradoxical mobilities and constraints fundamental to aid work today.

Yet there is more complexity than just a bifurcated global humanitarian industry, divided neatly between lightness and heaviness, or those who can move with dexterity and regularity and those who cannot. In Somali communities in Ethiopia, for example, local staffers travel and relocate between Somali-Ethiopian communities easily and often for work and educational opportunities as part of and outside the relief industry. Most Somali aid workers depart home every few days, weeks, or months – for site visits, data collection, distributions of goods or services, training in new skills, or professional meetings. Migration and travel are requirements and expectations of their jobs. However, their mobilities are limited to people’s countries of origin – and even within their own home subnational regions and ethnic communities. Occasionally, Somalis work temporarily for relief agencies serving Somali or pastoralist communities in countries nearby, in Somaliland, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Sudan. But Somalis were rarely hired to travel or work in other regions of Ethiopia or outside East Africa. Wherever they are posted, most Somali aid workers spend their careers working temporary, subcontracted, or lower-level jobs as “local,” “subnational,” or “field” staff.

Additionally, while Somali humanitarian aid workers move incessantly for work, they are not the only Somalis regularly traveling and migrating around the Horn of Africa. In general, Somalis frequently and easily cross international borders by foot, livestock caravan, cars, *khat* trucks, busses, and trains for healthcare, veterinary care, religious pilgrimages, family reunions, trading, shopping, or occasionally, to escape outbreaks of political violence, political insecurity, or natural disasters. Throughout the Horn of Africa, in the area called Greater Somalia, or *Soomaaliweyn*, populated and governed predominantly by ethnic Somalis, most Somalis can move easily across international borders, and outside the major checkpoints, can move without having to produce identification or official visas. In addition to these unrestricted and less regulated forms of movement, due to accelerating climate changes, regional desertification, political conflicts, population displacement, and the declining viability of pastoralist livelihoods, increasing numbers of Somalis are abandoning traditional pastoralist and agricultural livelihoods to seek employment in cities throughout Africa and the Middle East.

As this volume shows, South-South Migrations can offer important economic, professional, and education opportunities, for Somalis and others, across the African continent. However, my research shows that despite all the different forms of

mobility so popular and commonplace among Somalis in the Horn of Africa, their work in the global aid industry remains limited to geographic locations and professional positions within the Global South, and beyond that, mostly limited to work with other Somalis or pastoralist groups. The global humanitarian industry relies on flexible and mobile “assemblages” (Ong and Collier 2005) of local humanitarian aid workers, materials, and projects, but these assemblages are characterized by “disjunctures” (Appadurai 2000), or disruptive inequities, as well. Somalis love their traditions of nomadism and travel, and sometimes labor migrations present people with new economic and social opportunities, yet they share with other aid workers from places throughout the Global South stubborn limitations on their professional and geographic mobility. Accordingly, not all South-South Migration is equally beneficial or easy, and some industries like the global humanitarian industry, continue to rely on limited forms of South-South Migration and travel among its workforce, without offering much in the way of significantly increasing their access to better pay, benefits, professional advancements, and opportunities to take jobs elsewhere.

In the following pages, I examine the paradoxical and concurrent mobilities and “disjunctures,” or the contradictory “lightness” and “heaviness,” of Somali aid workers in the Horn of Africa, as they remain geographically stuck within Somali and pastoralist communities in the Global South, professionally stuck at the lowest professional ranks of the global humanitarian industry, and at the same time, incessantly and necessarily on the move for work in relief operations throughout the Horn of Africa. These contradictions and limitations are fundamental to global humanitarian response, and thus transcend aid work in any one place. Humanitarian aid workers originally from the Global South have little hope of moving from work in crisis-affected places near their countries of origin to headquarters offices in the Global North, for example, and moreover, they retain little power over the design and determination of humanitarian responses they work to implement and measure. Somali aid workers are humanitarian nomads – proudly and effectively so – but like other aid workers from the Global South, this research reveals they lack for equitable rights, compensation, protection, and recognition for their labor, expertise, and capacity to successfully migrate and travel for work compared to other aid workers (Carruth 2021). Keeping these nomadic humanitarians “local” and restricting their movements to pastoralist and Somali communities within the Global South, ensures their expertise and ideas fail to contribute to reforms and innovations happening elsewhere and in the global humanitarian sector.

“Moving Out Widens the Heart”

A young and ambitious aid worker named Ahmed³ from the Somali regional capital of Jigjiga in Ethiopia confessed to me in an interview that he loved traveling for work – it was one of his favorite parts of the job. It was one reason he applied to work with a large European non-governmental relief agency in town. “We are pastoralists,” he said. “We were born to move, movement, migrations.” As he spoke, Ahmed waved his hands back and forth across the table between us. “You see, that

is us, the camel tender moves from here to here regardless of the territories and boundaries. Moving is learning. You're exposed to cultures. Indigenous knowledges. Moving out widens the heart" (Carruth 2021).

Somalis are known for their seasonal migrations and distant travel for herding, religious practice, trade, education, and work (Laitin and Samatar 1987). Nomadism is key to Somali cultures and politics, and contingent and geographically dispersed kinship structures are vital to nomadic and semi-nomadic livelihoods, economies, and trade networks throughout the Horn of Africa (Catley 2013; Sabates-Wheeler, Lind and Hoddinott 2013; Watkins and Fleisher 2002). Today, however, there are additional nomads (or "*reer guraa*") in the Somali Region – the rising legions of local aid workers and health care providers funded by relief organizations. The chronicity, rhythms, and seasonality of these nomadic aid workers' frequent travels back and forth between rural and urban locations, between camps of pastoralists and settlements of displaced people, and between dry seasons, regular droughts, and devastating floods, resonate among many Somalis who have been raised among nomadic pastoralists and traders always on the move.

Throughout the Horn of Africa, this burgeoning cohort of nomadic aid workers – usually young people, just out of secondary school or university, including men and increasing numbers of women – finds economic and educational opportunities moving around the region for training and work opportunities with the global aid industry. Mohammed, a young program officer, with two toddlers at home, working for an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Jigjiga similarly recounted:

There is high population mobility here, there are mobile phones, there is social media, and the like. People move around a lot and they are familiar with many different people. Traveling is good. Trying new things is good. ... I like to pass through different zones [in Ethiopia] and it's good.

Somalis' longstanding dependence on and love for mobility does not just enable the kinds of job opportunities provided by the relief industry. Mobility "widens the heart," Ahmed argues. It is a moral experience to travel, meet new people, experience new ways of life, and provide assistance across geographic, political, and cultural divides. He continued,

For example if you are on a field trip passing through *kebeles* [communities or neighborhoods] you should stop and spend five or ten minutes in a place. And then you can ask them if there is anything they need. One day I was actually doing this, and they said 'you are passing through and providing for another community – but don't pass us. We have needs too!' At that time, we [the relief NGO] were only targeting one side and didn't realize others' needs. Then we could come back, get all the information we needed, and prepare for future projects.

Many Somali women love to travel too. Nimo, a female project officer in a European relief agency, told me once that, "there is a perception of Somali women that

they are conservative and do not want to travel and work outside the home.” Another woman named Mona nodded nearby, saying, “Yes! Indeed, there is a perception but it is not the culture that is constraining.” It is not cultural, they both spoke out, but rather in Nimo’s words, “practically how can you work there when there is so much hardship? Where can a woman use the toilet? Where can you sleep?” Nimo explained, “We are not divided from men,” meaning women did not necessarily need to work or sleep separately from men or, as she explained later, should not be considered unequal to men. “We have even been left with a situation in the field where we had only one room to share with other male staffers!” Both women were laughing at this, Mona encouraging her to keep talking, “We were willing to share the one open room, but the men decided to sleep outside the building, and let us sleep inside.” Laughing, Nimo reiterated how glad she was to have the opportunity to work in humanitarian relief, despite the awkward sleeping arrangements it sometimes required. “I love to work here. Even there in the field.” When I asked specifically what motivates them to do this kind of work Mona chimed in with enthusiasm,

Number one, I get more money. Two, I am building my own experience and education, and three, I have the potential to travel to different places, different countries even maybe. In the government you stay in one office, one clinic, one duty, but with NGOs you can get different experiences.

Abshir, a program officer in a United Nations relief agency based in Jigjiga, is joyful, insatiably curious, and when not at his desk, can usually be found with arms around his friends’ and colleagues’ shoulders, teasing them, making small talk around the office, and recounting his children’s latest achievements. For the last 14 years, Abshir has helped organize and staff dozens of mobile teams of health workers to travel and provide care to remotely camped pastoralists and disaster-affected Somali communities.

In 2004, reports of rising rates of severe acute malnutrition in children and outbreaks of diarrheal disease increased, especially in an area southeast of Jigjiga populated mostly by members of the Marehan *qabiil* (family or “clan”). Abshir described these places as, “perhaps the most marginal and remote in the country,” due in part to the fact that Siad Barre, the former dictatorial leader of Somalia who went to war with Ethiopia in 1977, was born and raised there. Early on, during the implementation of a Mobile Health and Nutrition Team operation there, Abshir expressed frustration at the reluctance among his Ogadeni colleagues to travel and stay overnight in Marehan-dominated territory. Like most of the mobile team nurses, Abshir is Ogadeni. He said, “I understand how they feel about us Ogaden people coming down from all the way here in Jigjiga.” His staffers were afraid to stay the night, and begged him to let them drive until after curfew and sleep in the Ogaden city of Gode instead. But there had been no outbursts of violence and no threats against the nurses, so Abshir required them to stay. Then, gradually, over time, he said, first following a successful polio vaccination campaign, and then after another clinical response to measles along the border, misgivings between the aid workers and the patient population noticeably relaxed.

Abshir concluded his story, saying, “People” – meaning these aid workers on the mobile team – “need to go. Just go! Be present there.” With his index finger pointing to his eye, he repeated to me insistently, “They must look the other people in the eye. It makes a difference. It makes a big difference.” In other words, being “present” with people can facilitate successful interventions. It can help build new relationships of trust, and in so doing, undercut fears, animosities, histories of violence, and political insecurity. Humanitarian aid work attends to suffering and saves lives, but in doing so, can also build reciprocal relationships of care, trust, and peace across oppositional social and political divides.

Multiple conflicts and political violence in Ethiopia triggered more than 5.1 million new displacements in 2021 – the highest annual figure ever recorded for a single country (IDMC 2022). In the eastern part of the country, including in the Somali Region, population displacements and conflicts were exacerbated by drought conditions (IOM 2022). Stressful migrations have accordingly shaped lives and livelihoods in this part of the world for years. Borderlands between Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia, and Kenya have been sites of contestation, resistance, terrorism, violent policing, detention, military aggression, and interpersonal violence (Galaty 2016; Tazebew and Kefale 2021); additionally, regional boundaries between the Somali, Afar, Oromia, and Tigray, among other ethnic-based regions in Ethiopia have been sites of numerous acts of violence, competition for natural resources, and construction of camps and settlements for internally displaced persons (Adugna 2011; Hagmann 2014; Kefale 2010; 2013; Kenec 2022; Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). So being able to travel, to meet new people across disputed territorial and political boundaries, and then to advocate and care for people in need, were all vital and morally transformative for local aid workers there. Aid work instantiated a world – articulated and enacted by many Somalis, inside the aid industry and outside it – free of violent borders, camps, and geographic enclosures.

Hospitality Enables South-South Mobility for Aid Work

Hospitality is commonly cited as characteristic of Somalis, and many Somalis have interviewed over the years have testified to its centrality in their lives. The importance of hospitality to Somalis derives, at least in part, from the precarity and vast distances between trading centers and expansive grazing lands in the mountainous and arid landscapes of the Horn of Africa and *Soomaliweyn*. Somalis’ traditional land-sharing practices and flexible restrictions on access to natural resources like grasses and water sources, especially during dry months and droughts, reflect this ethic of hospitality. Further, rejecting or ignoring a visitor, a refugee, a stranger, a herder, or any person in need risks being “cursed,” Yoonis, a local Somali community leader in Ethiopia explained, “and potentially, if the violation is serious, the family will have to pay blood money (*diya*) or livestock to the other person in compensation,” just as they would have to do to for violent crimes. Being inhospitable, Yoonis went on, “is a total insult; it is like violating a law. *Ugaas* [traditional Somali community leaders outside government] set standards for hospitality and enforce these traditions. Hospitality is the fundamental, core ethic here.”

Hospitality is also key to notions of humanitarianism – or “*samafal*” in the Somali language (Carruth 2021). Doctor Hamza, an elder and a health policy leader from Jigjiga introduced previously in this chapter, described *samafal* by telling the following story:

When I was a child in the bush, some families were broke—they had no camels, no money. Nothing at all. At that time, early in the morning, our family would milk a camel, and then we would bring a container of that milk to the person’s house. And the container would stay there at their house, in the front of their house [he gestured, demonstrating a container shape]. Many people would contribute milk to the same container, filling it up. That family would then have more than enough milk, you see, it would be totally full, and then they would be able to share the milk from the full container with others. We share. That is how we have enough.

On another occasion, during a conversation about his extended family’s move from a rural village to the bustling city of Jigjiga, Farah, a program officer at a UN relief agency said,

If you have five camels for example, you will distribute each of the five camels to your family members or other people who need them. People share and redistribute resources during crises to make sure everyone has enough to survive.

Every one of the aid workers I have lived with, travelled with, and interviewed during research throughout Ethiopia and Djibouti, had themselves survived multiple humanitarian crises, and most of their families had at some point, often repeatedly, received humanitarian assistance – food ration, supplies of clean water, schooling in a refugee camp, and so on. Many spoke of being inspired by the professionalism and competence of Somali, Ethiopian, and expatriate clinical providers during relief operations and inside refugee camps. Of course, aid was also widely critiqued by locals for its late arrival, its ephemerality, its inadequacy, and the way it was often manipulated by politicians. But even so, the life stories of Somali aid workers typically involved the phrases, “when my parents fled with me to...” and “I was a refugee once, too” and “my God we had nothing then.” These individuals have witnessed, time and again, the miracles of lives saved through various forms of global humanitarian engagement – children recovered from cholera in a UNICEF-funded hospital or childbirth attended by a woman trained and supplied by Doctors Without Borders.

A Somali aid worker I call Mahamed, for example, was born in a small community in eastern Ethiopia near the Somaliland border. When he was a toddler, in 1978, during what is often called “The Ogaden War” he and his family fled southward over the border with Somalia as regional militaries fought for control of the mountainous borderlands near his home. Then, six years later, during the civil war in Somalia, his family led northward, back across the border, through Somaliland,

and back into Ethiopia. They settled in a sprawling refugee camp near the town of Degago. As a teenager and then young man, Mahamed worked for six different humanitarian organizations and two different governmental relief bureaus in and around the camp. Sometimes he volunteered in the clinic run by Doctors Without Borders and UNHCR, and he helped organize soccer games and other activities for youth in the area. As he got older, he was hired for temporary gigs with aid agencies, providing Somali-to-English or Amharic language interpretation, or helping lead expatriate aid workers through the desert expanses where nomadic pastoralist families camped. In his 20s, fluent in English, Amharic, and Somali, he worked short-term salaried jobs monitoring distributions of food aid and conducting research for needs assessments whenever emergency conditions arose.

Mahamed has for decades been invaluable to aid agencies. He knows nearly everyone living within a three-hour driving radius of the Degago refugee camp. As of 2022, his father lived an hour away along the border with Somaliland, his mother lived in a small town closer to Djibouti, and his wife and children lived in the nearest city nearly three hours away where they attend high school. Mahamed spent most days traveling between these different homes, sleeping and eating in the homes of his friends and extended relatives, and staying in towns where work and training opportunities are available. He can do so because of common understandings, habits, and expectations of hospitality.

Mahamed is not unique. Numerous professional Somalis now travel and stay in the homes of friends and family members in communities and countries nearby as they navigate the mercurial nature of ad-hoc relief operations, and the unpredictable flows and sites of international attention and funding. Every year greater numbers of Somali women, like Nimo and Mona, join the humanitarian workforce and travel from place to place for work as well, despite women's relatively lower rates of participation in the workforce and lower access to higher education compared to other Ethiopian groups (Elezaj et al. 2019; Teklehaimanot and Teklehaimanot 2013).⁴ The familiarity of mobility and the centrality of hospitality to everyday life and work allows local staffers, men and women, to take temporary jobs that require travel and relocations, whenever and wherever they emerge.

Labor Hierarchies that Enable and Constrain Mobility

Most humanitarian aid workers – both in the Horn of Africa and in the Global South more generally – at some point travel or relocate to communities or countries nearby for temporary work and training opportunities, as disasters, conflicts, and international attention to different crises ebb and flow. Mobility is fundamental to the humanitarian sector and the humanitarian mission to save lives in emergencies (Redfield 2008). While Somali aid workers' mobility for aid work is made possible by long traditions of regular migrations and hospitality, their mobility is also shaped and constrained by their positions within the hierarchical global humanitarian aid industry. Figure 6.1, below, describes the labor hierarchies inherent to the global humanitarian industry, using humanitarian response in eastern Ethiopia as




Figure 6.1 Labor hierarchies in the global humanitarian system, as experienced in Ethiopia.

a case example. At the top of the industry hierarchy operating there, a relatively small number of expatriate staffers work for high salaries, enjoy generous work benefits, and can travel and relocate internationally with ease. These international aid workers typically have permanent homes in Western donor countries and capital cities where aid agencies are headquartered. They may travel to places like the Somali Region of Ethiopia for site visits or data collection, but they do not spend more than a few days or weeks in the places where relief operations occur.

National staffers populate the second highest, but still relatively small section of the workforce hierarchy. In Ethiopia, for example, these individuals mostly speak Amharic as a first language and are usually fluent in English as well. They are part of the burgeoning middle to upper class in the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa; most have university degrees and post-graduate training in nursing, medicine, or the social sciences; and many occasionally travel around the country and internationally for conferences and education. These staffers may spend a few days or weeks outside urban headquarters offices, but like expatriates, these Ethiopians typically do not spend much time in communities, camps, or relief operations outside these cities.

The majority of the humanitarian workforce in Ethiopia, indicated by the largest and lowest part of the pyramid, are neither expats nor Ethiopians from the capital city. They are locals from places like the Somali Region of Ethiopia perpetually in crisis, who work in offices close to where crises and relief operations happen, and who struggle to advance to jobs located in offices in capital cities – much less to headquarters located outside their country of origin. Many workers at the bottom

of the aid work hierarchy, including Somali aid workers, are from minoritized and racialized ethnic groups, and remain simultaneously marginalized and distant from political power in Addis Ababa.

In Ethiopia and elsewhere, this humanitarian labor hierarchy is characterized by gradations of power and material resources, marked by parallel racialized⁵ ethno-linguistic distinctions, differences in educational attainment, everyday language use, wealth, and the capacity, frequency, and ease of international movement to and within Global North countries (Carruth 2021). More broadly, “[t]he contemporary professional structure of the liberal humanitarian space,” Junru Bian argues, is characterized by “a covert power hierarchy fueled by perceptions of expertise and competency along racial lines—particularly around one’s whiteness” (Bian 2022, 2 drawing on Benton 2016). Thus, the professional hierarchies that structure aid workers’ positions and mobilities in Ethiopia are shaped by perceptions of and proximities to the whiteness that dominates global humanitarian aid work (as discussed in Carruth 2021), as well as histories of imperialism, ethnic federalism, and perceptions of racialized ethno-linguistic distinction particular to the Ethiopian context (discussed in Abbink 2011; Kefale 2013; Mengisteab 2013).

Somali-Ethiopians, accordingly, mostly populate “local” “field” offices and hold most lower-level, temporary, and subcontracted staff positions in eastern Ethiopia, whereas Amharic-speaking Ethiopians from the central parts of the country hold most higher-level, salaried positions in the capital city of Addis Ababa. A Somali man I call Aden, a leader for over 15 years in a UN relief office in the Somali regional field office in Jijjiga said, accordingly, “I cannot get an international post despite the fact I have applied many times. I have been rejected and rejected. ... They want me to stay. They want to keep me here” (Carruth 2021, 4).

Participation, Localization, and the Necessity of South-South Mobility

Several reform movements over the last few decades have attempted to ameliorate these kinds of structural inequities within the aid industry, worsened in low-income countries by structural adjustment programs and the decimation of governmental budgets for health, disaster prevention, and social services. Beginning in the latter half of the 20th century, international aid programs began explicitly referencing the moral necessity of “local participation” as a way to address beneficiaries’ perceived innate and moral deficiencies and prevent their potential “dependency” on foreign aid distributions (Carruth and Freeman 2021; Chambers 1994; Hickey and Mohan 2004, 5–9; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Mosse 2003). Methods for designing international interventions, like “participatory rural appraisals,” for example, were designed to give recipients ownership of the aid they received and meaningfully engage them in shaping aid projects that unfolded in their communities.

As participatory approaches were mainstreamed and supported by major aid organizations and Global North donor countries during the 1990s and 2000s, the residents of communities in the Global South where global aid agencies intervened, in some cases, gained a modicum of power to determine the design and priorities of

the aid packages in their communities. As such, some scholars argued, participation could potentially be “transformative,” even sometimes undermining tyrannical and undemocratic regimes (Hickey and Mohan 2004). Many of these participatory projects modeled democratic participation in government and spurred democratic reforms (Fox 2007; Gaventa 2004; Gaventa and McGee 2013). The rising popularity of participatory methodologies and projects was part of humanitarian policy and workforce reforms as well (Asgary and Lawrence 2020). The 1991 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (UNOCHA 2016), the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (ICRC 2018), the new and revised Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (2014), and the Sphere Standards (2018) each underscore the importance of “local” people and “local” organizations to making relief more effective and ethical.

Local participation and participatory methodologies require substantial work on the ground. Local labor is necessary to liaise with local leadership and residents, distribute materials, enforce adherence to program designs, process paperwork, collect data, provide language translation, provide logistical support, distribute goods and services, and monitor and evaluate projects. Even in humanitarian crises, when many governmental and nongovernmental emergency response agencies may be compromised, these jobs are mostly performed by people from the regions where the interventions unfold. While all these different forms of local labor are necessary for the production of participatory projects, they are often only performed as side gigs, or as part of subcontracted, temporary, or informal work, and are thus neither counted by human resource departments, nor necessarily leading to promotions, professionalization, raises, or benefits packages.

Within many global humanitarian aid institutions like the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (or UNOCHA), and others, there has been increasing attention in the last ten years to the needs of the “locals” who are also the beneficiaries or targets of temporary global humanitarian interventions (ODI 2013; UNOCHA 2023). What’s called “The Grand Bargain,” for example, launched in 2016, is an agreement between major donor and aid organizations to provide beneficiaries, local aid workers, and local organizations the means to design, evaluate, and improve the humanitarian interventions in their midst. This is one part of an effort across the humanitarian sector to prioritize the “localization of aid,” and the decentralization of resources and staffing from institutions and offices in the Global North to sub-national and local organizations and citizens located in crisis-affected countries in the Global South (Bennett et al. 2016; Charter4Change 2020; Gingerich and Owen 2015; Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2022; Oxfam 2016; Mahmood 2017).

Workshops and publications by relief organizations now portray the national and sub-national staffs of relief organizations as the heroes and the rightful focus of global assistance (Oxfam 2014, e.g. UNICEF 2019). Lower overhead, lower salaries, and reduced logistical hassles by subcontracting or partnering with local organizations – compared to hiring and deploying expatriate staffers and consultants – mean “localized” interventions can potentially cost less and involve

fewer challenging logistics (Van Brabant and Patel 2018). But beyond these material and logistical concerns, interventions and people that are more “local” are also now perceived by global relief organizations as somehow better, more ethical, more attuned to local realities and cultures, and more accountable to beneficiary populations. As a recent report from the Brookings Institution argues,

After generations of investment in education, technical training, and social infrastructure, no one now argues that developing countries lack talented people. Indeed, the ranks of development organizations are filled with highly qualified, deeply experienced local professionals who have grown up working in international development.

(Fine 2022)

This has observable effects on humanitarian interventions and aid workers in places like eastern Ethiopia. Doctor Hamza, a physician and a former leader within the Somali regional government within Ethiopia said in an interview,

Today the [governmental] Health Bureau here is 100% Somali. ... Most INGOs [international nongovernmental organizations] are headed by Somalis now too, and before five years the heads of office were mostly either white or highlander.⁶ This is a big change for us now, and it really helps us to be free.

Powerful global relief organizations working in eastern Ethiopia, such as UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, and others are progressively funneling more money to subnational governmental offices like the Somali Regional Health Bureau and local Somali-run nongovernmental and civil society partners. These organizations are also hiring more locals, more Somalis, and fewer Amharic-speaking Ethiopians from the capital Addis Ababa, as well as fewer expatriates, to staff subnational and field offices. As such, localization is a powerful movement within the humanitarian industry – a movement that can have profound local political and social effects.

However, the burgeoning power of local people and organizations is still dwarfed by the power of donor governments and international NGOs headquartered in the Global North (shown elsewhere in Cooke and Kothari 2021). While local offices are almost exclusively staffed by ethnic Somalis in eastern Ethiopia, few if any ethnic Somalis from the Horn of Africa staff headquarters offices in the Global North, and according to recent research, more generally, few crisis-affected people have managed to obtain leadership positions within the global aid industry or sit on international NGO governing boards (ALNAP 2022; Worden and Saez 2021). “Localization,” for the most part, has meant more work for residents of crisis-affected communities, but not more power for individuals or organizations in the Global South. The global aid industry is paradoxically reliant on the mobility of local aid workers within the Global South for their localization efforts while leaving unaddressed the inability of local aid workers to travel or obtain visas or jobs

outside their countries or regions of origin (see also Tsanni 2023, regarding similar challenges in the field of global health).

Humanitarian Assemblages: Global, Local, and Mobile

The international humanitarian industry is comprised of complex relations of actors and organizations that are at once products of globalization – or the global reach and movement of ideas about crisis, intervention, and humanitarianism, as “abstractable, mobile, and dynamic” phenomena (Collier and Ong 2005, 4) – as well as products of “localization” – or the effort to devolve power and resources away from Global North centers of power to the communities where interventions happen, mostly in the Global South (ALNAP 2022; Fine 2022). As such, the contemporary humanitarian industry represents what Collier and Ong (2005) call a “global assemblage” that is territorialized not primarily through nation-state borders, but through its focus on locality and mobility. Humanitarian interventions must be adequately “localized” and staffed by locals, as well as flexible and responsive to dynamic and dispersed emergency situations happening around the world. Within this, aid workers must be mobile and adaptable, exhibiting what Ong (1999) calls “flexible citizenship” in their ascertainment of resources, benefits, belonging, and rights outside governmental authorities and across territorial or political boundaries. As such, “flexibility, migration, and relocations, instead of being coerced or resisted, have become practices to strive for rather than stability” (Ong 1999, 19).

However, Somali aid workers, most of the world’s humanitarians, are neither like Ong’s (1999) “flexible citizens,” able to fully seize economic opportunities in the global capitalist economy through global mobility, nor do they reflect the “lightness” of Redfield’s (2012) “expats” – global elites with passports from donor countries and the ability to travel and live in the Global North as well as the Global South. As shown in this chapter, Somali aid workers’ networks of mobility, social relations, and labor differ in three important ways: first, Somalis’ constant mobility within the Horn of Africa for work, livestock, trade, healthcare, and so on happens across Global South borders but often without hallmarks of imperialist or nation-state territoriality in the forms of checkpoints or visas. Somalis easily and frequently pass over borders that were historically designed to partition them and thwart their geographic movements, kinship ties, economic ties, and political solidarities. Second, the increasing numbers of Somali aid workers from the Horn of Africa, traveling and relocating within the region frequently for job opportunities, happens concurrently with the simultaneous sedentarization and displacement of nomadic pastoralists throughout the region. Humanitarian nomads reflect traditions of mobility, hospitality, and *samafal* long held by nomadic pastoralists, but at the same time these legions of nomadic humanitarians are available to work largely because of the declining viability of careers in livestock pastoralism and the continuing political insecurity and displacement of Somalis from their homelands. Third, as aid workers, they are part of a burgeoning well-educated, professional class in places like the Somali Region of Ethiopia, but they also remain alienated

from the means of producing policies and designing relief interventions. They lack equal power, capital, and global mobility compared to aid workers from the Global North.

Global humanitarian aid assemblages, to riff on Collier and Ong's (2005) phrasing – including aid workers, relief operations themselves, and all the different global and local relief agencies and governments involved in aid work – are therefore not solely products of or subordinate to global capitalism, neo-liberal politics, or donor countries and wealthy actors in the Global North – but neither are they independent of these powerful forces and forms.⁷ These nomadic aid workers present alternative ways of working and providing humanitarian assistance today. Their power, mobility, and labor in post-colonial, politically insecure, non-capitalist, and economically precarious spaces have allowed for the emergence of subaltern but powerful global assemblages of nomadic aid work. These emergent humanitarian assemblages are shaped and enabled by Somalis' long traditions of nomadism, hospitality, *samafal*, and transnational mobility but they are at the same time constrained by inequities inherent to the global humanitarian system and the impossibility of Somalis' migration, travel, and work outside the Global South.

Arjun Appadurai (2000), likewise, finds that “relations of disjuncture” characterize contemporary global assemblages. Somali aid workers in Ethiopia – and other aid workers moving for work within the Global South – are thus neither completely excluded from nor equally powerful within capitalist labor economies like the global humanitarian relief sector. Instead, he finds, “these disjunctures themselves precipitate various kinds of problems and frictions in different local situations ... that produce fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice, and governance” (Appadurai 2000, 5). Relations of disjuncture, and unequal distributions of power, resources, opportunity, and the ability to move and travel with the global humanitarian industry, shape the limitations and potentials of Somalis' aid work. Somalis' nomadic humanitarian work reveals important subaltern mobilities and emergent forms of power and success within the progressively localizing aid industry – even as their work continues to be limited by long-standing racialized global inequities.

Disjunctured South-South Mobilities

Somalis' “lightness” and their enjoyment of regular travel and migration enable their easy interpolations into nomadic forms of aid work. These humanitarian nomads are remarkably skilled in the provision of emergency relief across geographic and political boundaries. However, throughout the Horn of Africa, traditions of nomadic pastoralism exist alongside the progressive sedentarization of pastoralists. Somalis' regular travel for visiting, trade, livestock, religious practice, education, and work exists alongside conflict and forced migrations throughout the region. Somalis' reliance on and love of travel and migration remain, even as most Somalis in the Horn of Africa lack access to visas, passports, and opportunities for travel and work outside the Global South. Somali aid workers retain a desire and enjoyment for fieldwork and site visits, even as their geographic and professional

mobilities are curtailed by an inequitable aid industry, inflexible laws, and global forces and trends largely beyond their control. Efforts to promote participation and localization within the aid industry have necessitated increased South-South mobilities and migrations for aid workers, but never their true freedom or equality. In the face of these paradoxes, however, “moving out widens the heart,” Ahmed insisted, and travel and migration within and between crisis-affected places in the Global South contain the potential to emancipate individuals from violent political and economic enclosures.

As Appadurai points out, the uneven distribution of power, resources, and rights to move, or the disjunctures and inequities so characteristic of global assemblages like the global humanitarian aid industry, contain within them the potential for transformation and empowerment. Thus, for many Somalis, nomadic aid work enables and represents limited forms of freedom, fulfillment, and career advancement. Somali aid workers’ imagination of the world and the humanitarian industry otherwise, their mobility and work in defiance of inequities and borders, “allow people to consider migration, resist state violence, seek social redress, and design new forms of civic association and collaboration, often across national boundaries” (Appadurai 2000, 6). Global humanitarian assemblages can enable emancipatory politics, including potentially through what the global aid industry calls “participatory action” or “localization.” In this case, among Somali aid workers and local humanitarian industry in the Horn of Africa now staffed almost exclusively by Somalis, emancipation is imagined and enacted through mobility, in ways only nomads can imagine.

Notes

- 1 Following ALNAP (2022), in this chapter I define the humanitarian industry as all the actors (people, institutions, laws, governments, etc.) that organize, fund, and implement relief operations. They may be local organizations, like civil society groups or religious organizations, and they may be global relief agencies and donors, such as UNICEF or USAID. Humanitarian relief operations, in contrast to development or health interventions, are defined as temporary programs or interventions designed to save and protect human lives during conflicts, population displacements, disasters, and major social, political, or economic upheavals.
- 2 In this chapter, I use the phrase “aid workers,” to refer to people who work in some position within the humanitarian industry and who work on the ground or in the field planning, implementing, or evaluating various responses to humanitarian emergencies.
- 3 All names in this chapter are pseudonyms to protect my interlocutors’ identities.
- 4 Unlike male aid workers, female Somali aid workers I spoke to during this research frequently mentioned they struggled to balance childbearing with the frequent travel required of humanitarian relief operations. However, more and more women were employed every year by global relief agencies, and all women I spoke with expressed excitement about the growing number of women doing this kind of work.
- 5 Race in Ethiopia remains a complex rather than a binary or static concept. Racialized hierarchies include complex racialized and politicized differentiations between the many ethnic and linguistic groups in Ethiopia, whereby self-identified *Habesha* Ethiopians from the central and northern mountainous parts of the country, who mostly speak Amharic or Tigrinya as a first language, are perceived by Somalis and others to be disproportionately promoted to higher levels of authority within the humanitarian industry

compared to people from pastoralist groups and other ethnolinguistic groups from the southern and eastern part of the country.

- 6 The term “highlander” is typically used to refer to persons of Amhara and other ethnicities that mostly live in the mountainous central, northern, and western parts of Ethiopia.
- 7 Even people like Somali aid workers, for example, perhaps outside what Ong (2005, 698) calls “hypercapitalist zones,” are not, I find, completely “globally excluded,” or part of what Ong characterizes as “populations without rights” only working for “sheer survival.” They work as part of important global economies like the global humanitarian industry, and they have found professional success and relatively lucrative gigs as aid workers, compared to their peers in the declining sectors of nomadic pastoralism, for example.

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7 The Flow of Resources in the Global South

The Transfer of Agricultural Skills between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso

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Introduction

Compared to South-North Migration, South-South Migration is vastly less discussed in international debates, the media, and scientific literature. However, it represents a significant share of international migration (De Lombaerde, et al. 2014). In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, intra-regional migration represents 70% of total migration in the region (World Bank Group 2019). The Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire migration corridor is one of the most renowned migration corridors in West Africa. Because of their shared colonial history, their socio-cultural similarities, and the economic appeal of Côte d'Ivoire, the latter has long been and remains the primary destination for Burkinabe migrants. Over the years, the literature has shown the financial benefits of this migration for migrant families. Indeed, thanks to work done in Côte d'Ivoire, Burkinabe migrants have long been able to support their households of origin financially and thus participate in improving their living conditions. While the financial benefits of migration captured the most attention in the literature, its non-material contributions have not been thoroughly explored. The movement of people leads to the sharing of ideas, knowledge, and skills that are highly beneficial to the origin countries upon the return of the migrant. We also consider that the reasons for which migrants return are often related to geographical proximity, family needs, and long-standing goals.

In this chapter, we focus on the skills acquired by returned migrants from Côte d'Ivoire looking specifically at new and innovative agricultural skills. To do so, we use qualitative data collected as part of the MIDEQ project conducted in five regions of Burkina Faso to understand the ins and outs of this type of skill transfer between the two countries and their impact on Burkina Faso's development. More specifically, we focus our work on the Centre-East region of Burkina Faso. According to the 2006 national population census, this region was the third most crucial departure region for international migrants (Dabiré et al. 2009).¹ We draw on the migration biographies of ten migrants returning from Côte d'Ivoire, who invested and innovated in one way or another in agriculture in Burkina Faso.

The remaining part of the chapter is organised so as to consider the contributions of the flows of resources in the case of Burkinabe migrants to Côte d'Ivoire. Firstly, we present the context of the study, giving basic background to readers

about the context of the study area and the research that led to this publication. We continue with a brief review of the literature on the non-material contributions of migration and the flow of resources. Lastly, we have a discussion based on empirical data collected from the field and analysis. Section five presents the conclusions.

Overview of the Migration History in Burkina Faso – Côte d'Ivoire Corridor and Social Remittances

Côte d'Ivoire, an Old but Still Up to Date Migration

According to Coulibaly (1986), the migration history between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire goes back to colonial times, which contributed to migration flows within the West African region. The colonial period can be divided into two major phases, each triggering a different type of migration flow. Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) was established in 1919. In 1932, the French colonial power divided the colony and attached three-quarters of it to Côte d'Ivoire. The abolishment of the colony was intended to attract the Mossi (the main ethnic group in Burkina Faso) labour to the northern part of the colony of Côte d'Ivoire and divert some commercial movement from the Gold Coast (present Ghana) towards the French territory. Thus, the coloniser constructed a continuum between the ex-colony of Upper Volta and Côte d'Ivoire into a single country, facilitating migration between the two colonies. At that time, colonies were considered a whole, each having to play a role according to its natural potential. The Mossi Plateau (Upper Volta) was the most densely populated at that time, and according to the division of labour assigned to each colony, hence Upper Volta was designated as a labour provider for colonies, notably Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly, Gregory and Piche 1980). At this time, massive departures of Burkinabe (almost deportation) began; most of them were sent to work on the railway (Abidjan-Niger), in the plantations in Côte d'Ivoire, or elsewhere. At the beginning of independence, public authorities tried to manage the situation inherited from the colonial period by signing a convention with Côte d'Ivoire on March 1961 to regulate labour migration in the corridor. Still, the Burkinabe migration pattern remained marked by this colonial period. Thus, migration flows between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire remain essentially movements of Burkinabe towards Côte d'Ivoire. Although Ivorians are migrating to Burkina Faso, their number is far behind Burkinabe migrating to Côte d'Ivoire. Hence, according to the latest census in Burkina Faso, there were a total of 299,507 Ivorians living in Burkina Faso (85.6%, the largest share of immigrants living in the country). In Côte d'Ivoire, however, Burkinabe migrants were estimated at 3.5 million in 2014. Mobility from Côte d'Ivoire is, therefore, essentially the return mobility of Burkinabe.

With its lands particularly suitable for the production of coffee and cocoa, Côte d'Ivoire has helped to encourage the migration flow of Burkinabe established since the colonial period, to maintain it and, above all, to strengthen it with what is known as the "Ivorian miracle" (Cogneau and Mesple-Soms 2002) or the economic growth of the country due to agriculture, in particular with the coffee/cocoa

pairing. According to the last national census conducted in Burkina Faso, in 2019, Côte d'Ivoire is still the first destination country for recent (last 12 months) Burkinabe migrants, with a share of 61.1% (INSD 2022) which shows that Côte d'Ivoire remains attractive to Burkinabe migrants.

Given the large number of Burkinabe migrants in Côte d'Ivoire, remittances sent to Burkina Faso have been quite significant. Of the 96 billion CFA in transfers received in 2011, 34% came from Côte d'Ivoire (OECD 2012).² These remittances are mainly used for consumption and rarely for productive investments.

Burkina Migrants Are Heading Increasingly Further Afield

The flow of Burkinabe migrating towards Côte d'Ivoire is still very high, but is declining. In fact, the share of recent emigrants towards Côte d'Ivoire was 77.4% during the 2006 national census (Dabiré 2009), higher than the 61% recorded in the 2019 census. The decline can be explained by multiple factors such as the socio-political Ivorian crisis in the 2000s, but also by the fact that destination countries of Burkinabe migrants are expanding into new destinations like Italy and Gabon. According to the 2019 census, Gabon is the first Central African destination country of recent emigration, and Italy is the first intercontinental destination of recent emigrants.

An interesting point is that the early stages of the migration towards these “new” destinations date back to the 1990s. In fact, according to Blion and Bredeloup (1997), Côte d'Ivoire constituted a step used by West Africans to migrate towards more developed countries. Migrants migrate to Gabon thanks to contacts in Côte d'Ivoire and fellow citizens already established in Gabon. Migration towards Italy began with Burkinabe migrants working as cooks and sawmill employees. Some followed their Italian employer when the latter returned to their country. Before 1993, visas were not mandatory for Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso citizens to enter Italy. Arriving in Italy, they were able to legalise their situation and give the word to their “brothers” still in Côte d'Ivoire. This intercontinental migration to Italy was dominated by the Bissa ethnic group, more represented in the Central eastern part of Burkina Faso. Côte d'Ivoire can therefore be seen as a first step in continental migration, which helps intercontinental migration or migration towards richer countries. The network created by the Bissa migration towards Italy was therefore perpetrated and was the fact of more prosperous households. In fact, the work of Wourtese and Van Den Berg (2011) in Beguedo and Niaogho, two villages in the Central East region, found that intercontinental migration occurs in the highest-income group where there is at least one intercontinental migrant. This is obviously a remittance effect, proving that remittances from intercontinental migration are higher than remittances from continental migration. Migration towards more developed countries is therefore encouraged by remittances that elevate the household's standard of living and also by the created network, that will ease access to information for candidates of that migration. The Central East region of Burkina Faso is very well known today, especially for the impact of remittances sent by its rich diaspora in developed countries and especially from Italy. In fact,

Tapsoba and Dabiré (2022) argue that remittances in this region have a development impact as they are not only used for consumption but also to build schools and hospitals and develop income-related activities.

We base our research on this specific part of Burkina Faso, and on a non-financial contribution of migrants. The non-financial contribution of migrants within the Global South is less studied, despite the fact that they can be an essential productive investment for origin communities. This chapter investigates this topic, focusing on the immaterial contributions of migrants in the Burkinabe agricultural sector and trying to reveal the panoply of innovations they bring when they return from Côte d'Ivoire to the Centre-East region of Burkina Faso.

Social Remittances: Looking beyond Financial Remittance

Social remittances can be defined as ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that circulate from a given destination country to an origin country (Levitt 1998). The majority of research on this topic focuses on transfer of political norms (Chauvet and Mercier 2014) and social norms such as gender norms (Tuccio and Wahba, 2018) or fertility choices (Beine et al. 2013; Bertoli and Marchetta 2015). Therefore, according to the existing research, social remittances are often referred to as “political remittances,” “intangible flows,” “democratic diffusion,” “transfers of norms,” or “health transfers” (Lacroix 2016). Lacroix et al. (2016) emphasised their importance by arguing that only focusing on money to the detriment of people, objects, skills, and ideas that flow between origin and destination countries leads to an incomplete analysis of the migration-development nexus. Also, unlike financial remittances that often take informal channels, and are difficult to estimate especially within the Global South, social remittances are traceable as migrants and non-migrants are able to tell where they learned a particular idea or practice (Levitt 1998). This transfer of knowledge can occur when the migrant visits or returns to live in their country of origin, when non-migrants visit their migrant household member, or through exchanges of letters, messages, or phone calls (Levitt 1998).

The theoretical and empirical debate is well documented when it comes to the transfer of norms and skills from developed countries to developing countries, especially in the areas of social and political norms. Little is known however for the context of South-South Migration and especially in the sector of agriculture which is the sector employing the majority of people in Western Africa specifically. Focusing on the transfer of agricultural skills is very relevant for that matter, given that the chances of a migrant to work in the sector of agriculture when moving to another African country, and reintegrating into the same sector upon his return home are very high. Also, the climate, plant species, and agricultural practices are very different from one country to another, and it is very possible that migrants, when they return to their origin countries, bring the agricultural expertise they gained in their communities of migration upon return.

We consider questions such as: are all returnees able to transfer skills? What technical skills are transferred? Is there a link between the field of skills transferred and the field of activity of the migrant before he or she migrated? We hypothesise

that return migration can indeed influence the agricultural sector in the same way remittances do, because migrants can return to their country of origin with savings and new skills acquired at the place of migration.

Data and Results

We use the qualitative data of the MIDEQ project, focusing on migration biographies of return migrants in the Center East region of Burkina Faso. The survey gathered information about their experiences and the contribution of their migration in areas such as trade, business, and agriculture. A total number of 42 interviews were conducted in Bobo Dioulasso, Center-West, Center-East, and South-West regions of the country. We talked to returnees who got involved in the agricultural sector upon arrival

We present some descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 7.1.

The time spent in Côte d'Ivoire by returnees varies from being born overseas to residing in Côte d'Ivoire for 27 years. The cities in which the migrants resided are also

Table 7.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents

<i>Pseudonym</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>First migration in Côte d'Ivoire</i>	<i>Cultivation</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Years in CI</i>	<i>Marital status</i>
Fatouma	36	Female	Born in CI	Vegetables	Never been to school	Born in CI	Widow
Albert	50	Male	2002	Vegetables	Primary	3	Married
Boris	61	Male	1986	Vegetables	Never been to school	14	Married
Boureima	44	Male	1995	Vegetables	Never been to school	5	Married
Idrissa	47	Male	1996	Banana	Never been to school	6	Married
Boubacar	58	Male	1979	Banana and cassava	Primary	15	Married
Bruno	62	Male	1987	Cocoa	Never been to school	20	Married
Cyril	57	Male	1985	Rice and cassava	Never been to school	27	Married
Yara	69	Male	1976	Rice	Primary	8	Married
Michel	50	Male	1982	Vegetables	Never been to school	15	Married

Source: MIDEQ data and authors' calculations.

very diverse. Most of them resided in the southern part of the country with cities such as Tiassalé (south of the country), Divo (south of the country), Sassandra (extreme south of the country), Port Bouet (extreme south of the country), Adiaké (south of the country), and various districts of the economic city of Abidjan such as Anoumanbo or Marcory. The respondents were all initially employed in agriculture before moving to Côte d'Ivoire. One noticeable gap is related to the fact that of all these returnees there was only one woman aged 36, while the remaining were all male, with an age range of 22 to 66 years. This lack of women's representation in our panel reflects two situations. Firstly, migration is predominantly a male phenomenon in Burkina Faso, with young men going to Côte d'Ivoire to work. Female migration, which is marginal, is mainly the case of women joining their husbands and coming back whenever he comes back. Secondly, women's access to land in Burkina Faso is conditional in many parts of the country because a woman, even though she can access land, usually can't be the owner. Therefore, women work most of the time in their father's field or their husband's. The entire sample is also all married, some with several wives in Burkina Faso and outside the country. The only woman on the panel was widowed but remarried after coming to Burkina Faso for the first time. Notably, most of the panel had not been to school either in Burkina Faso or Côte d'Ivoire. Only three respondents attended primary and secondary school, while the rest had been to Koranic school.

Regarding their family life and living conditions in Côte d'Ivoire, three lived with former family members who preceded them in migration. Others lived with people from the same locality but were not directly related to them. For others who had no family before them, they lived in accommodation provided by their bosses at their place of work. For instance, one respondent said:

Over there, if you agree to do the work to be paid per year, it is the boss who will find you a house to sleep in, but if you want to do your own work, if you want the boss to share the field and give you your share, it is you who will find a place to sleep.

(Boubacar Interviewed on 29th November 2021 in Bagré,
Center East region.)

Causes of Return

The concept of return migration can be dated back to the famous list of migration laws written by Ravenstein (1889, p. 287), where he stated that "each main current produces a counter current of feebler strength." The scientific literature considers return migration as a component of this counter-current (Bovenkerk 1974). From the economic point of view, neoclassical economic theories state that return migration is a result of failed expectations in destination countries or the result of a bad arbitration between the cost and benefits of migration in the first place (de Haas and Fokkema 2011; Todaro 1969). In any case, these theories consider return migration as a failure, because people who are able to succeed in their migration process stay in their destination countries (Tezcan 2019). In the same way, some authors consider that for countries of origin, return migration receives little attention especially

when the return is involuntary or subsequent to a failed migration and failed integration in the country of destination. Return migrants are therefore even more overlooked when the origin countries' economies and labour markets are weak (Haase and Honerath 2016).

The New Economics of Labour Migration Theory states things differently. In fact, unlike the previous theory, migration decisions are taken at the household level, where the member who is more likely to succeed in migration is selected to travel. Success in that case means contributing to the household income by sending remittances or saving for investments in the origin country upon return. In a practical way, the International Organization for Migration defines return migration in the context of international migration as “the movement of persons returning to their country of origin after having moved away from their place of habitual residence and crossed an international border” (IOM 2019). In this chapter, we argue that return migration is not a failure, but rather is usually a choice of the migrant, even though some factors can make them return prematurely.

Before discussing the skills acquired in the place of migration and used in Burkina Faso, it would be appropriate to take stock of the migrants' intentions to return. Indeed, it should be noted that, whatever the reason for their departure, all the people interviewed emphasised their long-term desire to return when they started their migration journey. This is a common finding in the literature as argued by Batistella (2018), most migrants leave with the idea of returning home one day. In our case, the migration project is often framed as a plan, aiming to earn an income that will allow the migrant to send money home, and make savings for his return. Hence migration is described by the informants as a viable life option.

Bruno, interviewed in Bagré on the 27th of November 2021, stated:

I had the intention of coming back. I went there to search for money and have a better life. One who earns between a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand CFA returning home would be forced to migrate after spending his/her savings. I came, went back, came back, and went back to Côte d'Ivoire more than ten times. However, in the meantime, we knew settling here in our country to find something to do would be better than staying away. So that is how we came back to settle here permanently.

The geographical proximity of Côte d'Ivoire, accompanied by cultural proximity and regional agreements like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), reinforce the migration pattern and allow people to circulate easily between borders. ECOWAS agreements allow all citizens from member States to move freely within the community. However, it is important to note that since 22 March 2020, Côte d'Ivoire chose to unilaterally close its ground borders with neighbouring countries. Air borders were still opened however, but considering that the majority of people moving from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire are relatively poor, they were stuck and had to use clandestine ground roads to enter the country. Note however that ground borders have been recently opened on the night of 15–16 February 2023.

Those who are not involved in the migration process as such, as well as those who were born there, also mentioned the desire to return to their country of origin one day. The female respondent, Fatouma interviewed on the 23rd of November 2021 in Tenkodogo, shared her experience: “... *even from the age of twelve (12), I kept bothering my parents with this story of “I want to go to Faso.”*”

It should be noted that while the desire to return home was present in the minds of all migrants, some of them had to shorten their stay for reasons beyond their control. In fact, many mentioned family reasons that pushed them to return prematurely. These reasons are often related to old age or the death of a parent, which necessitates the premature return of the migrant, especially if the migrant is a man. The return is, therefore, sometimes imposed by family members. In circumstances where several members of the same household have migrated, those who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire are more likely to be called back home because they are considered closer geographically.” Cyril, interviewed on the 27th of November in Bagré, emphasises the non-voluntary character of his return by saying:

In any case, my return was not good for me. I did not go back for a simple cause. The death of my older brother, leaving behind his wife and children, was the main factor for my return. It was a very sudden death that made me come back involuntarily. It was involuntary because if it was not for that, I was not going to come back right now.

In addition to familial responsibilities many have mentioned that another reason for returning is the feeling of rejection and the harsh social conditions in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, Boubacar Interviewed on 29th November 2021 in Bagré, Center East region argues that

Ah, concerning our return to Burkina, in any case, we can say that we left Ivory Coast for compulsory reasons. Because we were tired there. Every day it is just the blows that we take. So we saw in the end that the best thing was to arrive home. Our suffering was too much.

This last statement refers to a common finding in the literature stating that perceived xenophobia, and difficulties to integrate the labour market in destination countries can catalyse migrants’ return to origin countries (Tezcan 2019). Return migrants come home with new sets of skills and a new mindset that direct them towards self-employment and entrepreneurship upon return. In fact, with the help of savings acquired overseas, they are more likely to become entrepreneurs upon return (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; McCormick and Wahba 2001; Mesnard 2004). Studies emphasising the transfer of migrants’ skills in their countries of origin are however focused on the North-South Migration. Moreover, they do not focus on the agricultural sector that employs the majority of people, especially in Africa.

Agriculture is a common activity carried out both in Côte d’Ivoire and in Burkina Faso. Indeed, the interviewed returnees mention that they were already

involved in agricultural activities before their migration and that by returning to Burkina Faso, they simply reintegrated into an activity they already knew, even if their cultivation techniques had changed. Albert, interviewed in Pakala on the 28th of November 2021, working in the gardening sector, argues that: “...we were in the business since our childhood”. As stated above most of the respondents were initially employed in agriculture before moving to Côte d’Ivoire. The qualitative survey results in the Centre-East region show a whole range of skill transfers by returnees in agriculture. Indeed, whether they innovate by introducing species unknown in Burkina Faso or farming techniques, they add value to the Burkinabe agricultural sector.

They all mention the undeniable contribution of their stay in Côte d’Ivoire in gaining new work culture and skills. As Boris, a market gardener interviewed on the 28th of November 2021 in Garango/Pakala, said:

At the moment, if it was not for the fact that we were in Côte d’Ivoire, we would not be here today doing this work... Today the way of planting the different plants is no longer a secret for us.

Idrissa, a banana farmer interviewed in Bagré on the 29th of November 2021, added: “*Regarding our way of working, it is our migration to Côte d’Ivoire that taught us everything.*”

It should also be noted that returnees adapt their working methods to local conditions. Indeed, whether they are cultivating new or local agricultural species, they recognise fundamental differences between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, which leads them to adapt their knowledge to the local context. Improvisation takes on its whole meaning when the return migrants consider the essential fact that climatic conditions and soil types are not comparable with the Ivorian context.

New Agricultural Species as a Returnee Asset

Our study found that some uncommon and new species of plants are cultivated in the Centre-East region as a direct result of knowledge acquired by return migrants. Some of these species are directly imported from Côte d’Ivoire as well as all the techniques used in the culture. The main imported crop grown by the returnees surveyed in the market gardening sector is the flowering onion imported from Côte d’Ivoire. As Boureima stated during his interview on the 28th of November 2021 in Tenkodogo, “*This new species is called here the Chinese onion... That is what I used to grow in Côte d’Ivoire. It came from Côte d’Ivoire. It came with the brother who is leaving there to return home.*”

We also noted the cultivation of cassava, which initially came from the local species but has gradually changed with the arrival of species cultivated in Côte d’Ivoire and with changes in consumption habits. The yields of these new crops are good and result in national sales, especially in the major cities. Localities such as Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Bittou, Pouytenga, and Manga are sometimes mentioned, indicating that these crops introduced by the returnee are well consumed in the large cities. It is important to note a point concerning the crop of

which Côte d'Ivoire is one of the main exporting countries that is cocoa. One of the returnees in this study also imported this crop in Burkina Faso, and is growing it for sale. As he stated, after spending about twenty years in Côte d'Ivoire, Bruno, tried to grow cocoa in Burkina Faso with techniques he learned in Côte d'Ivoire: "*Here, when I am growing cocoa, I learned that in Côte d'Ivoire.*" After growing millet and rice in the first years of his return to Burkina Faso, he used the earnings from this activity to travel back to Côte d'Ivoire to get cocoa seeds: "*It was recently in 2015 that I started growing cocoa. I used to grow maize, rice, and small millet. On 20 July 2015, I returned to Côte d'Ivoire with 300,000 CFA to buy cocoa seeds in Côte d'Ivoire.*"

The yields are good for Bruno, and he has international ambitions. He argues that "*Here, if the production is a lot, you can go to Côte d'Ivoire to sell it. If it's not much, you'll connect to people who will come and buy it.*" He continues by addressing an issue that seems common to our interviewees, which is the access to larger farmland:

But as my plot of farm is not large, I am looking at it, if afterwards the government sees that my idea is good and it comes back to add space, necessarily I will now have the market with the white people.

In addition to Bruno, Idrissa tried to introduce a new variety of banana found in Côte d'Ivoire and Western countries. He argues: "*There is another variety, the 'grande-naine,' but that is only available in Côte d'Ivoire or in Western countries.*" He was however not able to succeed in his enterprise because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and lack of support from the government.

We once ordered this variety of grande Naine in France to try it out. It was at the time of the COVID pandemic, the order was delivered and blocked somewhere because of the closure of the borders. But as they were grains, they lost their necessary weight and qualities. So when we experimented here, it didn't work. When it came, we asked the region to help us with a small area, even if it's two hectares, to experiment with, but they flatly refused. With all that time added, the grains were totally spoiled.

The Case of New Agricultural Techniques and Work Ethics

Some of our interviewees did not cultivate new species but rather reintegrate into their old activities upon return, and yet one could see a significant difference in the new set of skills they brought with them. When asked whether the techniques they use are the same as those of the non-migrants, Fatouma replied: "*That is clear. Those who are here will not necessarily have the same techniques, let alone me, who learned outside.... Here, as there is not enough water, my partings are less wide than those in Côte d'Ivoire.*" Similarly, Albert argues:

The fact that we have been to Côte d'Ivoire is already a difference. The work cannot be the same. Even between us returning migrants, the way of doing things cannot be the same. That is it. The techniques we use differ.

About the cultivation of the local variety of cassava already present in Burkina Faso, Cyril remarked that:

For cassava, I have noticed that the ones growing here are often placed closer to each other. The gap here is not at all wide, so you have to leave a gap between each cassava plant. You have to plant it so that it is wide... So if you plant in better measures, normally if you remove one cassava plant, it should be enough for several people.

He further emphasised the contribution of Côte d'Ivoire to his way of working, maintaining that

In the plantation process, I am faster than them (non-migrants). I have a good understanding of that. I have a good grasp of water piping and everything. I know it well because I had to do it in Côte d'Ivoire. I have done in the big lowlands in Côte d'Ivoire, so I master all that.

The region often offers capacity-building training to farmers in order to help them in their activities. Migrants and non-migrants take the courses; however, they seem not to have the same understanding of the training's importance. Cyril, therefore, emphasises that even in the training courses they attend, they are more assiduous in the sense that those who have not migrated are less inclined to follow the recommendations given to them during the training. In addition to this rigour and assiduity at work, there is also a distinct difference in the eagerness to work, as many of our respondents mention the fact that they are more tenacious at work than non-migrants. This is due to the fact that in Côte d'Ivoire, they were used to large areas of cultivation compared to the hectares that the Burkinabe government agrees to grant them here. Boureima emphasises that this has become a habit, a second nature for them: *"Those who did not go out there cannot last long in the fields like us. It has become our habit. That is it."*

Returnees' Reflections on Their Return – The Contribution of Migration

Migrants were also asked directly what they think about the non-financial contribution of their migration experiences. Not surprisingly, they mention several contributions of this migration that are not only financial. The female informant Fatouma adds:

Taking a step away from home is already like enrolling in a new school. There are things that you will never accept or refuse if it is not that you are once out. Someone who is out and someone who is not out these two are very different. The one who went out is doubly rich in the head than the one who stayed. If I have reached this level today, it is because I was born outside.

This point underlines the awareness that migrants acquire during their migratory process. Thus, even if their migration does not succeed in economic terms, it still has some positive sides to it, as emphasised by Albert: *"It is true that our migration*

has not enabled us to achieve anything, but at least we are mature and returned home with some lived experiences on what a hard work can pay one in life.”

Some refer to the fact that their migration has made them value education. Fatouma argues,

In the village here, you cannot see a child who has his parents in Côte d’Ivoire leaving school because of school fees. You can never see that. It is not that they have more money than those here, but it is because they better understand the value of education.

Given that the majority of the participants of the study have never been to school, this is significant and marks a shift in beliefs about the role of the school. This trend in South-South Migration, as Chapter 1 argues (Zelege and Smith 2023), partly relates to the migrants’ consideration of investment in education as a compensatory act, compensating for their own lack of educational attainment.

Finally, as Cyril, one of our 57-year-old interviewees stated: *“Knowledge is not something that can be measured; it is not something that rots away so that the traces will be there, and we will benefit from it. That is how it is.”*

Conclusion

Return migration in the context of South-South Migration, especially in intra-continental migration, unlike the migration to remote destinations, needs to be addressed with reference to how much proximity between places of origin and destination impacts the return migration dynamic. In fact, our work showed that migrating to a country close to the origin country raises the probability of being required to come home in case of necessity. In that framework, return migration can be involuntary in the context of intracontinental and especially geographically closed migration.

Nevertheless, the idea of returning home after migrating has always been in the minds of our interviewees. Hence, the skills and knowledge gained by Burkinabe migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire are not to be neglected. This contribution argues that any discussion on the flow of resources needs to unpack how the flow of skills and new work ethics, as part of the overall resources that migrants acquire at places of destination, has diverse impacts on origin communities, ranging from the creation of businesses to development of new activities in the agricultural area in our case. The benefits of their migration are also definitely impacting the economy of their country of destination. In fact, they use their physical and intellectual strength in their place of migration, which undoubtedly contributes to the development of their host country. As for their country of origin, the financial spin-offs sent are the primary source of benefits for migrants. In this chapter, we have discussed the non-financial benefits of migration, including the introduction of new species in agriculture, new worldviews and work ethic, and the transfer of skills and knowledge as a whole, in the Centre East region of Burkina Faso.

The results of the survey show that migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate ingenuity in agricultural practices, both in terms of introducing new species

and new working techniques. The results also show difficulties related to the social acceptance of migrant labour, access to land, and the difficult climatic conditions of the country. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the unfailing determination of the migrants who, even when faced with obstacles, overcome them, recalling the character of self-transcendence that they have acquired during their migratory journey. It would therefore be appropriate for government-led policies to consider accompanying these migrants so that they can capitalise on their knowledge for the benefit of the entire nation.

Notes

- 1 We cite the 2006 census because 2019 census results regarding the main regions of departure are not available yet.
- 2 Remittances data are made available by the World Bank. However, they are not disaggregated by sending countries. We only therefore can rely on surveys to estimate them by country.

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8 Transnational Flow of Ideas in the Ethiopia-South Africa Migration Corridor

Hadiya Experiences

Dereje Feyissa

Introduction

This chapter examines the transnational flow of ideas and their impact on processes of social change in places of origin through a case study of the Ethiopia-South Africa corridor. It focuses on Hadiya migrants from southern Ethiopia, a major place of origin for Ethiopian migrants destined for South Africa. The nature of the flow of ideas and its impact on Hadiya society is discussed against the backdrop of the historically shaped regional inequality within Ethiopia. The transformational impact of Hadiya migration to South Africa becomes clear when we historicize current processes of migration, situating it within broader processes of social change. Hadiya society is part of the broader southern Ethiopian periphery that has been subjected to political marginalization, economic exclusion, and social discrimination ever since its full incorporation into the Ethiopian polity at the end of the 19th century. Prior to that, the Hadiya built a powerful Sultanate representing an alternative centre of state formation to the Christian empire in the northern highlands which later evolved into the modern Ethiopian State. The historically shaped relations of dominance between the Hadiya and the Ethiopian state have reduced a once proud and powerful nation into an insignificant minority, with far-reaching consequences, including the internalization of inequality and lack of self-confidence (Braukamper 2012).

The chapter draws on and seeks to contribute to the social remittances conceptual framework, as first developed by Peggy Levitt (1998), and refined by other scholars in the field later on (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Carling 2014; Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2017). By and large, remittances are divided into two: financial and social. Financial remittance relates to flows of cash sent by migrants to their origin countries, also called monetary remittances. Social remittances on the other hand involve transnational flow of ideas, identities, behaviours, and social capital (Levitt 1998). In her study among migrants from the Dominican Republic in the USA, Levitt (2001) identified four types of social remittance – norms, practices, identities, and social capital with great social transformational potential in places of origin. Social remittances develop at both the individual/family and collective level. At both levels, social remittances may

generate new business or trade practices, new welfare arrangements supporting fellow nationals both at home and abroad. They may also involve

reconsideration of past events and the self-understanding of a community by reference both to its past, its emigration experience and its future.

(Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2017, p. 3)

Social remittances could also have a negative impact on places of origin, whether expressed in the form of negatively affecting agricultural and educational outcomes, transfer of violent norms, or reinforcing existing social inequalities.

Notwithstanding this crucial dimension of social remittances, for long the focus in migration studies has been on financial transfers and the development potential of this transfer in places of origin. This disproportionate focus on financial remittances is partly informed by the magnitude of the transfer. Statistics on monetary remittance flows show the substantial importance and significance of those transfers. According to the World Bank (2019), financial remittances flow in 2018 amounted to \$683 billion, which is much more than overseas assistance development, and almost equal in size to foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result, migration scholars focus on issues such as the effects of financial remittances on poverty levels (Adams and Page 2005) and the pro-growth nature of remittances, especially in countries where financial systems are weak and remittances can be a substitute to overcome liquidity constraints (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009).

However, recent studies (Boccagni 2015; Carling 2014; Lacroix 2014; Thai 2014) have paid attention to social remittances of different types. Social remittances can be transferred through various means: transnationally mobile migrants, returnee migrants, and social media. Following these studies, this contribution also argues that social remittances from South Africa to Hadiya, expressed in the form of new economic norms, new and positive ideas of self (both individual and collective), and ideas of development more broadly, are as important and in some sense more important than the financial transfers. Hadiya migration to South Africa has generated a new and positive sense of self both at the individual and collective levels. It has also unlocked Hadiya's potential for growth expressed in the new entrepreneurial drive with the requisite skillsets. At the individual level, the new sets of experiences in South Africa have expanded business horizons, brought about identity reformation, and injected a new self-understanding and a belief in oneself. Collectively, related to the individual level, migration has engendered a new consciousness, as Hadiya is not only catching up but even excelling with their neighbours with a growing participation in the local economy hitherto dominated by members of other historically dominant ethnic and religious groups.

The migration-induced entrepreneurial drive also has significance even at the national level. Migration has enabled the Hadiya to enter into the national economic space, as their domination of the national public transport sector indicates. The transnational flow of ideas is also evidenced in the form of the diffusion of new models of economic development with a greater role and space for the private sector. Exposed to and working under the South African private sector-led development model, returnee Hadiya migrants criticize Ethiopia's deep-seated statist approach to development. Exposure to the technological capabilities of South Africa has also inspired some of the Hadiya migrants to contribute to knowledge transfer

from South Africa to Ethiopia, such as the use of agricultural technology to ensure food security. They critically appraise not only the agent but also the terms of development. Statements development is not about the skyscrapers but is about ensuring food security or the state should not monopolize the space for development as mentioned by some visionary returnee migrants have transformational impact that goes beyond Ethiopia's entrenched statist conception of development that views people as recipients of development. They rightly criticize the limits of the state as an agent of development and rather highlight its facilitating and enabling role. Nearly all of these visionary migrants that seek to contribute to local and national level development processes through their practical engagement are not trained in formal education beyond high school, but to borrow their term they are 'graduates of the South African life school'. They owe their entrepreneurial drive and skillset, resilience, perseverance, and the culture of saving to the life-changing experience of migration, both during the journey and at the destination.

As mentioned in previous studies, there are different modes of social remittance transfer, but the main mode of transfer among the Hadiya which is the focus of this chapter is the role of returnee migrants as vectors for the transnational flow of ideas. Limited transnationally mobile migrants travel between South Africa and Ethiopia because most migrants are irregular and their capacity to travel is constrained. Many Hadiya migrants have moved back to their places of origin citing the growing violence and sense of insecurity in South Africa and/or for investment purposes. What is important about returnees as vectors for social remittances is their practical engagement with the new norms which has demonstrative effects such as returnee migrants inspiring those who are left behind in adopting their entrepreneurial culture and business ventures in areas hitherto shunned as 'backward' (e.g., dairy farms).

This study is part of the broader Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ); a comparative research project that examines migration processes in six migration corridors in the context of South-South Migration (SSM).¹ Fieldwork was carried out at various times from 2019–2022 in Hadiya Administrative Zone focusing on four emigration localities: Hosanna, Jajura, Fonqo, and Shashogo. Additional fieldwork was done in Addis Ababa among Hadiya returned migrants who set up businesses there. Specifically, it draws on the 100 life histories of returned male migrants collected as part of the MIDEQ research project, of which I extensively refer to three life histories to substantiate arguments. Hadiya migration to South Africa is gendered, predominantly involving male migrants except for the few females who migrated as wives of the male migrants. The contribution uses a narrative strategy providing a textual space for the migrants to tell their stories with regard to how the flow of ideas and knowledge has personally affected them throughout the various phases of the migration processes.

The discussion that follows is organized into four sections. Following this introductory section, the section "The Genesis and Trajectory of Hadiya Migration to South Africa" sets the context. It contains drivers of Hadiya migration from policy shifts and material to subjective factors. The section "Development Dividends of Hadiya Migration to South Africa – Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Skills"

identifies and examines the transnational flow of ideas at the individual and community levels. The section “Beyond Statism – Migration and Diffusion of Liberal Economic Ideas in Places of Origin” discusses the long-term impact of this flow expressed in the form of diffusion of liberal economic ideas such as the critique of a statist conception of development arguing for a greater space for the private sector enabled by a visionary and enabler public sector. “Conclusion” concludes with a reflection on the role of social remittances in processes of social change in places of origin.

The Genesis and Trajectory of Hadiya Migration to South Africa

As one of the richest countries in the African continent, South Africa is among the major destination countries for migrants moving within Africa. Close to 3 million migrants resided in South Africa in 2020 (UN DESA 2021). Ethiopians are amongst the most significant of these migrant populations, with estimates varying between 200,000 and 300,000 (Cooper and Esser 2018; Yordanos 2018; IOM 2021). According to a report by the South African Department of Home Affairs (2015), Ethiopia is ranked as the second of the top 15 migrant-sending countries.

Ethiopian migrants’ journey to South Africa is perilous, involving the crossing of state borders of as many as six countries covering close to 5,000 km.² The journey follows different routes involving different modes of transport: air, water, and by land. The few migrants who can afford the high-priced means of migration take a direct flight from Addis Ababa to Johannesburg or countries that border South Africa, but most combine bus, boat, and foot to cross transit countries. Typically, the land route from Ethiopia to South Africa starts in Kenya, then passes through Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique/Zimbabwe to South Africa. Most Ethiopian migrants are engaged in the informal retail trade, running shops predominantly in Jeppe, the Ethiopian commercial enclave in Johannesburg, and in the nearby townships, popularly known as ‘locations’ (Zack and Yordanos 2016). Some of the migrants are well established, evident in the growing remittances they send to support families and the investments they have made in small and large-scale businesses. Successful migrants send also collective remittances, supporting local and national development projects.

Although Ethiopian migrants in South Africa come from all over the country, most are from Southern Ethiopia, particularly from the Hadiya area (Yordanos and Zack 2020; Dereje 2022). According to the latest 2007 census, the size of Hadiya population was around 1.2 million currently living in an administrative area called Hadiya Zone. Hosanna town is the administrative capital of Hadiya Zone, located 230 km south of Addis Ababa. As used in this contribution, the term “Hadiya” refers to a/the people, a language, and an administrative area. A recent report by Hadiya Zone Human Resource and Social Affairs department (quoted in Fikreab 2020, p. 10) estimated that 61,148 Hadiya youth have migrated to South Africa between 2013 and 2018 alone. Given the dramatic increase in the number of Hadiya migrants to South Africa in recent years, a conservative estimate by returned migrants put the figure at least 100,000. A recent survey by Tsedeke and Ayele (2017,

p. 3) on the other hand found that nearly 40% of households in Hadiya have at least one international migrant. Hadiya migration to South Africa is barely over two decades long but it has already left major imprints on their social fabric.

Hadiya migration to South Africa is situated within the broader historically shaped regional inequality between the ‘core North’ and ‘peripheral South’ in the context of state formation in Ethiopia, evident both in political representation and national wealth distribution. Historically, Hadiya belong to Ethiopia’s broader southern periphery and migration to South Africa is helping them renegotiate this regional inequality. Hadiya was part of the medieval Hadiya Sultanate that dates back to the 13th century (Braukamper 2012), itself part of the wider Islamic principalities that represented alternative centres of state formation in competition with the Christian empire of the Ethiopian northern highlands. The incorporation of Hadiya into the Christian empire was completed at the end of the 19th century when it was subjected to political marginalization, social discrimination, and economic exploitation. Subsequently, they lost autonomy and the local economy has been dominated by people who come from the north, and partly by their neighbours such as the Gurage who managed to attain greater socio-economic mobility within the Ethiopian empire through internal migration, mainly to Addis Ababa (LeBel 2011).

The long-term impact of imperial rule in the southern periphery is structural inequality marked by ethnic stratification. This has undermined Hadiya’s capacity to aspire for a better life with the requisite capabilities. As various research participants mentioned, it is also expressed in the form of a lack of self-confidence. By the turn of the 20th century, western Protestant missionaries were active in southern Ethiopia including among the Hadiya. Despite its Islamic heritage, contemporary Hadiya are predominantly (75.3%) followers of Protestant churches (CSA 2008). This sharply contrasts with peoples of the northern highlands, the core of the Ethiopian state, who are predominantly Orthodox Christians. Only 11.1% Hadiya are now Muslims. Protestantism was brought to Ethiopia through the missionary societies in the 19th century, who were by and large viewed as potential agents of modernization so long as they did not operate in the Orthodox majority areas in the northern highlands and “evangelize and the evangelized” (Tadesse 1998) but were allowed in the broader South which was/is largely non-Orthodox. Of all modern emperors of Ethiopia, it was emperor Haile Selassie who sought to utilize the missionaries’ connection with Western countries and tap into their technological capabilities as allies of nation-building especially in his state-making project in the country’s peripheries (Tibebe 2009). For their part, the Hadiya have tapped into evangelical religious resources such as prophecies and prayers to build their migratory agency.

The Hadiya, like most of their southern neighbours, were excluded from the politics of the Ethiopian empire and they were subjected to social discrimination including turning them from a once proud and great nation into a mistreated ethnic group. The Hadiya were referred to with a pejorative term, *gudela*, much in line with similar debasing names used to disparage other peoples of the periphery (Braukamper 2012). Although few Hadiya managed to achieve individual

socio-economic mobility within the Ethiopian polity, most were left behind who through time incorporated external definitions of who they are; construed in negative terms. The only opportunity the Ethiopian empire provided them with was labour migration to the budding sugar estates in the Awash Valley since the 1950s, especially to sugar plantations in Wonji. But this wage labour, though it contributed to a modest household well-being of migrant families, did not lead to Hadiya's meaningful economic participation at the local and national levels. Nor has the stigma associated with their ethnic identity changed. If at all, it added a new pejorative layer as they were referred to as *shenkora korach* ('people who slash sugar canes').³ Despite promises made by the 1974 revolution to redress ethnic inequalities and greater inclusion of peoples of the periphery into national affairs, Hadiya continued to occupy a marginal status throughout the Derg period (1974–1991). In fact, whatever was there in the local economy was extracted to fund Derg's endless wars, while military conscription brought a heavy toll on the Hadiya youth (Dereje 2022).

When the EPRDF came to power (1991–2018), and developed its Constitutional structures of ethnic federalism, this kindled yet another hope for social transformation and democratic transition. However, the self-rule that the Constitution has granted to ethnic groups (nations and nationalities in the Ethiopian parlance) has not led to real political and economic empowerment (Turton 2005). True, change is visible in local political leadership to the extent that Hadiya Zone is now ruled by Hadiya elites and Hadiya are given the right to use their language as a language of local government. However, EPRDF's self-rule was not translated into the kind of socio-economic transformation one would expect. Political legitimacy continued to be extroverted, with local elites operating under the centralising logic of EPRDF whose interest they primarily served. A Hadiya opposition party, the Hadiya National Democratic Organisation (HNDO), put up a strong resistance against the EPRDF through peaceful means. In fact, HNDO won the seats for the 2001 parliamentary election in Hadiya Zone but the result was later on flawed and EPRDF was declared the winner through a repeat election in the Hadiya Zonal council (Tronvoll 2001). Meanwhile, the economic situation in Hadiya Zone was made worse with the politicization of internal labour migration. Thousands of Hadiya labour migrants from Wonji and Metahara, now in Oromia regional state, left and went back to Hadiya Zone as ethnic federalism overnight turned them into 'outsiders'.⁴ Hadiya was already suffering from land shortage because it has one of the highest population densities in the country, and so it could not absorb returnee internal migrants creating a social crisis. Nor was there a single factory which could have provided a modicum of employment opportunity for the Hadiya youth.

Hadiya was in an explosive situation when a Canadian pastor, Peter Youngren, came to Hosanna in 2001 and delivered a prophecy announcing that "God has opened a southern door to the Hadaya through which prosperity would come" (Dereje 2022, p. 41). Although this prophecy stopped short of mentioning migration to South Africa, it indeed referred to the movement of people towards the south. Hadiya mass migration to South Africa peaked in the 2000s, though few Hadiyas have already migrated by the end of the 1990s. The prophecy, further

expounded by local variants of prophecies customized to the needs of prospective individual migrants, lent a divine script for a secular migration project. The Hadiya have creatively used religion as a space to create agency to materialize the migration project. In effect, this prophecy sacralises and endorses migration as God-sanctioned and God's redemptive plan for the Hadiya. The Hadiya often use the spiritual term *aberalin* (God awakened us) while talking about why and how Hadiya migration to South Africa started. Abandoned by the Ethiopian state and lagging behind their neighbours, God, as it were, stepped in and is now engaging Hadiya by opening a southern route through which prosperity comes, helping them to catch up with and even excel compared to their neighbours. Most Hadiya who migrated to South Africa are from the villages and unskilled with little formal education and experience in business, as to be discussed below.

In addition to this, Hadiya migration to South Africa, like other migrants from the Horn of Africa more broadly, has been enabled by a more liberal immigration policy especially for African migrants in post-Apartheid South Africa, at least until 2011 when policy started shifting. This reversed Apartheid's restrictive policy that instituted its vision of an all-white South Africa through a system of 'influx control' applied to black South Africans as it was also used to contain and regulate migration from other African countries. Post-Apartheid South Africa under President Mandela opened its door to migrants partly as an act of gratitude to African countries that actively supported the African National Congress during the liberation struggle. President Mandela was also keen for black South Africans to learn from African migrants, especially business skills (Siddique 2004). South Africa is the only country in the continent where refugees and asylum seekers have freedom of movement and the right to work rather than being confined to camps. Drafted in 1998 under the post-apartheid era of democratization, the law is among the world's most progressive in terms of the rights it grants asylum seekers and refugees. Unlike other African countries, South Africa never established refugee camps. Instead, asylum seekers and refugees are free to settle anywhere in the country, and are also free to work and study.⁵ Even those claimants whose case is pending or their stay is extended for a short period found themselves at the workplace soon after their arrival. In principle, working without documents makes them illegal but there is a greater tolerance by South African authorities towards migrants, especially in the informal trade sector. However, this comes without a right to protection and access to social services. Some migrants negotiate their precarious existence through informal arrangements with South African law enforcement agencies and various brokers who help them secure fake documents. South Africa is one of the strongest economies in Africa and offers opportunities for migrants to work both in the formal and informal economies. In addition to South Africa's progressive immigration policies, policy reforms in Ethiopia since 1991 also included the constitutional right of movement of people, including international travels (the 1995 Constitution, Article 32. 1). Prior to that international travel was very much restricted, as this required government permission which issued an exit visa.

This simultaneous liberal migration policies at the place of origin and destination have increased the momentum of Hadiya migration to South Africa.

Although few Hadiya migrated to South Africa because of political persecution, especially the youth affiliated with the opposition HNDO in the early 2000s, most are irregular migrants who request asylum in order to get work permits so that they can be self-employed in the informal trade. But as the number of migrants from the Horn of Africa seeking asylum in South Africa has reached unprecedented levels, South African border authorities have started refusing migrants entry. This has given way to the emergence of a robust smuggling industry that involves multiple intermediaries situated in places of origin, in transit countries and in South Africa.

Most Ethiopian migrants work in the informal trade sector, running businesses in townships and business districts of bigger towns such as Johannesburg and Durban. From villages with little education, skills, and language barrier, nearly all Hadiya migrants in South Africa are self-employed and engaged in small businesses. Typically, they start with home delivery of consumer goods in the townships. This business is known among migrants as 'location'. The goods range from household appliances to belts and curtains. These types of businesses were enabled by the gaps created in service delivery to townships during Apartheid (Ogura 1996). No proper shops were established in the black townships and blacks were either not allowed or were fearful of accessing goods and services in bigger towns which were predominantly inhabited by the white South Africans. When the country was opened in the post-Apartheid period and the economy was liberalized with greater integration with the global economy, the hitherto scarce consumer goods became suddenly available for the black South Africans who now also have greater purchasing power thanks to South Africa's welfare state. South Africa has one of the most extensive social welfare systems in the global south (Naidu 2022).⁶

Migrants involved in the informal trade entice black South Africans to spend their welfare money in purchasing consumer goods offered in the form of credit. Currently, the door-to-door delivery of consumer goods is replaced by small shops in the townships popularly known as Spaza or tag shops, instancing a form of economic mobility of migrants, Hadiya migrants included. Although this form of business has a darker side involving a growing form of violence, including xenophobia and shop robberies (Solomon and Kosaka 2019; Liwewe 2022), it has also enabled Hadiya migrants to accumulate wealth, evident in the volume of remittance and sprouting migrant businesses in places of origin, especially in Hosanna and other towns in Hadiya Zone. Above all, migration has equipped the Hadiya with the much-needed entrepreneurial skills which they deploy in the businesses they set up in places of origin. Other forms of the flow of knowledge/ideas include a belief in oneself; a culture of saving, networking skill, resilience, and perseverance, and an alternative conception of development that critiques Ethiopia's historically sedimented statist conception and terms of development. In the following section, we discuss the flow of economic norms expressed in the form of new business skills and entrepreneurial drive more broadly and the transformational significance of this both at the individual and collective levels in places of origin.

Development Dividends of Hadiya Migration to South Africa – Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Skills

Animated by spirituality and determined to improve their conditions of life without the skill set and language competence, Hadiya migrants acquired business skills in South Africa the hard way. They are all self-made. Most returnee migrants emphasized non-monetary gains when asked about the importance of their South African experience. Most described migration to South Africa in its transformational sense, as the following extracts from interviews with returnee migrants indicate:

South Africa is like a big school for me. I was a grade 10 student when I dropped out of school and migrated. I had no idea about business. I used to think business is meant for the Amhara, Tigrayans, Gurage and other people from the north. But South Africa has showed me a different world – expand my horizon and most importantly that hard work pays off if the right system is put in place. Yes, there is discrimination and violence in South Africa but still you can succeed and improve your condition of life. We go there empty handed and come back not only with money but also with the knowledge and skills. Above all, we feel now good about ourselves. We Hadiya were made to feel inferior in Ethiopia. We also work hard in Ethiopia but no change. I am ever grateful to South Africa for the better person that I have become. I would have remained in a village for the rest of my life doing what my forefathers did for generations. But now I run a vibrant business – owning two Sino Trucks, a construction materials shop and plots of land, one of which I built a villa on. You see now many Hadiyas are doing business, which would have been unthinkable without South Africa. Most Hadiya businesses you see in Hosanna are somehow connected to South Africa one way or the other.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, May 17, 2021)

Another returnee migrant, Abraham (a pseudonym) shared a similar view, appreciating the transformational impact of migration not only through knowledge acquired in South Africa but also life life-changing experiences during the journey:

I was 16 years old when I migrated to South Africa. Not only that was I a boy but also, I did not have enough money to pay for the cost of migration. The money I had took me only to Kenya. My situation forced me to be self-reliant. I approached smugglers and worked with them. I connected them with many Hadiya migrants who were passing through Kenya. I did this for six months. With the savings that I made; I continued my journey passing through Tanzania. By the time I reached Malawi I run out of money. I went to the refugee camp where I again got connected with smugglers. I stayed with the smugglers for one year facilitating the money transfer between migrant families and the smugglers. I got commission for that. In fact, I wanted to stay in Malawi but when I heard that the borders of South Africa would

be closed soon after the 2010 World Cup I rushed and crossed the border to South Africa. By the time I reached South Africa I already learnt a lot from my stay in Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi. Although I did not have relatives in South Africa, I knew many people and that social network helped me to get started the location business not long after my arrival. After some time, I opened shops in Durban and made lots of money. I realized how important social network is which helped me even get a Mozambique work permit where I used to do “brand” business [business in counterfeit products] from Mozambique to South Africa. Had it not been for the growing violence and robbery I would have liked to stay in South Africa longer; a country which made me a better person. It is not only money that I got from South Africa. I have also learnt how South Africans make a living. The most striking thing for me was how rich white people still do farming or keep cattle. I thought, once you are rich, you do something else. This is how people think in Ethiopia, Hadiya included. I did not have a clear business plan when I returned from South Africa. I assessed the market and realised that there is milk shortage in Hosanna town. Then milk supply was only 25% of the demand. I sensed that the supply would be even less because of the rapid urbanisation in Hosanna. I decided to invest in dairy farm. I bought 25 milk cows with an investment worth 8 million birr. That was shocking for many, including friends and relatives. They expected me to be modern and invest in other sectors, not going down and waste the money on cows. I told them that many rich white people in South Africa keep cattle and cultivate even those who are highly educated. Look where I am 3 years after my return – my dairy farm is growing by the day supplying the town with 800 litres of milk per day. It makes me very happy to see I am contributing to food security supplying over 1000 children with the much-needed milk.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, July, 14, 2021)

From Abraham’s story, we also learn how important social network is for migrants to cope with and thrive in their destination and upon return to their places of origin. Throughout his stay in South Africa, this returnee migrant made a robust socio-economic network across religious and ethnic boundaries, and which he continued upon his return. He recounted that he consciously crossed boundaries to enhance his life chances while responding to the imperatives of migration. It is no wonder thus that the fundraising for his send-off party was the highest, earning him over 400,000 Rand which he used, in addition to his saving, as seed capital to start his dairy farm business in Hosanna. During his journey back to Ethiopia – he preferred the land route from South Africa via Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya – he met an Indian businessman which evolved into an important economic network. The Indian businessman was keen on networking with Abraham who introduced himself as half South African and half Ethiopian in order to increase his business appeal. They planned a business venture in South Africa. While Abraham visited the brick workshop of the Indian businessman in Addis Ababa, he reciprocated by visiting Sisay and his dairy farm in Hosanna. More crucially, this network helped

Abraham to travel to India where he visited a trade fair of dairy products. Two of his Muslim friends from Addis Ababa whom he met in South Africa also visited Abraham in Hosanna, also with a plan for a joint venture.

Currently, Abraham is embarking on commercial farming with 300 hectares of leased land that he got from the government, itself a product of his newly found networking skill. He clearly identified where investment is most needed, as Hadiya have been progressively reduced from producers of grain to net importers. With a view of further modernizing his farms, Abraham is also networking with trending educated Ethiopian farmers on YouTube, who continue to inspire him and sustain his belief that it is possible to be modern and a farmer at the same time; an expanded business horizon thanks to his exposure to a different worldview during his stay in South Africa and in transit countries.

For others, creating a new sense of self through the transformational impact of migration sometimes comes from parents who use the migration of their children to South Africa as a parental disciplinary measure, as the following story by a returnee migrant indicates:

I come from a relatively well to do family. How I migrated to South Africa is somehow different from most cases. It was imposed on me by my parents. I was the naughtiest of all their children. I started smoking and drinking at an early age. I even joined gang groups in Hosanna and participated in hanging. My father vainly tried many things. He finally thought of sending me to South Africa. He said to me “go to South Africa and be somebody”. He did not mean this in the sense of go there and make money but rather he believed in the transformational power of migration. Many people who do not do anything in Hadiya would become hard workers in South Africa and come back not only with money but also as a better, responsible persons. South Africa proved my father right. I migrated reluctantly but now I am a successful businessman owning a house, plots of land. Shops and trucks. Above all, my parents are happy with me.

(Returnee migrant, interviewed in Fonqo, August 5, 2021)

Still for others what South Africa has taught them is perseverance and resilience. Although in the early years of migration, South Africa was safer, things started changing with a more visible sign of wealth expressed in the form of sprouting shops in townships making them vulnerable to robberies, as recounted by the following returnee migrant:

Yes, there are risks running shops in South Africa. As soon as your business expands it attracts robbers. Robbers know that we put our money in the shops because we can not use banks as we do not have documents. Black South Africans do not know how to make business but they see us prospering. That is why they think we are stealing their money. But as soon as we are robbed, we start the business from scratch. We have learnt how to persist and rebuild business. I have learnt the value of perseverance. Always find a way to come

back, for example, if I am broke, I won't just quit. I rather work harder to get back to business. Most people give up business when things go in the wrong direction; they lose the psychological battle that is not a good thing. You fight on with what you have until you get something better. You also need to be patient. That is in the logic of business. This is helping me a lot in my business here in Hosanna. I am a believer of myself. No matter how I go down in my business I know that I will get up again.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, July 28, 2021)

A value addition to the entrepreneurial skill set, and an important economic norm, is how migration has reinforced the culture of saving. A key component of Ethiopian migrants' success in business in South Africa is *iqub*. *Iqub* is a traditional means of saving in Ethiopia and exists completely outside of the formal financial system. It is a form of revolving savings. People voluntarily join a group and make a mandatory contribution (every week, pay period, or month for example). The "pot" is distributed on a rotating basis determined by a drawing at the beginning of the *iqub*. Amounts contributed vary according to the means of the participants. *Iqub* is adapted to the specific migration milieu of South Africa in which it plays a crucial role; part of migrants' resilience repertoire and means of accumulation (Girmachew 2019). The revitalization of *iqub* in the situation of migration directly relates to the status of Hadiya migrants and the nature of the labour market. Most Hadiya migrants in South Africa do not have documents, which bars them from access to the South African banking system. Even those who have documents feel uncomfortable using the banking system for fear of losing money to South African immigration authorities. As a result, nearly all put their saving in the shops until either they invest it in the expansion of their shops or remit to families through the hawala system. They mitigate the risk of being robbed by entering into *iqub*. The nature of their business also encourages the use of *iqub*, especially during the formative 'location' phase of migrant businesses in which daily income comes in the form of small amounts (coins) which requires diligent saving to pay for the weekly *iqub* contributions. Otherwise, it would be very easy to lose earnings as they appear insignificant. *Iqub* functions based on trust. As Hadiya form the largest Ethiopian immigrant community in South Africa this has provided them a wider social network offering various forms of *iqubs*. The importance of *iqub* in migrants' business can be gleaned from the following recount by a returnee migrant:

The reason why Ethiopian migrants have become more successful in business than black South Africans is because of *iqub*. *Iqub* helps us save and be planned. We plan expansion of business based on the size of our *iqubs*. Once in an *iqub* you have to think twice before you spend your daily income. *Iqub* is also kind of addictive. The more money you earn the more *iqubs* you want to enter. *Iqub* is also important to restart business after a robbery. People who are robbed often get priority so that they get going as soon as possible. When the *iqub* money is not enough we also give each other money either as a gift or borrowing. Hadiya would have prospered even more had it not been for

the jealousy and competition. People talk a lot about black South Africans robbing Ethiopian migrants and killing them. In fact, the rise in robbery and violence against migrants is related to migrants themselves. Those migrants who are not as successful in their business are now going to black South Africans and tell them who gets the *iqub* money when and where they put their money. South Africans would not have known about these things otherwise. Now they say give me my *iqub* money. Migrants do this either to eliminate competitors or get a share of the loot. Hadiya community in South Africa has now established an informal institution that monitors criminal activities [the Enough Campaign] and report to the South African law enforcement agencies.⁷ A handful of such people have already been deported to Hadiya.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, August 10, 2022)

At any rate, the culture of saving epitomized by *iqub*, though it has local roots prior to migration, has been elaborated on due to the imperatives of the specific migration context of South Africa and the nature of the labour market. As much as we speak here about social remittance, it is important to note also how migrants move with their traditional assets which are customized and appropriated to the contexts at places of destination. The evolution of *iqub* from a means of mobilizing financial resources into a safe deposit mechanism in the South African context goes beyond its original purpose at the place of origin.

Returnee migrants further use the culture of saving to support their businesses. They stand out very differently from migrant families whom they supported while they were still in South Africa. Migrant families are known for their conspicuous consumption and display of the material wealth generated by the flow of resources from South Africa. They are nicknamed *yihune* which in Amharic means ‘let it be’; a reference to their spending culture including paying for whatever price suggested by a shopkeeper. Returnee migrants are shocked to see such extravagance and they seek to counter this by leading through example, for which they are sometimes mocked as *qoraliyews*; a term used in Ethiopia to people who go door to door to exchange used cloth and shoes or any other household item in exchange for cheaper but functional imported Chinese goods. Calling returnee migrants as *qoraliyaws* is meant to discourage their ‘aggressive’ saving culture, as the following experience of a returnee migrant businessman in Addis Ababa indicates:

When I first visited Hosanna upon return from South Africa, I was shocked when I heard the price that I was hearing from the shops. Nearly all goods are much more expensive in Hosanna than in Addis. When I asked people why is it that goods are very expensive in Hosanna, they told me about the *yihunes*. The hard-won money that we send to support families is wasted here as if we dig money; thus endless. I also realised that shopkeepers, especially those who come outside of Hadiya, take advantage of this irresponsible consumption. If you haggle over a price they would say, ‘are you a *mengist serategnal* civil servant?’, as if being a civil servant is something that one has to be ashamed of. Implicitly they are referring to the difference between migrant

and non-migrant families and their different spending behavior. Let them call us *qoraliyaw*. We should rather strive to make the *yihune qoraliyaw*s. We should not waste this unique chance that is provided to us. South Africa is a gift from God to Hadiya. We should make use of it to transform our society. But if people [migrant families] become irresponsible in their spending all would be for nothing.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Addis Ababa, July 25, 2021)

A different flow of idea is the culture of working together; exposure to migrants from other countries who not only support each other financially but work together in the form of joint ventures that enables the pooling of capital and labour. This has led to self-reflection on the saying that “Ethiopians are good at eating together but not working together”. A returnee migrant thus recounted:

Many non-Ethiopian migrants in South Africa found our culture intriguing, including our neighbours the Somalis. They say “Ethiopians are perhaps the only people who eat from a common tray and even feed each other, and yet we do not see you working together”. They wonder what will become of us if we combine our strong sense of sociality with working together. This is true, more so among Hadiya and migrants from southern Ethiopia. We support each other through *iqub* and all sorts of fund raising for social events – from welcoming new comers, weddings, to sending off parties for those who return home. And yet it is rare to see us working together, except this temporary contractual arrangement between a *boss* (established migrants) and *borders* (new arrivals). There is also another problem with Ethiopians. We tend to do exactly the same business. If I open a shop somewhere and becomes profitable, others would come and do the same. This is the reason why there is a lot of animosity and violence among Ethiopian migrants. In South Africa a certain business is often associated with a certain family [business profiling] so that they expand the business with greater profit margin. The same business is run as a family business for generation.”

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Shashogo, July 17, 2022)

Some returnee migrants are moving towards a family firm, and few with friends. Abraham who is quoted extensively in the previous section, for instance, recently opened a video game and PlayStation business with a friend who is still in South Africa, combining financial resources and market information. A recent example of investing in shareholding would be six Hadiya migrants (some returnee, others still in South Africa) who have invested in the Addis Ababa City Administration’s Convention and Exhibition Centre. Such incipient forms of shareholding are very important, more so as Ethiopia is gradually opening its economy-creating opportunities for Hadiya migrants investing in the financial sector or embark on joint ventures.

Migrants’ entrepreneurial drive and its potential for transformation of Hadiya society is also visible not only in catching up but also excelling in a certain sense.

For instance, migrant investment in the public transport sector has not only tremendously enhanced rural–urban connectivity in Hadiya Zone but also enabled the Hadiya to successfully insert themselves into the national economic space, evident in the sheer number of inter-regional buses Hadiya own and how Hadiya language has become the de facto lingua franca of *autobus tera*, the headquarters of inter-regional public buses in Addis Ababa. A saying has it that whenever a passenger asks which bus, he should go to, the management would tell them “Go to a bus which posted ‘*hulum be esu hone*’ in its front window” (a bus with a statement “everything is the way it is because of God), an implicit reference to the Protestant religious identity of the Hadiya.⁸

What is an even more striking example of Hadiya excellence is how returnee migrants are engaged in a rare business in Ethiopia, more so in areas outside of Addis Ababa such as Hosanna. There are a couple of Hadiya returnee migrants who are involved in digital currency trade and keen on spreading the information and the skill to fellow Hadiya youth, especially those who are tech-savvy, as the following narrative by a returnee migrant indicates:

I learnt about cryptocurrency in South Africa. I always tried to communicate with people even with those whose language I do not know. I had many black South African friends and they showed me how to do business with cryptocurrency. It is not that I am educated. In fact, I was born and grew up in a countryside; not even Hosanna. I did not know that people know about cryptocurrency in Ethiopia. After I returned, I met somebody in Addis Abeba who trades in cryptocurrency. He created a WhatsApp and telegram format. It was simple for me because I already knew about it in South Africa. The challenge was rather there was no bank access in Ethiopia to do cryptocurrency trade. We have accessed the money and the goods that we import through the Hawala system. It is a very lucrative business. World billionaires such as Bill Gates are using it. I have 85 people in my group under one company only. Most of them are Ethiopians, also some blacks. You must read and study about the currency before you buy, that which company uses it. Individuals can also influence the value of a cryptocurrency such as what Elon Musk did; he wrote on social media about the currency as people’s currency next thing you know the price went up to the sky. But later his announcement about not selling the car by cryptocurrency also sharply decreased the doch coin. By the way, it is legal in the rest of the world. I don’t think the Ethiopian government gives enough attention. In Kenya and South Africa, you can withdraw from the bank, which is not available in Ethiopia. I earn on average 30,000 birr a month, which is not bad. The good thing is that I can still work on other things.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, August 10, 2021)

If this story is from an educated Ethiopian and more so from Addis Ababa, it might not be noteworthy. But this is indeed news coming from Hosanna with someone with very little formal education compensated by the experience in the situation

of migration; instancing not only Hadiya's catching up but also integration into a global financial market that is really cutting-edge. In June 2022, Ethiopia joined the league of crypto-antagonistic countries when its central bank issued a statement calling crypto transactions illegal and warning people to avoid using them. The bank claimed that only the birr, Ethiopia's currency, can be used to settle transactions in the country. However, the policy quickly shifted to regulation. Instead of shutting out cryptocurrencies, it wants to regulate the space as part of a fight against cybercrime and fraud. Through its registration scheme, Ethiopia wants to be the first African country to offer investors protection from criminal crypto enterprises from a cybersecurity perspective.⁹

Cryptocurrencies give easy access to the dollar, which has been scarce in Ethiopia. Importers have been going to the informal market to access foreign currency because the government reduced foreign exchange allocations to the private sector. Ethiopia can't take the same drastic decisions as it might backfire. While it seems sceptical about digital currencies, Ethiopia is exploring innovative uses of blockchain technology.¹⁰ The current massive upgrading of Ethio telecom and its partial privatization is expected to boost the ICT infrastructure which the trade in digital currency could benefit from. If and when this happens, Hosanna is already well placed to tap into a new economic niche thanks to the entrepreneurial drive injected by Hadiya migrants. The world is changing and it's changing quickly. The speed at which cryptocurrencies are taking over is a clear indicator that traditional financial institutions can no longer be the only game in town.¹¹

Beyond Statism – Migration and Diffusion of Liberal Economic Ideas in Places of Origin

The state is big in Ethiopia at the various stages of the development process. It has little faith in the role of the private sector as a driver of economic development. Ethiopia under the EPRDF was characterized as a developmental state, a specific form of state that is said to enjoy high levels of autonomy from different segments of society and have strong institutional capacity, "both of which allow this specific form of state to implement a set of successful state-interventionist policies in pursuit of developmental goals" (Mollaer 2016, p. 2). But the statist conception of development through a top-down planning process goes much earlier to imperial rule as well as the Derg period, though Ethiopia under EPRDF 'provides one of the clearest examples of a 'developmental state' in Africa (Clapham 2018); the idea that development is made by the state and is offered to the Ethiopian people. PM Abiy who came to power in April 2018 and his Prosperity Party's economic policy (the Home-Grown Economic Reform – 2021–2030) somehow deviates from the developmental state model with a focus on "a gradual transition from public to private sector-led growth" (MoFED 2020, p. 8). While some describe the approach under Abiy as a radical neoliberal departure, others say that it is more of a pragmatic affair, involving significant continuity as well as novelty (see for instance Davison 2019). As noted by Tsegab (2021, p. 51), "looking at the reforms underway [...] features of a developmental state as well as neo-liberal views of the economy are

incorporated” and “reforms do not jettison and do away with past policies but build on the successes and correct the failures of the past.” Development construed this way, there has been little or no space for the public sector, a challenge which is more accentuated at the local level within which migrant businesses are situated.¹² Abraham’s lived experiences related to his business interaction with the local government bear this out:

The local government does not do anything to support the private sector but they are the first to claim credit. Most officials are not accountable and live up to their expectation. Without doing anything they just come to my farm and act like as if they were supportive. They need that for their reporting. Several times I turned them down when they wanted to visit my farm. Where were they when the road in my neighbourhood was sold [leased] because of which my business suffered? There is problem with access to electricity and water as well. I had to use my own device to access both. Once an official came to my milk shop and asked me to sell him milk without queuing. I told him to wait for his turn and he replied ‘do you know who I am?’ I said I don’t care who you are. I want you to wait for your turn and those people who are waiting here are my priority. He screamed at me and told me to accept his bottle. I was mad. I wanted to fight with him but controlled myself and told him that I respect all my customers and he is one of them. He threw his bottle and left the place. I did that because I wanted him to know that he is appointed to serve the people, not to ask for priority. That is how things are in South Africa. If this was in South Africa the official would have queued like anyone else to get the service.

(Interviewed in Hosanna, June 2021)

Abraham’s practical engagement with local authorities resonates with Levitt’s account of Gilberto, a returnee Brazilian migrant from the US and his critique of local government instancing a social remittance: “Every time a street light went out or the garbage wasn’t collected in his home town, Gilberto visited City Hall”. He justified his act as follows:

I learned this in the United States – that governments can do what they’re supposed to do and that citizens should make sure that happens. I’m trying to get people here to understand that they don’t have to accept business as usual.

(Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011)

This is strikingly similar with Abraham’s story and his defiance of a local authority who demanded a preferential treatment.

Daniel Gofer is another returnee migrant who has also invested in dairy farm. He came back to Hosanna after ten years of stay in South Africa. He was one of the most successful Hadiya migrants, thanks to the South African documents he managed to acquire, including a business licence and citizenship for his two children

who were born in South Africa. While Daniel's possibilities might be better looking in South Africa, he decided to come back and settle in Hosanna where he invested in a dairy farm. Having formal, legal documents enabled Daniel to make multiple trips to Ethiopia. It was during his last visit that an encounter in a café in Hosanna inspired him to come back and invest in Hadiya:

While I was hanging out with friends in a Café in Hosanna, I saw an employee of the Café mistreating an elderly woman. When I asked why this was the case, I learnt that it was about shortage of milk. The milk supply in Hosanna is so little that it was not enough for cafes to serve milk and at times even macchiato. All that quarrel between the girl and the old lady was caused because of food shortage. Had there been enough milk supply they would not have quarrelled! I could not help compare the situation between Hosanna and Joburg [Johannesburg] and anywhere else in South Africa. That country is food secure. Even the poor have enough to eat and customer service is excellent. What we consider as basic in Ethiopia – food security, infrastructure etc. are no longer issues in South Africa. At the heart of food security in South Africa is their use of technology. This is what I want to do here. I have invested in agro-industry to make my own contribution to food security. What is a country for, if it does not secure food? I hear a lot people saying Ethiopia is developing fast, including Hosanna. When I ask what is the evidence for this, they would say look at the sky scrappers! Development is not measured in terms of buildings. The most basic is food. And food can be secured if we use agricultural technology. My plan is to secure the investment licence so that I can import agricultural technology duty-free. There is nothing more important for me than contributing to this noble idea. It is amazing what technology could do for food security. And what Ethiopia needs is technology, especially agricultural technology.

(A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, May 23, 2021)

Daniel continues his critique of the public sector in Ethiopia and why there should be greater space for the private sector:

Unfortunately, the government is not supportive. I asked for investment land but no one would give that. Instead, I had to buy land from farmers – over three million birr! Normally, investors get land for free in Ethiopia as per the law of the land. It is not only that I did not get investment land but also the government has refused to recognise the land that I bought from farmers as investment land. They said this is farmland not investment land! I need the recognition of the land that I bought as investment land so that I will be entitled to the investment benefit packages including importing goods from South Africa duty free. I have a plan to import modern agricultural technology from South Africa to Ethiopia. I came back with the hope to contribute to the development of my country. I could have stayed and lived in South Africa forever. Not only do I have work permit the whole family also has permanent

residence status. My aim is to meet the growing demand for milk in Hosanna town. Improved fodder varieties could easily be imported from South Africa which is known for modern dairy farms. I am also growing my own fodder for the cows because there is simply not enough in the market. My thinking is shaped by my experience in South Africa. There is no limit for production if you have the right technology. When you invest in something, it is not only for you. Investment creates employment opportunity, income for the government and service for the community. For instance, I have four employees. If I did not invest that money in that business, they might be still unemployed. I supply milk to Cafes in Hosanna. I have not yet profited from my investment but that I am making a contribution to the public makes me happy.

As a believer in the role of the private sector in the development process, Daniel further criticizes the Ethiopian public sector as a constraint to development. However, his faith in the market is combined with a sense of social responsibility, as the following statements indicate:

It has been two years since I submitted my application at the Zonal investment bureau to get recognition of my dairy farm as investment land. The back-and-forth exchanges and endless demands are tiresome. This would not have happened in South Africa. I need the investment licence to import technology duty free. Under normal circumstances it should not take longer than three or four days to issue investment licence. What is intriguing, and unfair at that, is you see many so-called investors who do not develop the land but they were given land for free. Here we are, even buying the land and yet difficult to get investment licence. No wonder then that there is no development in this country. This has to change if we really want development. Government cooperates with the fake investors because they get kickbacks from the sale of the land. They get the land for free and sell it after couple of years in millions. Hadiya used to be famous for its surplus in wheat production. It used to export wheat to the neighbouring regions but now Hadiya is a net importer of all grains. Many migrants left their business because of bureaucratic red herring and inefficient government system. I fear in the coming three or four years the food security situation in Hadiya Zone would worsen because of bad governance and lack of infrastructure. The Zonal government is not doing anything to improve governance problems. If I give up and go back to South Africa, I fear this would set a bad precedent and my friends who want to come back home and invest would be discouraged and lose interest. Strange that I could invest in South Africa, but not in my country. In South Africa most people are employed by the private sector, not by the government of South Africa. The Ethiopian government even distributes fodder to dairy farms for free which it buys from private farms.

Unfortunately, Daniel's vision of contributing to food security to the local economy through technology transfer between Ethiopia and South Africa was frustrated by

government bureaucracy which has made it very difficult for him to get the investment licence. From a purely individually rational choice point of view, it would make a lot of sense if Daniel packs it up and goes back to South Africa where his business is still intact, run by his brothers. More importantly, he could sell the land he bought from farmers with a high-profit margin, as many land speculators would do, given the ever-rising price of land especially in Hosanna. Instead, Daniel persisted and after two years of perseverance, itself acquired from his experience in South Africa, he managed to secure the investment licence. At the time of writing this article, Daniel was organizing his trip to South Africa to realize his dream of technology transfer, thus working to make a contribution to the development of Hadiya society and Ethiopia more broadly. Returnee migrants such as Daniel are also vectors for the diffusion of liberal economic ideas where statism is the dominant political and economic norm in countries such as Ethiopia.

Conclusion

As the case study of Hadiya migrants indicates, a transnational flow of ideas helps us broaden the scope of transnational flow of resources to include social remittances. In the Hadiya case study discussed in this chapter, this is expressed in the form of the much-needed entrepreneurial skill which hitherto monopolized by members of the dominant groups. Other forms of social remittances include a belief in oneself; a culture of saving, networking skill, resilience and perseverance, and alternative conception of development that critiques Ethiopia's historically entrenched statist conception and terms of development.

All these new economic norms are functional in setting up and running businesses in places of origin especially for people such as the Hadiya who start with a low base. Hadiya have seen themselves not only adapting to a radically new South African context but also thriving, notwithstanding the initial gap in skills and cultural competence. To materialize their migration project and its transformational impact, the Hadiya have used religious resources and mobilized social and political networks throughout the migration process.

This migration-induced new positive self-identification and the sense of being "awakened" is perhaps more important and transformational than the monetary gains the Hadiya have made from their stay in South Africa. Hadiya was part of the broader southern periphery where the local economy was dominated by members of the dominant group. With a far-reaching consequence of this relationship of dominance was the internalization of inequality and lack of self-confidence. Thanks to the transnational flow of resources, including social remittances, Hadiya are no longer the periphery they once were. Migration has unleashed their capacity for growth. They also rightly identified the root cause of their predicament, i.e., the fundamental social inequality within the Ethiopian polity that has put entry barriers to the business sector and economic participation at the local and national levels more broadly. In effect, with their new sense of positive self, the Hadiya are now saying, "it is the system, not us"; that there is nothing wrong with them, and the reason why they lagged behind is because the Ethiopian socio-political system is

fundamentally unequal. Such attitudinal shifts and new forms of self and collective consciousness have a revolutionary ring to them with a potential to further accelerate processes of social change towards economic empowerment and the emergence of an assertive citizenry.

Notes

- 1 Funded by the UKRI Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), the MIDEQ Hub unpacks the complex and multi-dimensional relationships between migration and inequality in the context of the Global South in 6 migration corridors and 12 countries. For more information visit www.mideq.org
- 2 The typical countries crossed during the journey include; Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
- 3 The Wonji sugar plantation was established after a concession was signed between the Imperial Government of Ethiopia and the Dutch Company, Handels Vereeniging Amsterdam (HVA) in 1951. Workers were paid only Eth \$0.75 cents for a day. The almost idyllic picture that management had succeeded in portraying of life at Wonji concealed one of the most notorious cases of exploitation and racial discrimination in Ethiopian industrial life while Hadiya came to be pejoratively known as people worth slashing sugar canes (Kumar, 2021). Even members of the Derg political leadership at times invoked this label to justify exclusion of people from the South in distribution of administrative positions (interview with Ambassador Tesfaye Habiso, Addis Abeba, 2021).
- 4 FGD with returned migrants from Wonji, Hosanna, 2021.
- 5 African refugees in South Africa are often unable to access their rights | | Africa at LSE.
- 6 South Africa has one of the largest social welfare systems in the developing world. It includes grants for disability, child support, old age, and, more recently, the COVID-19-related social relief distress grant (SRDG).
- 7 <https://www.facebook.com/Gezahegn-Sumamo-official-page-113911003650767>.
- 8 Apparently, it is borrowed from the biblical verse Ecclesiastes 3:11 (“He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in the human heart; yet^[a] no one can fathom what God has done from beginning to end.
- 9 INSA announced in June that it had thwarted 97% of cyber attacks on various institutions in the country since July 2021, saving the nation \$26.3 million. The Internet Crime Report by the FBI shows that illicit use of cryptocurrency sits among the top three reported cybercrime incidents globally.
- 10 Why Ethiopia is moving from banning crypto to regulating it – Ventures Africa.
- 11 How Cryptocurrencies Can Help Global Economy and Build a Better Future (finextra.com).
- 12 Although Abiy’s economic reform program has tilted in favour of neoliberalism, there are still some continuities. At the regional level there are even reversals towards parastatals and proliferation of state-owned enterprises.

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9 Religious Place-Making and African Mobilities

Muslim and Christian Moroccan Sites in Migrant Trajectories within and beyond the Continent

Johara Berriane

Introduction

The privileged relations between Morocco and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are not only political and economic. They are, in essence, age-old human and spiritual ties. Given the situation in some of these countries, many of their citizens immigrate to Morocco legally or illegally. Formerly a transit point to Europe, our country has become a residence destination. Faced with the significant increase in the number of immigrants from Africa and Europe, we have invited the government to develop a new comprehensive policy on immigration and asylum issues, following a humanitarian approach in line with our country's international commitments and respecting the rights of immigrants. To illustrate the special interest We attach to this aspect, We have charged a ministerial department with immigration issues.

(Speech of King Mohammed VI, 6 November 2013)¹

The speech of the Moroccan King Mohammed VI cited above as well as the concrete migration policy measures towards sub-Saharan migrants that followed have been analyzed as significant indicators of the country's geopolitical reorientation towards Africa (Cherti and Collyer 2015). At the same time, during this speech, the Moroccan monarch referred for the first time to Morocco's role as an immigration country. It represents a remarkable change in public awareness of Morocco's role as a receiving country. While there were a significant number of European immigrants in Morocco during colonial times, this number gradually decreased in the 1960s. At the same time, with more than 5 million Moroccans living abroad today, Morocco has become one of the most important African emigration countries. But since the early 1990s, Morocco also became a place of residence for a growing number of migrants from West, Central Africa, and Europe as well as Syrian refugees. Whereas European immigration to Morocco has rather been neglected by academic scholars,² 'sub-Saharan' migration in Morocco has, since early 2000, become a popular research topic (see for example Barros et al. 2002; Escoffier 2008; Alioua 2009; AMERM 2009; Péraldi 2011; Norman 2016; Mourji et al. 2016; Mouna et al. 2017; Üstübcici et al. 2018; Berriane 2018; Stock 2019; Haouari et al. 2020; Gazzotti 2021).

The growth of migrants from West and Central Africa in Morocco has been mainly understood as an effect of the tightening of European border controls (AMERM 2009; Bensaâd 2009; Péraldi 2011). Indeed, the tightening of European migration policies towards African nationals in cooperation with Morocco, which has been taking place gradually since 1997 has contributed to transforming the kingdom into a European frontier zone where migrants have become blocked and had only a few opportunities to move forward (see for example Perrin 2009; Casas-Cortes et al. 2013; Vacchiano 2013). However, this perception of migration flows between West and North Africa and the settlement of migrants in Moroccan cities as a mere effect of Europe's closure is not only a very 'Eurocentric' perspective. This point of view also undermines the value of research approaches that highlight the diachronic dimension of migration projects (King et al. 2006; McKeown 2019) and that demonstrate the intertwining of migration and other forms of spatial mobility (Bruijn et al. 2001; Schapendonk 2020). This perception ignores the long-standing relations and mobilities between Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa as well as the different historical, cultural, and socio-economic factors that have played an equally important role for today's migration processes as the kingdom's geographical proximity to Europe and its role as a stepping stone or a waiting post to Europe.

In this chapter, I would like to highlight the complexity of mobility patterns and installations of Central and West African migrants in Morocco³ while focusing on religious place-making, as the "activity of establishing a particular locality for religious practice" (Hüwelmeier and Krause 2010, p. 8). This approach allows me to empirically examine the meaningfulness and significance of Moroccan places for migrants and to consider the role played by religious sites as nodes for transnational circulation and settlement. In particular, I would like to show how religious places and the social spaces⁴ associated with them support migrants in their local settlement. At the same time, these places and the spaces are drivers for new forms of migration and circulation. In part, these places are created by migrants, while in part they are places that have already existed and are transformed. Looking at the interrelations of migration and religious place-making also makes it possible to show how the (Moroccan) places that migrants cross or where they settle can be or become part of their imaginaries. They are not only localities where migrants are in an extraordinary transitory state of in-between (Pian 2009), a state from which they only emerge again when they settle permanently or return home. In doing so, this contribution will not only recentre the perspective on the South-South dynamics of African migration to Morocco, but also show how the longstanding relations between Moroccan cities and sub-Saharan Africa shape today's migration patterns and the multiplicity of forms of migration and mobility encountered in Morocco. That would also suggest that instead of analyzing Morocco as a country that was previously a space of transit and has become a space of immigration, we should rather look at the connections and the overlapping of long-term forms of settlement and modes of circulation.

The chapter is based on two research projects in which the connections between transnational mobility, migration, and religious place-making have been investigated empirically. The first enquiry took place between 2008 and 2014 and focused

on a Muslim Sufi pilgrimage site in the Moroccan city of Fès.⁵ The second investigation was conducted from 2014 to 2017 in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca and studied the place-making of Pentecostal African migrant churches.⁶ Both projects were based on ethnographic research methods, such as participant observation and qualitative interviews. These projects investigated from different perspectives and in different urban settings the various connections between intra-continental transnational spatial mobility and religious place-making in Morocco. Whereas the first project focuses on a historical Muslim place located in a Moroccan old town and used by West African migrants and locals, the second investigation looks at religious spaces produced more recently in Moroccan suburbs by Christian migrants from Central and West Africa. Comparing the results of these two studies will enable us to see how places linked to different religious traditions with different historical backgrounds and different positioning in local power relations (a majority and a minority religion) can play similar roles for migration projects. The comparative analysis of the connections between migration and religious flows in Moroccan settings highlights further the multiple and complex intra-continental religious entanglements and circulations in Africa. After a brief theoretical overview on the interlinkages between migration, mobility, and religion, I will describe how the shrine of the founder of the Tidjaniyya Sufi order based in Fès has contributed to the development of translocal religious networks and mobility between West Africa (particularly Senegal) and Morocco. In a third section, I will focus on the more recently founded Pentecostal migrant churches in Rabat and their role in the life trajectories and migration projects of Central and West African migrants.

Religion, Migration and Community Formation: Giving Meaning to the Temporal Stay

In recent decades, scholarly works have clearly demonstrated the crucial role of religious practices and institutions in migrants' daily and community lives. Mainly conducted in traditional immigration countries, this research has shown the role of religious practices in the everyday and community life of migrants (e.g., Levitt 2007; Hüwelmeier and Krause 2010; Vásquez and Knott 2014). It has also shown the importance of migrants' establishment of religious places, especially in the formation of a sense of home (Vásquez and Friedmann Marquardt 2003; Baker 2013; Sheringham and Wilkins 2018). Migrants also engage in the creation of religious spaces in urban settings as a means for them to enhance their visibility (Hüwelmeier and Krause 2010), and to participate locally beyond their communal and cultural group (Baker 2013). Studies have further shown how transnational social networks and religious institutions and practices are intertwined (Levitt 2007; Garbin 2014).

The role of religion as a migratory resource and tool to give sense and a home to people on the move is particularly relevant for Africa, where 'mobility' in itself is extremely important, i.e. that migration consists of very different forms of mobility and travel. These forms of migration can also be circulatory or represent permanent forms of living that do not only have economic motives (see for example De

Bruijn et al. 2001). However, the interlinkages between migration and religion in African settings have only recently started to receive attention from scholars. Most of these recent works have been conducted in South Africa and have focused on the role of Christian churches or Muslim mosques as spaces of local and transnational belonging in big cities (see for example Landau 2009; Bukasa 2018; Cazarin 2018; Sigamoney 2018). Similar accounts have been made by Bruce Whitehouse on West African Muslim spaces in the Congolese city of Brazzaville (Whitehouse 2012). Due to their transnational dimension, in the sense of “complex, pendular and multidirectional movements” (Adogame and Spickard 2010, 56), African migration flows within and beyond the continent have contributed significantly to the dissemination of religious movements, ideas, and practices. This has also led to a range of studies on the transnationalization of African religions (see for example Fourchard et al. 2005; Adogame 2013; Settler and Engh 2018; Van Dijk 2002 and 2004) that could demonstrate the significant impact of African actors, ideas, practices, and movements for global religions both within and beyond the African continent. Within the research field of trans-Saharan migration, the role of religion for migrants on the move has also been observed. During the crossing of the Sahara Desert and for the temporal settlement, religion has become a crucial spiritual and material resource (Bava 2005; Escoffier 2008; Bredeloup 2013; Bava and Boissevain 2014). Researchers have also analyzed the social and cultural effects of trans-Saharan migration on the Sahelian and Saharan cities where Central and West African migrants settle temporarily (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005).

In Morocco, research has primarily focused on the socio-economic integration of sub-Saharan migrants (Kettani and Péraldi 2011; Pickerill 2011; Weyel 2015; Mourji et al. 2016). Other scholars have analyzed how African migrants being supported by Moroccan civil society and later globalization movements were able to mobilize in order to claim more rights (Alioua 2009; Pian 2009). The religious effects of the presence of African migrants in Moroccan cities have also received some attention more recently. These works have shown how the more or less permanent settlements of West and Central African migrants have contributed to a pluralization of the religious landscape and the introduction of new forms of religiosity (Coyault 2014; 2021; Bava 2016; Bava and Boissevain 2020; Berriane 2020). At the same time, the Christian and Muslim spaces used and shaped by sub-Saharan African migrants are usually neither publicly visible nor shared with locals (Timéra 2011; Berriane 2014; 2021; Coyault 2021).

This contribution draws on these later works. It aims to show how in different Moroccan urban settings religious places (Muslim and Christian) and the ritual and social spaces linked to them play a crucial role in the mobility and the settlements of migrants in Africa and beyond. While looking at the interrelations of migration and religion as well as the role of transnational religion for home-making and social networking, it will show how the (Moroccan) places that migrants cross or where they settle are not places where migrants are in an extraordinary transitory state of in-between but rather places and sites that have a meaning for them and can be or become part of their imaginaries.

The *Zawiya* of Ahmad al-Tidjani in Fès Past and Present: A Drive for Migration and Mobility between North and West Africa

Given its historical role as a translocal intellectual centre, the city of Fès represents a prime place to analyze the long-standing history of West African migration towards Morocco. With its theological university, al-Qarawiyyin, founded in the 9th century, Fès has long been an important intellectual centre for African scholars. Similarly, the existence of the tomb of the founder of the Tidjaniyya Sufi order⁷ has been playing a crucial role in the consolidation of translocal religious networks between Fès and West African places. As I will show now, these religious networks have contributed, until today, to foster different forms of migration and mobility and have shaped the migration projects of West African migrants based or circulating in Morocco.

Trans-Saharan Tidjani Networks and Multidirectional Circulations between West Africa and Fès during Colonial Times

After the establishment of the Tidjaniyya Sufi order in an Algerian oasis in 1781/82, the Sufi scholar Ahmad al-Tidjani settled in Fès, where he built a Sufi lodge (a *zawiya*). From there, the Tidjaniyya teachings spread throughout the region and reached West Africa in 1820. Partly by an armed movement established in 1852 by al-Hajj Umar Tall, different channels of transmission departed from Mauritania towards Guinea, Senegal, and today's Mali. The Sufi order spread further to other places in Africa, Asia, and beyond. Although the Tidjaniyya order is currently found in several countries within the Muslim world, it certainly has more prominence in African countries (Triaud 2000: 10), especially in Senegal where it represents the first brotherhood by the number of its followers. Like many Sufi orders or spiritual paths (*tariqa*), the Tidjaniyya has developed many branches over time and represents today more a shared heritage of readings and rites and a strong identity than an organized, centralized Sufi order (Triaud 2000: 14). Today, there are various religious centres and Tidjani branches and families with international outreach. Besides the multipolarity of the Tidjaniyya, Fès has developed into one of its most significant sites (El Adnani 2005: 181). With the burial of Ahmad al-Tidjani in his *zawiya* in 1815, the edifice acquired even greater value in the eyes of the Tidjani adepts for whom it became a significant pilgrimage site and a place to foster translocal social networks.

Already at the beginning of the 20th century, networks with Fès had gained importance for Senegalese Tidjani scholars, as they usually made a stop in Morocco on their way to Mecca to visit the tomb of Ahmad al-Tidjani and to meet Moroccan Tidjani scholars. At this time, the role of the journeys to Fès became particularly important for the religious careers of Tidjani scholars. This was the case, for instance, of one of the most influential Tidjani scholars of the 20th century, Ibrahim Niassé (1900–1975). In his account of his first journey to the Hijaz (to Mecca) in 1937, he documented how he had travelled to Fès via Morocco on the way there and back to visit the tomb of Ahmad al-Tidjani and to meet Moroccan scholars who

had been initiated directly into the Tidjaniyya teaching by companions of Ahmad al-Tidjani. The meetings with scholars in Fès had an effect on his religious authority and recognition as spiritual guide (*muqaddam*), i.e. who is allowed to initiate into the Tidjaniyya teachings (for more details see Berriane 2016).

Since the late 19th–early 20th century, the Tidjani networks between Senegal and Fès also contributed to the fact that members of large trading families from Fès made their way to Senegal and settled in Saint Louis, which became the first capital of French West Africa (Abou el Farah et al. 1997). This Moroccan migration to Saint Louis was mainly characterized by the fact that the traders mostly belonged to the Moroccan elite from Fès and married Senegalese women, most of whom also came from influential local families. This created a *métisse* community with very high social status and close ties to Fès, where, for example, the children were sent to grow with relatives in order to learn and pass on the Arabic language and Moroccan customs (Abou el Farah et al. 1997; Berriane 2019). While the Tidjaniyya does not play a significant role today for the descendants of these Moroccan migrants, these religious networks played an essential role for their settlement, trade activities, and local integration in Saint Louis (*Ibid.*).

From the 1920s to the 1950s, journeys to the shrine of Ahmad al-Tidjani to Fès were also organized by French colonial administration as part of the pilgrimage to Mecca, for loyal West African Muslims (Marfaing 2004; El Adnani 2005; Sambe 2010; Berriane 2016). Between 1928 and 1958, the annual pilgrimage of West Africans to Mecca was made under the supervision of a commissioner of the government of French West Africa, in order to control all contacts between the Muslims of French West Africa and the Muslims of North Africa, the latter being suspected of supporting nationalist and independence movements (El Adnani 2005). From that moment on, it became common for boats heading towards Mecca to stop off in Casablanca or Oran for a stay of a few weeks before continuing the journey on another ship with Maghrebian pilgrims. This stay was very often used to buy some goods that were later given or sold in the home country (Marfaing 2004: 246–247). It became also the rule to travel to Fès to visit the tomb of Ahmad al-Tidjani: after the involvement of private travel agencies in the organization of pilgrimages to Mecca in the 1950s, pilgrimages to Mecca via Morocco were still offered.⁸ Senegalese pilgrims, in particular after independence (1960) opted for journeys that combined the pilgrimage to Mecca with a stop in Morocco and a visit of the shrine of Fès.⁹ With the closure of the sea link between Dakar and Casablanca in 1970 and the introduction of direct flights to Jeddah for the pilgrimage to Mecca, the number of West African travellers stopping by in Fès during their journey to Mecca decreased. However, they have been replaced by other West African travellers whose mobility and stay in Morocco was also linked to the *zawiya* and its networks.

Ahmad al-Tidjani's Zawiya in Today's Transnational Mobility to Morocco

In the aftermath of African independence, the movement of West African people heading to Morocco was also influenced by the religious journey to Fès. Besides the development and commodification of the Tidjani pilgrimage practices to Fès,

the development of transnational informal trade, student mobility, and migration were also linked to the existence of trans-Saharan Tidjani networks and mobility towards Fès. Whereas these networks were first connecting Fès to West African places, the more recent circulations and networks were also originating in Europe.

In her work on Senegalese traders, Laurence Marfaing demonstrated how the Tidjani pilgrimage to Fès was closely tied to the development of informal commerce between Senegal and Morocco (Marfaing 2004: 235–260). In the 1960s, Senegalese women in particular began to travel to Morocco to buy goods, which they later sold in Senegal. According to Marfaing, the sacred dimension of the journey to Morocco – the place where the founder of the Tidjaniyya was buried – played a significant role in the existence of this activity, as it allowed female traders to make these journeys alone and engage in trade activities. Senegalese female traders also used the Tidjaniyya networks to find accommodation in various cities in Morocco where Tidjani lodges were located (*Ibid*). The mobility of pilgrim-merchants and their goods that initially occurred between Morocco and West Africa (especially Senegal) is nowadays also extending towards Europe. Some Senegalese pilgrims who reside in Europe use their journey to Morocco to supply themselves with Moroccan products that they later sell to migrants based in Europe (Kane 2007). Making the pilgrimage to Fès is also an opportunity for transnational couples (usually the husbands live in France or Spain and the wives are engaged in trade activities between Morocco and Senegal) to meet and exchange goods (coming from Europe and Senegal) (Berriane 2015a). Through these activities, the city of Fès has become a hub for people and goods circulating between Senegal and Europe and is consequently today a site in West African transnational territories (Kane 2007; Berriane 2015a).

The significance of the Tidjani networks for the migration and local insertion of various mobile groups is also apparent in the surroundings of the *zawiya*, where different groups meet and connect with each other. Indeed, traders circulating between Morocco and Senegal played and play an important role as intermediaries for pilgrims, migrants and students who wish to immigrate to Morocco. In this context, for example, the neighbourhood around Ahmad al-Tijani's tomb itself has become a temporary base for circulating Senegalese street traders who use the shrine as a social space to establish local contacts, as well as to gain access to accommodation and local business partners.

Similarly, West African students receive pilgrims and pilgrim-traders from their countries of origin and accompany them on their journey to Fès. The mobilities of West African students towards Fès are the oldest mobilities. It was common for West African pilgrims to combine the pious journey to Mecca with study periods in North African theological universities, including the al-Qarawiyyine University founded in the 9th century in Fès (Harrak 1994). Even today, this university attracts West African students who come to further their studies in Islamic sciences. It is also common for the al-Qarawiyyine to be one of the stages in the university curriculum of a sub-Saharan student, who then goes on to other Arab theological universities in Tunis, Cairo, or the Gulf States (Bava et al. 2013). In addition to the mobility of religious students, a considerable number of sub-Saharan students – mainly from

French-speaking countries – are heading for Moroccan public and private universities to study economics, law, natural sciences, and technical sciences. Thus, during the 2008–2009 academic year, 1,039 sub-Saharan students were enrolled in public institutions in Fès. In the same year, the private education sector in Fès had 852 foreign students (i.e. 36.6% of students in general), the majority of whom were from French-speaking African countries (Berriane 2015b). Among the private schools in Fès, some even have specialized in foreign students from West African countries such as Mali, Senegal, or Guinea (Touré 2014). In 2021, more than 19,000 African students were studying at Moroccan public universities.¹⁰

In this way, the tomb of Ahmad al-Tidjani has become a hub for different forms of mobilities and a site in the transnational territories of West African individuals who trade, work or study in Morocco. Through its integration in these West African territories, the Moroccan Tidjani site also becomes a religious meaning for West African migrants who settle in Fès.

The Zawiya in the Quotidian Life of African Migrants Based in Fès

Besides hosting traders and students, Fès has also become a destination for migrants since the early 2000. Many migrants choose Fès as a stopover or a place of retreat after an unsuccessful attempt to reach Europe or after spending some time in other Moroccan cities. These migrants are mainly from West Africa (84.6%) with a small minority of Central Africans. Being mostly men (77.4%), they represent a predominantly young community and 91% of them are between 20 and 35 years old (Berriane 2018).¹¹ They often live on circumstantial solidarity and small jobs. Those with higher education qualifications work, like many French-speaking students based in Morocco, in international call centres that have relocated to the city in recent years. As with the students, the stay in Fès is rarely planned as a lasting settlement. Most of them came at the earliest five years ago and more than a third have been living in the city for less than a year (*Ibid.*). Although the religious history of Fès and its connections with the South does not play a direct role in the city's choice as a destination, the religious meaning of the city becomes relevant once in Morocco. The very existence of the *zawiya* of Ahmad al-Tidjani in Fès can be relevant for the migratory project or the quotidian life of West African migrants based in Morocco.

I was in Casablanca when I started to think about how to reach Europe. But what also motivated me to come to Fès was that I am a Moslem, and I am a Sufi. I knew that in the *zawiya* of Ahmad al-Tidjani, there are numerous Senegalese. Therefore, I thought that if I went to Fès, it would be easier for me. And since all Senegalese Tidjanis dream of visiting the *zawiya* in Fès, I thought that given that I was still in Morocco, not knowing until when I would stay, I had to take advantage of this opportunity and go to Fès. Spiritually it gives me more strength.

(Interview, Senegalese, male, Fès, May 2010)

This is the statement of a 20-year-old Senegalese migrant interviewed in Fès and who had not initially planned to settle neither in Fès nor in Morocco. He travelled

to Morocco by bus and spent six months in Marrakech then went to Casablanca where he found a permanent job in a call centre. However, besides this job opportunity, he decided to proceed with his journey, moving to Fès. This new destination was motivated by the religious meaning this place has for the society of origin. He wanted to give a religious purpose to his stay.

In a similar way, a female Tidjani disciple from Dakar settled in Fès after getting married to a Senegalese migrant working in Italy. Fès was chosen due to its geographical proximity to Italy and the existence of cheap low-cost flights between Fès and North Italy so that her husband could visit her frequently. After having discovered the city during a pilgrimage to the *zawiya*, she found accommodation with local families living in the surroundings of the shrine and decided to extend her stay. During her stay which lasted more than six months she spent all day praying in the *zawiya*, conceiving her stay in Morocco as a spiritual retreat (Interview, Senegalese, female, Fès, 15 May 2010). And later, after she was able to join her husband in Brescia, she maintained her relationships with Fès and has been visiting the *zawiya* and the local families regularly (field notes, Fès, June 2012). Besides giving sense to the stay in Morocco, this second example shows how the religious meaning of the stay in Fès contributes to building a relationship with Morocco that can last even when the migrant has left the country. It reassesses the value of the moment spent in Morocco that represents more than just a moment of waiting and can be a driver of future North-South mobilities connecting Morocco to West African migrant communities in Europe.

Besides reorienting or giving a new meaning to the journeys of Senegalese migrants, the existence of the *zawiya* can also become relevant for West African migrants arriving or stranding in the city. The interviews conducted with migrants who have been living in Fès have shown that they mostly know this place and visited the saint. The shrine represents a place where they are able to connect both in a symbolic and in a concrete way with their 'home'. A Malian student tried to convince me that Ahmad al-Tidjani is a particular saint, saying:

There is a saint who is sleeping there. For that reason, you cannot compare it with a mosque. And this saint, it is our saint. He is a saint in Islam. He can be your mediator with God. If you go there, you can make some wishes there and they can be fulfilled. Even if you are not Muslim, you can go there and inshallah your wishes might be fulfilled. My mother, who is very pious, told me if you go to Fès. You should go there and pray.

(Interview, Malian, male, Fès, May 2010)

Further, the *zawiya* is a religious place in which West African migrants connect socially with their home country. These migrants often have no local social networks, and the tomb has become a preferred religious site where they feel much more welcome and belonging, unlike other religious sites in the city. Those migrants who come from countries with Sufi traditions (Senegal, Mali, or Nigeria for instance) perceive the visit of the *zawiya* as a way to connect with their homeland (Interview, Malian, male, May 2010). They can meet their fellow countrymen and women and the place reminds them of rituals and practices they are familiar with. It was for

instance the case of a homeless migrant from Burkina Faso who regularly went to the tomb to “see people from home” (Interview, Burkinabe, male, May 2010). The identification with the place and its appropriation by West African migrants of the city becomes also apparent in the account of an Ivorian migrant who, although being Christian, visited regularly the *zawiya* to benefit from the blessings of the saint’s descendants (Interview, Ivorian, male, 22 June 2010). Due to its translocal outreach and the presence of West African fellows, the *zawiya* is a place where West African migrants feel to belong. In this way, Morocco has been integrated into the sacred and social territories of many West African mobile people crossing or settling temporarily in this North African society with whom they share similar Sufi traditions.

Migration, Mobility, and Christian Place-Making in the Suburbs of Rabat

The section above described how a Muslim site and the Sufi community related to it have been shaping transnational social spaces and multidirectional mobilities between West Africa, Morocco, and Europe during the last century. This *zawiya* is characterized by its anchorage both in Moroccan and West African society. Due to this shared heritage, Fès has been meaningful for West African migrants and other mobile people who have been travelling or settling in Morocco in past and present. The discussion in this section will shift the focus on another religious tradition and on another Moroccan urban setting. It deals with ritual spaces created and used by Christian African migrants in the suburbs of the Moroccan capital of Rabat. Although these places are the direct effect of more recent migration flows and introduce a foreign religion, their existence and use reflect also the complexity of Morocco’s migration pattern and the country’s place in transnational African spaces.

Revitalization and Pluralization of the Christian Landscape of Morocco’s Main Cities

Due to the more recent immigration movements from sub-Saharan Africa to Morocco, a revitalization and diversification of the religious and especially Christian landscape has been taking place in Morocco’s main cities such as Rabat. Christianity in Morocco was originally linked to the colonial past, as there were and are no official Christian locals (Bava 2016; Bava and Boissevain 2020). During colonial times, Protestant and Catholic churches were built and used exclusively by European settlers. As a result, following independence in 1956, all the churches served only a limited number of European worshippers, with Christianity being perceived as the religion of the French and Spanish colonizers (Baida and Féroldi 1995). Since the 1980s, with the arrival first of Christian students and later migrants from West and Central Africa, these same places were reactivated and filled up again.

In addition to the revival of historic churches, a pluralization and spatial expansion of the Christian landscape has been taking place since 2004 on the outskirts of the main Moroccan cities. This was especially the case in the capital Rabat which was for

a long time the most popular destination for African students, migrants, and asylum seekers (Alioua 2009). A survey conducted by the Protestant church in 2013 find out a large variety of newly founded Christian churches in the city.¹² These places, which often are referred to as house-churches, have all been founded by migrants from Central (both Congo states) and West Africa (mainly Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Liberia) and are exclusively frequented by migrants from these regions (Coyault 2014; Berriane 2020). Besides slight doctrinal differences, these churches belong mostly to the charismatic movement which has become the most influential Christian movement in Africa (and worldwide) and attaches, among other things, a central importance to the work of the Holy Spirit in teaching and faith practice (Robbins 2004).

Through the very existence of these new Christian places of worship, Christianity in Morocco has become more diversified. It is also no longer confined to isolated places inherited from the colonial past. When we consider the geographical placement of these Christian places, the majority are situated in working-class and impoverished districts where African migrants have settled more or less permanently during the last 25 years. All the churches visited were in the most run-down buildings in the street, some above illegal liquor vendors (interview 10, male, DRC, 18 December 2015), while others had had to relocate up to five times before their leaders were able to find a safe and permanent site for their gatherings (interview 12, male, DRC, 1 January 2016). These are also the districts where former migrants have run hostels (typically referred to as ‘foyers’) where migrants settled first and have remained until they are able to continue their journey (Timéra 2009). Since 2014, many migrants also started to move to new suburbs south of Rabat such as Témara or Mohammedia or north to Salé where the rents were lower and where they were able to move their churches or establish additional places of worship (Berriane 2021). As discussed elsewhere, one of the primary reasons for the existence of these spaces of worship is to provide a base for stranded migrants who are blocked in Morocco and who cannot rely on strong social ties (Coyault 2014; Berriane 2020; Bava 2021). For them the church becomes an important space of belonging and participation when they arrive to Morocco. Besides their social role, these places of worship are not officially recognized by the Moroccan state and stay invisible (Berriane 2021; Coyault 2021). They also do not target locals since Christian proselytization is not allowed by Moroccan law.¹³ Their proselytization mission is therefore mainly directed to other West and Central African migrants and local authorities tend to rather ignore the existence of these Christian ritual spaces as long as they do not become public (Berriane 2021). The religious worship tends to focus on migrants’ emigration aspirations and the struggles experienced in Morocco (Bava 2016; Berriane 2021). However, these semi-private charismatic churches are not a mere side effect of the permanent settlement of African Christian foreigners in Morocco but rather the result of diverse forms of circulation and mobility.

***Morocco’s Role in the Migration Projects of Church Leaders and Members:
A Stepping Stone and a Permanent Destination***

An analysis of the life trajectories of church leaders reveals a direct link between their migration projects and their church activities. It reflects the complexity of

Morocco's migration patterns and highlights the churches' position as a node that enables both installation and circulation. Indeed, it turned out that only half of the church leaders I interviewed between 2015 and 2017 were planning to move on to Europe or North America. The others had changed their migration project or came to Morocco specifically to stay permanently. This was for example the case of a pastor from Kinshasa who came to Morocco at the beginning of 2003 to emigrate to Europe, but now wants to remain in Morocco. He lives in Rabat with his wife and four daughters and even his oldest daughter – who had lived in Kinshasa for the previous 12 years – was able to join the family in 2016. It was only in Morocco that he became a member of a house church and was later appointed by this pastor (who was able to migrate to France) as his successor. In this way, he also became a renowned person in the Congolese migrant community, which also helps him in his other activities. For example, he owns a small shop selling African goods, organizes “informal” money transfers between Morocco and his home country and is involved in a cultural association he co-founded (Interview 17, RDC, male, Rabat, 20 October 2017).

Other church leaders who immigrated to Morocco later saw Morocco as their main destination from the beginning. It is the case, for example, of a woman from Abidjan, who was sent by her Ivorian church to Casablanca to establish a branch there, just after the Moroccan King has announced the launching of a migration policy and an operation to regularize migrants. When I met her in 2015 and asked her about her plans, she explained that she was applying for a residency permit and wanted to stay in Morocco (Interview 3, Ivorian, female, Casablanca, 22 November 2015). When I met her again in 2017, she had her residency and had left her old church and was in the process of starting her own church in another suburb of Casablanca (Interview 23, Ivorian, female, Casablanca, 1 October 2017). The members of this second church were mainly Ivorian and Cameroonian students and migrant workers, especially female housekeepers. Among them, some had just arrived and sometimes had contacted the church through social networks (Facebook in particular) before deciding to move to Morocco, which illustrates how these religious places connect also West African sending countries with Morocco.¹⁴

As in the case of the groups and individuals who meet around the tomb of Ahmad al-Tijani, the migration projects and aspirations of the members of these house churches are quite diverse. Again, it is clear that these religious places become nodes that support migration and mobility. Similarly, the establishment of West and Central African migrant churches in Morocco does not only encourage the permanent settlement and the integration of migrants but also supports multidirectional forms of mobility and circulation, as I will describe in the following section.

Migrant Churches as Nodes and Connection Points for New Forms of Circulation in Morocco

Besides their role as connection points for the circulation and installation of North-bound migrants in Morocco, the existence of these places today also facilitates the multidirectional mobility of images, individuals, and money. This circulation is

particularly important when the church becomes an intermediary for financial support from abroad. This is for example the case of a Congolese pastor, who, with the help of his mentor who left for France, made contact with a Pentecostal Nigerian church based in the United States. This Nigerian Church turned the house church into its North African branch and supported the pastor financially. This financial support initially enabled a move to a larger room entirely dedicated to church activities (Interview 19, Congolese, male, Rabat, 26 October 2016). Migrant churches in Morocco are thus networked with new church communities through the successful onward journey of their members to Europe where they got in touch with other Christian African diaspora members based elsewhere (here in the US). In this case, two migrants from the South with different migratory trajectories and places of residence (one based in Morocco and one based in the US) converge in a place in the South (Rabat) thanks to the networks built by religious fellows (the Congolese pastor who emigrated from Morocco to France) met during their respective journeys. This case shows how intracontinental African migration flows contribute to the establishment of complex religious networks that further shape multidirectional flows of individuals, ideas, and money.

At the same time, it is also a very common practice for preachers from the countries of origin (RDC and Ivory Coast) or Europe/North America (majority diaspora) to come to Morocco to organize religious events on religious leadership, healing, or the religious meaning of the blockades and struggle encountered as a migrant. Migration was generally positively valued during these gatherings, with Isaac and Job seen as models to follow to achieve the social and economic capital that the congregants aspire to (Berriane 2021). This circulation of preachers is often accompanied by the circulation of goods and money, thus also linking church communities in Morocco to different places in Africa and the North. In May 2016, the Nigerian supporter of the Congolese church described above came from the United States to Rabat to organize a five-day workshop on leadership (field notes, Rabat, May 2016). A few months earlier, this same church hosted two preachers from the Republic of the Congo, who, on their way to a religious meeting in France, had stopped in Rabat to organize a religious seminar. The visit of international preachers appears to be a common practice also in smaller and less prominent churches that welcomed preachers from France (interview 15, male, DRC, 30 June 2016) or the United Kingdom (interview 17, male, DRC, 26 October 2016). Sometimes the church based in Morocco becomes also a meeting point for preachers from different places. It was for example the case for an Ivorian church in Salé that became a regular gathering place for preachers from Ivory Coast and France who meet up in Morocco to preach together (Interview 23, male, Ivory Coast, 26 October 2017).¹⁵

Although Christianity does not have the same role for Moroccan society as Muslim Sufi orders such as the Tidjaniyya, the multidirectional circulation of Christian migrants and preachers has helped to integrate Morocco, or at least some of its suburbs, into transnational Christian territories. This perfectly reflects the complexity of Morocco's current migration pattern, mainly characterized by an overlapping of temporal installation and consciously planned immigration. The

charismatic migrant churches are therefore integrated in the transnational Christian spaces that encompass the migrants' countries of origin, Moroccan cities and the African diaspora communities in Europe, and North America. Besides showing the various forms and multidirectional dimension of migration in the country, the existence of these places and their transnational embeddedness within transnational Christian territories demonstrates perfectly how Morocco has been integrated with the imaginary worlds even for the people whose initial goal was to reach Europe.

Conclusion

The examination of the links between South-South Migration and religious place-making in Morocco demonstrates the historical depth of these migratory movements and their embeddedness in longstanding circulations and translocal social spaces. At the same time, the development of West and Central African migration to Morocco is linked to various forms of mobility and changeable motivations that can be observed in the field of religion. The establishing of localities for religious practices is a privileged way for mobile people to both become locally present and transnationally connected. Indeed, religious institutions and places of worship can play a significant role as networks and nodes for circulation, contributing to the transnational expansion of these networks and the shaping of new social spaces. Similarly, the religious places used and shaped by West and Central African migrants in Moroccan urban settings do not only attract migrants coming from the South but drive multidirectional forms of circulation and mobility, between the Central and West African sending countries, urban districts in Morocco and African diaspora sites in Europe or North America.

In this way, the stay in Morocco cannot only be understood as a moment of in-between or of transition, a space only for transit. Whereby not every migrant or individual on the move stays voluntarily in Morocco, their presence contributes to shaping Moroccan urban places and to integrate these places into their sacred and social territories. This stay, which can become permanent or be temporal, has a social and spiritual meaning. It demonstrates perfectly how religious place-making can be on the one hand a sign for processes of stability (Halbwachs 1971 [1941]) and on the other hand a support for circulation (Bava 2005) which in this case is multidirectional (see also, Picard 2014).

While demonstrating the historical and cultural dimension of African migration to Morocco and to overcome a Eurocentric vision of today's trans-Saharan migration flows, the analysis of religious spaces in Morocco shows further the significant impact of African religious actors in the spreading of transnational religious movements within the African continent and beyond. African migrants and other mobile people have not only participated in re-shaping religious sites such as Christian churches or the Tidjani *zawiya* of Fès. They have also been able to revive and re-shape Christianity and the Tidjaniyya in Morocco and beyond, indicating their significant role for various South-South, South-North and North-South flows of global religious traditions.

Notes

- 1 <https://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/discours-de-sm-le-roi-loccasion-du-38eme-anniversaire-de-la-marche-verte> (translation by the author)
- 2 There are a few exceptions such as Khrouz and Lanza 2015, Therrien and Pellegrini 2015, Berriane and Idrissi Janati 2016, or Péraldi and Terrazoni 2016.
- 3 Here, 'Morocco' is more of a starting point and should not be seen as a homogeneous space. Rather, the paper focuses on particular places (mostly cities or neighbourhoods) located in Morocco and that are interconnected.
- 4 Here, I understand social spaces as contexts of life and action that also include symbolic and imaginary geographies (Jackson et al. 2004 cited in Adogame 2020: 127).
- 5 This was the subject of the author's PhD thesis, defended at the Free University of Berlin in 2014 and published in 2016 (see Berriane 2016). The project has been supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
- 6 This project was conducted at the International Migration Institute in Oxford, the Ecole d'Économie et de Gouvernance in Rabat and the German Historical Institutes in Paris. The fieldwork was financed by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Max Weber Foundation.
- 7 Sufi comes from Sufism, which is an Islamic form of mysticism that consists of initiation training and teaching designed to provide access to esoteric knowledge.
- 8 Rapport sur le pèlerinage de 1956 (CAOM 1AFFPOL/2226), Archives nationales d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence.
- 9 Rapport du Capitaine Cardaire, Commissaire du Gouvernement de l'AOF au pèlerinage de 1952 (CAOM 14MIOM/2839 – 19G11) ; Annexe n°2 du rapport de 1953, Compte-rendu du pèlerinage à Fèz des Pèlerins d'AOF au retour de La Mecque (CAOM 1 AFFPOL/2157) ; Rapport sur le pèlerinage maritime de 1954 (CAOM 1 AFFPOL/2157) ; Article de presse « 300 pèlerins quittent Dakar demain pour La Mecque », Paris-Dakar du 20 août 1956 (CAOM 1 AFFPOL/2226). Archives nationales d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence.
- 10 <https://lobservateur.info/article/105725/maroc/socieacuteteacute/les-africains-subsahariens-premiers-etudiants-etrangers-au-maroc>
- 11 This is the results of a study conducted as part of the research project "New Mobilities around Morocco viewed through the case of Fès" carried out in the frame of the programme "African Perspectives on Human Mobility" (Université Mohamed V Rabat and International Migration Institute Oxford).
- 12 The map is only a snapshot of the situation in 2015 and cannot illustrate the mobility and dynamism of the Christian place-making observed in Morocco since 2004. The map is based on the results of both the survey conducted in 2013 (Coyault 2014) and my fieldwork in 2015. For more details on the local impact and presence making of migrant churches in Morocco, see Berriane 2021.
- 13 Notwithstanding the existence of Moroccan Christians, who have become more vocal via online channels and virtual social networks, Christianity is still seen as the religion of foreigners. At the same time, Moroccan law does not allow Moroccan Muslims to convert, condemning Shia Islam and combating Christian proselytization mission.
- 14 For more details on this study, see Berriane 2020 and 2021.
- 15 For more details on this study, see Berriane 2020 and 2021.

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10 Djibouti, a Migratory Crossroads in the Red Sea Basin

Prospects and Challenges

Amina Saïd Chiré and Géraldine Pinauldt

Background

While driving along the main roads connecting Djibouti's regions, one often comes across migrants moving in small groups towards the capital, the north of the country or the opposite direction turning back to Ethiopia. Walking through the streets of the capital, one can see a large number of migrants of all ages and sexes. This strong presence is confirmed by statistics. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Djibouti (INSTAD 2020), on the basis of various sources and surveys, the migrants present in Djibouti City were estimated at about 150,000 people and classified in the category of "special" population. According to the UNHCR, in 2021, Djibouti hosted 35,174 asylum seekers and refugees distributed as follows 14,281 people from Somalia, 13,392 from Ethiopia, 6,398 from Yemen, 1,023 from Eritrea, and 80 representing other nationalities. These figures bear witness to the migration dynamic at work in the Republic of Djibouti, a dynamic whose catalysts lie partly beyond the Gulf of Aden beyond the Mediterranean. In 2021, 137,000 migrants, almost exclusively Ethiopians, crossed the country on their way to the Arabian Peninsula,¹ a new development that anchors this chapter in the academic debate on transit migration. The case material presented in this chapter illustrates the migration dynamics in the global South whereby the global South is a place of origin, transit, and destination for migrants.

Conceptual Framework and Content

Since its creation in its modern form at the end of the 19th century, Djibouti has been known as a country of immigration. Several security, economic, and social factors have contributed to this. However, its migratory status changed significantly in the 1990s, following several political events in the Horn of Africa and an influx of migrants to the Persian Gulf countries, which have experienced rapid economic growth since the 1973 oil crisis. Since then, the focus has gradually shifted to the Persian Gulf, a region that has attracted some of the migratory flows from the Horn of Africa. This reversal of polarity has given the Republic of Djibouti a key role in South-South Migration linking the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, making it a privileged point of passage between the two shores of the Red

Sea. Since then, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have become a major magnet for migrants, who make up a significant proportion of their populations, if not the majority, as in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. From the Horn of Africa, they are even perceived as a veritable El Dorado. As such, they attract a significant proportion of the migrants who have been leaving the region via Djibouti since the closure of the Eritrean route and the dangers of crossing from the Somaliland and Puntland coasts. This transnational mobility has not failed to attract the attention of donors (European Union, France, Japan, and United States, etc.) since the beginning of the 2010 decade to prevent the spread of terrorism and trafficking of all kinds (Schraeder 2005; Thiollet 2009 cited by Dini 2018).

Starting from the observation of a strong migratory presence, particularly from Ethiopia, this contribution seeks firstly to grasp the foundations of Djibouti's emergence as a privileged passageway between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula on the one hand, and between the countries of the Horn of Africa on the other. Secondly, it aims to highlight the exact place occupied by the Djiboutian stage in the migratory trajectories of those who cross the territory to reach other climes, to return or to return to the country after a period of expatriation. Thirdly, it aims to uncover and analyze the challenges posed by migration in Djibouti and the issues at stake. The chapter will focus exclusively on Ethiopian migrants.

To achieve this triple objective, the preferred approach is to examine the determinants of international migration from Ethiopia, the attractiveness of Djibouti, and the conditions under which it is used as a host country, as well as the political management of the migration issue. With this in mind, we adopted a multi-disciplinary social science approach.

The determinants of mobility to Djibouti will be examined in light of several explanatory theories. Migration trajectories will be studied to highlight the characteristics and living conditions of migrants and establish a typology of committed mobilities. We postulate that these mobilities fall into two main types: "circular migration" and "transit migration," concepts we will define in the following sections. The challenges and prospects of migration will mobilize empirical data drawn from prior fieldwork. They will respond to the hypothesis that migration management can be seen as a conditionality to be fulfilled by the country in order to continue to benefit from certain development aids.

On the one hand, this multi-disciplinarity is made necessary by the complexity of the issue at hand. On the other, it is made possible by the richness of the theoretical corpus devoted to the migration question. According to the synthesis drawn up by Piché (2013), migration is often approached in a fragmented way, with explanatory theories and theories of effects.

With regard to the causes of migration, research is divided between micro-individual and macro-structural approaches (Piché 2013). Micro-individual approaches cover a broad conceptual spectrum, starting with the approach to the question in terms of individual costs and benefits, which considers the phenomenon as an individual investment from which a return is expected (Sjaastad 1962), continues with that which considers migration in terms of the attractiveness of places of destination and the repulsiveness of places of departure (Lee 1966) through to the globalist

approach which links the increase in flows to the reduction of intermediate obstacles to mobility thanks to scientific and technological progress. This contribution draws on these micro-individual approaches to understand the individual decisions of migrants, but not exclusively.

Indeed, faced with the limitations of linear, unidirectional micro-individual approaches, a macro-structural approach has been developed to contextualize migration. Some researchers, such as Mabogunje (1970), have even tested the relevance of a systemic approach to capture the interdependence of all the variables that determine mobility (economic and technological environment, social and political environment, social and family networks, monetary transfers, etc.) in the migration process. This macro-structural approach will be used extensively in this contribution to understand the contextual determinants of migration, whether structural or cyclical. This approach is particularly suitable for understanding the types of migration observed in Djibouti: circular migration, transit migration, etc. (Burawoy 1976; Schiller et al. 1992; Faist 2000; Vertovec 2009).

According to Düvell (2012), the concept of transit migration is a vague one that was coined and popularized in the early 1990s to refer to the increasing mobility of migrants and refugees from distant countries heading for Europe via neighboring countries (Düvell 2008; 2007). He attributes it precisely to political concerns, notably European and UN, which equate this type of migration with illegal migration (UN-ECE 1993 quoted by Düvell, 2012) and urge member states and neighboring countries to take the necessary measures to stem it (IOM 1994; Council of Europe 1998). Düvell (2007) refers this situation to the political context of its emergence, and measures the consequences of the latter in terms of the biases introduced into the use of the concept, often with the endorsement of certain UN agencies such as IOM. These biases have led to even more restrictive migration policies, not to mention the externalization of European migration policy, which is now carried out by neighboring transit countries via political agreements. According to Düvell, the political nature of the discourse on the concept of transit migration has also hampered scientific research into the phenomenon, often leading researchers to use the concept inappropriately and misleadingly. Under these conditions, our use of transit migration will be parsimonious and limited to the contours outlined by Düvell (2007), who defines the concept as mobility whose sole intention is to continue its journey without integrating into the countries it occasionally crosses.

Introduced into the scientific literature in the 1990s (Ma Mung et al. 1998), the concept of circular migration refers to forms of mobility that can be summed up as migratory practices involving repeated and intermittent stays and journeys in the country of origin and the host country to develop activities with the savings made, or simply to recreate themselves (Khachani 2008). These forms of mobility have been understood by Anglo-Saxon researchers from the point of view of the country of origin, and by French-speaking researchers from the point of view of the host country. It has been particularly studied in the Sahel (Lima 2013; Mounkaïla 2002). For some years now, it has been used to call on foreign labor without having to integrate it into its territory (Davies 2010), as is the case in Spain. This country calls

on Moroccan female labor to ensure certain agricultural harvests (Arab 2018). In this contribution, the concept will be mobilized to understand the mobility of the migrant who moves while always returning to his or her original place of residence (Ma Mung et al. 1998).

The first section of the chapter reviews the migration context in the Horn of Africa to assess the determinants of migration in the regions of origin and grasp the attractiveness of Djibouti. The second section examines the living conditions of migrants, based on their experiences, and characterizes the types of migrants that cross Djiboutian territory. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the challenges and stakes of migration in Djibouti. Migration, by its very nature a composite process, presents opportunities and risks that we must try to understand. One way of doing this is to consider the effects of destination countries' migration policies on transit through Djibouti.

Brief Note on Methods

The study leading to this publication employed different data collection tools. Part of the methodology used includes review of relevant secondary sources (literature review), direct observations of public, professional, and private spaces frequented by migrants and two surveys conducted in 2022 and 2023 among migrants (30 adults) and migrant children (31 children) residing in the city and data from a registration conducted in 2020 by ONARS (National Office for Assistance to Refugees and Disaster Victims) among migrants returning from the Arabian Peninsula and hosted in the transit camp of Aoura Aoussa (3,285 people). The two first surveys were conducted in Djibouti City, because this city contains nearly 60% of the national population, 87.7% of the urban population, and 81.5% of the special population (migrants), including children living on the street. The objective of these surveys was to capture a sample of adults and street children in order to verify the main characteristics of their lives, their migration path, the factors accounting for their migration, their living conditions, the length of their stay in Djibouti or Arabian Peninsula and their plans for the future, etc.

This primary data collection was consolidated with secondary data, borrowed from the ONARS, which registered Ethiopian migrants returning to the Horn of Africa due to the closure of Saudi borders following the Covid-19 health crisis. This registration includes, in addition to the socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants, places of origin, places of transit, and the time elapsed since the migrant left home. This secondary data captured another category of migrants, those who cross the Gulf of Aden to the rich countries of the Persian Gulf and also made it possible to consider the gendered dimensions of international migration from the Horn of Africa.

In Djibouti, statistical data on migration is still scarce. It comes mainly from two sources: the INSTAD, which regularly conducts intercensal surveys in the absence of a proper census, and the IOM, which collects data on migrants using its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). However, both sources of data often fail to capture migrant population who entered the country in an irregular manner. The

finding of the study conducted in Djibouti over the course of time leading to this contribution clearly shows the multilayered factors accounting for the migration phenomena as to be discussed below.

Macro-Structural Determinants of Migration: Demographics, Education, Underdevelopment

To grasp the complexity and interdependence of the determinants of migration, a macro-structural approach is favored in this section, although occasionally combined with a micro-individual approach. According to this approach, the macro-structural factors of mobility and micro-individual factors will be discussed in turn.

According to the analysis of the data collected, economic factors remain the main drivers of international migration in the Horn of Africa region (74.2% for Children migrants and 80% for the adult migrants interviewed). The migrants involved in this mobility are mainly from Ethiopia, who are mostly young. It is commonly accepted that young people are the most likely to aspire to migrate and to make this aspiration a reality. This is especially true for Ethiopian youth, as 42% of 15–25-year-olds express a desire to move to another country if the opportunity arises (Gallup World Poll of 2013 as quoted in Schewel and Bahir Asmamaw 2021).

Demography thus appears to be one of the main macro-structural drivers of Ethiopian migration especially since Ethiopia is the second most populous state in Africa with 122 million inhabitants behind Nigeria and its age pyramid is dominated by youth with a median age of around 18 years (UN 2017). Ethiopia is also characterized by relatively high population growth of around 2.6% per year, a high fertility rate of 4.6 children per woman, declining infant, child, and maternal mortality, reflecting its commitment to a demographic transition (Schewel and Fransen 2018), but also giving an idea of the size of the stock of potential emigration candidates. While demographics can be seen as a structural driver of departure, it does not alone determine migration, which displays other structural and cyclical drivers as well linked to the economic and educational environment.

The migration aspirations of Ethiopia's youth are often realized when confronted with the realities of the country's 80% agriculture and livestock-based economy, sectors whose contribution to economic growth has declined considerably over time (May 2020). The weakness of economic growth in the agricultural sector is also linked to the narrowness of the land base, which has declined in proportion to population growth, the impact of climate change and sometimes to land grabbing for the benefit of investors, often foreign (Oakland Institute 2019). This situation explains the underemployment of young people in rural areas and acts as an incentive to leave.

In addition to demographics and the structure of the economy, there is a third push factor: education. According to Sumberg et al. (2014), formal education substantially alters young people's aspirations and expectations for the future and thus creates a mismatch between these and the opportunities available to them

in the more particularly (Sumberg et al. 2014 as quoted in Kerilyn Schewel and Sonja Fransen 2018). It comes into play in migration decision-making when available job opportunities do not match the desired occupational future (Mains 2013; Kuschminder 2017 as quoted in Schewel and Fransen 2018), although its share is difficult to establish. Indeed, in Ethiopia, net primary school enrollment tripled between 2000 and 2016, and the youth literacy rate (for ages 15–24) has been improved from 49.9% (2004) to 69.5% (2015) (UNICEF 2018).

Since 2010, in order to support the growth of its economy, the Ethiopian government has undertaken the development of new economic sectors located in urban areas, sectors with greater potential in terms of job creation and economic growth. Its economic situation thus improved with the development of a commercial, industrial, and service sector (Geda 2022). Throughout the following decade, Ethiopia experienced relatively rapid economic development until it became the African champion of economic growth with average rates of 10.8% per year from 2003/2004 to 2014/2015 (Schewel and Fransen 2018). The development of these new sectors has been accompanied by the rural exodus of labor. The number of Ethiopians “residing in or within three hours of a city with at least 50,000 inhabitants increased from 15.5% of the population in 1984 to nearly half in 2007 (Dorosh and Schmidt 2010) and probably much higher today” (Schewel and Fransen 2018). But the above-mentioned growth sectors have not generated the expected jobs, with the exception of the service sector, a situation that is linked according to Geda (2022) to a mismatch between the sources of economic growth and the sources of employment growth. These macro-structural elements also play a role in explaining youth unemployment and indirectly their international migration, but some researchers conclude that Ethiopia is in a “mobility transition.”² The mobility transition positively correlates development and migration on the basis of increasing levels of emigration with improving human development indicators that move countries from low-income to middle-income status. The evidence advanced lies in the improvement of Ethiopia’s human development index from 0.292 to 0.485 between 2000 and 2019, the increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from \$197.43 to \$602.53 (constant 2010 USD) over the same period and the commensurate increase in international migration volumes which rose, subtracting refugees and asylum seekers, from 364,944 in 2000 to 641,528 in 2019 (UN 2019), a number to which must be added irregular migrants to the Middle East, East, and South Africa (WDI 2020 as quoted in Kuschminder, Andersson and Siegel 2012 and Kefale and Mohammed 2015; Demissie 2018; Schewel and Asmamaw 2021).

The new economic sectors developed by Ethiopia have been unable to absorb youth unemployment (Geda 2022) but have contributed to an increase in the urban population growth rate which was estimated in 2022 at 4.63% annually (Benti et al. 2022).³ These elements show that the migration of Ethiopian youth has been driven by the lack of economic opportunities available and the absence of prospects in rural areas, but also by the demographic, educational, and economic transitions in which their country has engaged over the past decades. This macro-structural approach will be incomplete without a micro-individual perspective to help us understand why the migration’s drivers that have just been examined seem to impact men

and women in a differentiated way. Their gendered dimensions therefore deserve to be better considered.

In the spaces of departure, dominant sociocultural gender norms often circumscribe women's universe to the private space of domestic work and reduce their participation in education, employment, and decision-making. These gender roles and the socialization they imply from an early age impact their aspirations and expectations and also explain why they are less out of step with the opportunities offered in the spaces of origin (Zelege 2019). Thus, they play a role in their desire to migrate or stay. When the decision to migrate is made, however, social norms again come into play to give preference to proximity migration over international migration (Saïd Chiré and Tamru 2016). Proximity migration (Djibouti, Kenya, Somaliland, Sudan), which is less profitable than international migration, is thus preferred by families who are often involved in the decision-making process, as it is deemed safer (Kefale and Gebresenbet 2021). This sense of security is provided by the many social networks that have been built up over time between the country of origin and the country of destination and that sponsor, host, and place migrants (Saïd Chiré and Tamru 2016; Zelege 2019; Saïd Chiré, Tamru and Mahamoud Ismaël 2022). For all these reasons and as we will see in the following sections, Ethiopian women are less engaged in international migration from the Horn of Africa.

Despite these situational constraints and gendered socialization that privileges forms of staying, the decision to migrate can also be made by women (Oso et al. 1997; Lesclingang 2004; Sakho et al. 2010) as a result of a desire for independence and a refusal of a dominated situation. In the same sense, Zelege (2019) talks about the will to escape different forms of gender-based violence in the places of origin. It can also be the result of the existence of a favorable labor market in the destination regions: the existence of a booming domestic labor market (Djibouti, Saudi Arabia).

Insecurity

While the structural factors driving migration from the Horn of Africa are mainly socio-economic in nature, flows are periodically accelerated by cyclical factors such as the many conflicts that have punctuated the region's history. In 1991, the fall of the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam saw the arrival in power of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by Meles Zenawi and supported by the United States of America. Indeed, since the fall of the Marxist regime in 1991, Ethiopia continues to be marked by political crises and internal conflicts. These conflicts have accelerated the international migration of Ethiopian nationals. This regime departed from the previous one by opting for a market economy⁴ and an ethnic democratic federal system, before retracting in 1995, implementing a "socialist market economy" and basing national development on agriculture (Cabestan 2012).

It was in this new political context that Ethiopia experienced its first period of post-Marxist instability as early as 1992 in the face of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had been an ally in the war against the Derg but had taken up

“arms against the EPRDF accused of monopolizing the transition (1991–1995).” This episode resulted in repeated arbitrary arrests of opponents of ethnic-national federalism and regular repression of demonstrations (Aisserge and Bach 2018). It was followed by a second episode between 1998 and 2000 during a border conflict with Eritrea that left between 70,000 and 100,000 dead (Marchal 2011). In terms of international migration, this border conflict has redirected the flow of irregular migrants from Eritrean ports to Djibouti via the Hanish Islands before reaching the Yemeni coast.

These two periods of political instability were followed by a third in 2005 when the first parliamentary elections were marred by irregularities and accompanied by violence that led to 200 deaths (Cabestan 2012). The hardening of Meles Zenawi’s regime was accompanied by a suspension of Western aid, which led him to adopt a true developmentalist state program (Cabestan 2012). The authoritarian trend continued and was confirmed with the 2010 elections, which gave the EPRDF the opportunity to take control of the Ethiopian parliament (545 out of 547 seats) until Zenawi’s death in 2012. This persistent political insecurity is not entirely unrelated to the exponential increase in migratory flows through Djibouti between 2012 and 2014. According to Reitano et al. (2014), the upsurge was linked to an increase in Ethiopian applicants.

Since at least 2005, migrants eligible for refugee status have thus reappeared in the migratory flows crossing the Gulf of Aden in increasing proportions. After Meles Zenawi’s death in 2012 and especially between 2014 and 2015, internal conflicts took on significant proportions and dragged the Ethiopian regime into a lasting and uncontrollable cycle of violence (Aisserge and Bach 2018) but also led it to change its methods and reform itself. In the spring of 2014, in Addis Ababa, Oromos massively and violently reacted to the metropolis’ urban expansion plan. On the one hand, the uprisings, which were often violently suppressed, contributed to an increase in migratory movements insofar as they were accompanied by chronic political instability. They also provoked regime change and political reform, leading to the resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn and the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, from the Oromo community (Table 10.1).

The most recent and deadliest conflict is the conflict in Northern Ethiopia which lasted for two years (November 2020–November 2022) was mainly fought in the Tigray region. After analyzing the macro-structural factors that encourage departure, it is appropriate to examine the determinants of Djibouti’s attractiveness as a host country and preferred transit route in order to understand the place that transit through this country occupies in the migratory trajectories of those who pass

Table 10.1 Number of migrants who crossed the Red Sea en route to the Arabian Peninsula between 2012 and 2020

	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total number of Migrants	138,000	37,000	137,000	10,800

Source: DTM, IOM (2022).

through it to reach other countries, return from there, or return home after a stay in the country.

Determinants of Djibouti's Attractiveness

As noted above, migrants leaving the countries of the Horn of Africa make a more or less prolonged stopover in Djibouti for several reasons. Initially, their decision seems to be linked to the prevailing security situation. The Horn of Africa is regularly troubled by internal and international conflicts. These security problems culminated in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the outbreak of civil wars in Somalia (1988) and Djibouti (1991), and the overthrow of central governments in Ethiopia (1991) and Somalia (1991). In this troubled regional context, Djibouti has always been a "heaven of peace." As such, it has exerted a certain attraction on the populations of the following countries. Their choice to migrate to Djibouti can also be attributed to the low cost of this regional migration and the benefits it is likely to bring in terms of the intermediary opportunities available, not to mention the many social networks forged over time between the two countries.

Indeed, as a host or transit country, Djibouti offers employment and residence opportunities to those who wish to settle there or prepare for their crossing of the Gulf of Aden. In this case, Djibouti's attractiveness is linked to its relative economic development on a regional scale, which stems from the geostrategic rent paid by several foreign powers in exchange for maintaining a military base on its soil. Djibouti's relative economic prosperity also depends in large part on its port activity and the similar services it has provided to Ethiopia since 1998, the size of the Ethiopian population having a multiplier effect. Transit to Ethiopia and transshipment account for the majority of the import/export activities of its ports. All of these components contribute to the country's level of economic development, which has a GDP per capita of US\$3074, placing it in the lower middle-income bracket with annual growth of between 4 and 5% since 2000 (World Bank 2022).

The work opportunities offered also stem from the massive urbanization of its population on the one hand and the growth of women's employment on the other (their participation rate in the labor force is currently 36%), two phenomena that have led to unsatisfied job offers in the domestic labor market since the late 1990s. Its citizens, especially urban dwellers, who now account for 80% of its population, are accustomed to employing domestic workers, especially cheap labor from Ethiopia and Somalia. Middle-class Djiboutian households currently employ at least one, and sometimes two, domestic helpers. Upper-class households have three: one for cooking, one for cleaning, and one or more for the children.

The work opportunities offered are all the more attractive because the wage levels, working conditions offered and general economic conditions are high compared to neighboring countries. These conditions are obviously linked to its strong and stable currency, which is tied to the dollar at fixed rates, and to the cost of living. The minimum wage in Djibouti is about 100 Euros per month, compared to 50 to 70 Euros in Ethiopia.

For all these reasons, Djibouti regularly welcomes many Ethiopian and Somali refugees and migrants, assimilating those with proven family or clan ties with Djiboutians. Since the late 1990s, these displacements have involved populations with no proven links to Djiboutians: Ethiopians and Somalis of other ethnicities, a situation that has contributed to making Djibouti a transit route. These elements make it possible to identify other key types of migration: a circular migration whose final destination remains the Djiboutian territory and its capital in particular, at least for a while, and a transit migration whose final destination is the Arabian Peninsula in general and Saudi Arabia in particular.

Characteristics and Living Conditions of the Migrants in Djibouti

To understand the role played by the stay in Djibouti in migrants' lives, it is necessary to look more closely at the various categories of migrants concerned, including those who are involved in circular and transit migration.

Circular Migration

The data on circular migration is based on an initial limited survey conducted between May and June 2022 among street children in Djibouti City who were surveyed in various places of activity or recreation. Entering irregularly by land, on foot, or by car, migrant children are highly visible to the Djiboutian population, as the street remains the exclusive and permanent setting for their lives and the source of their livelihoods. They are mainly found in the city of Djibouti, as indicated by surveys conducted by INSTAD. Their migration can be considered circular, as they move back and forth between Ethiopia and Djibouti.

According to the results obtained, these migrants are mostly pre-adolescents and adolescents (93.55%: 74.19% are male and 19.35% are female) from Ethiopia (75% of the sample). About 75% are from the Oromo ethnic group. Their migration was motivated by economic reasons (74.2%), as both boys and girls stated that they had left their activities in their region of origin with the desire to go to work in Djibouti. The vast majority of boys attended school, while the girls did not due to prevailing socio-cultural norms that remain unfavorable to the female gender. Nearly 75% said they were on the street to support themselves (64.50%) or their families (9.70%). However, more girls justify their presence on the street by the desire to provide for their families: 37.5%. This first survey also gives a fairly accurate idea of the migration route to the city of Djibouti. The majority of street children came accompanying other children. However, 33.33% of them came to Djibouti with their families. A number of children were even born to migrant parents.

The survey of street children was also an opportunity to study the living conditions of the category of migrants who wish to settle in Djibouti for a while. The children we met reside in the streets of the decommissioned neighborhoods of the alluvial plain, and in the interstices of certain well-to-do neighborhoods. But their presence is also palpable in the different neighborhoods of the outlying commune of Balbala. Slightly less than half of the children aged 10 to 17 live with their

families, even though these families live on the street. Twenty-five percent children live with other children on the street, 22.6% live alone, and 6.5% live with other unrelated adults. Girls surveyed live exclusively with their families, while boys live 34.8% with other children on the street, 30.4% alone, 26.1% with their families, and 8.7% with other unrelated adults.

Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the city of Djibouti, migrant children take on all the tasks left behind by Djiboutians. The occupations of the youngest children are divided between begging and hawking. The older ones are, in order of importance, shoe shiners (33.33%), car washers, street vendors (12.9%), idle workers (6.9%), domestic workers (6.5%), and load carriers. Girls were street vendors (37.5%), domestic workers, load carriers, and beggars. Begging thus plays an important role in the lives of these children, in the sense that it provides them with additional income.

According to the responses provided, the calculated average length of life on the street for these children is three years and three months and the median length is two years. The migration of street children can be described as circular; they move back and forth between Djibouti and Ethiopia. They often return to Ethiopia in the summer to escape the hot weather in Djibouti and visit their families. They sometimes leave for several years and then come back.

The adult migrants interviewed are composed mostly of young men: 17–26-year-olds represent 80% of the total sample,⁵ and men 80%. The women proved more difficult to capture because of the jobs they do (domestic work) that keep them out of the public spaces.

The data collected from these migrants also indicate that they are exclusively Ethiopian, the vast majority of them from the Oromo ethnic group (86.66%) and that they arrive mainly from the Harar region (53.33%). Fifty percent of the women came from the Amhara region and half from the Oromo region. These migrants also came to Djibouti on foot and/or by car to work (80%). To a lesser extent, they came to flee the war in Ethiopia or to go to Saudi Arabia. Eighty percent want to stay and work in Djibouti City, but 20% want to continue their migration to Saudi Arabia. These migrants are mostly employed in the informal sector where they perform the same jobs as the previous category of migrants: load carrying, selling consumer products, domestic work, car washing, etc. They live in shared rooms in the old urban fabric and more particularly in the popular districts of the alluvial plain following the example of migrant children (Arhiba, District 5, District 7, District 7bis). They live in shared flats in the old urban fabric (1940s), particularly in the working-class neighborhoods, where small houses made of precarious materials (wood and corrugated iron) are offered for rent by their owners, who have moved to newer neighborhoods less exposed to the flooding of Wadi Ambouli. A number of them live with their families, which shows that regional migration to Djibouti is also a family migration. A small number are homeless.

The average length of stay in Djibouti for this second category of migrants is 9.4 months. For 66.33% of them, this is their first stay in Djibouti. The remaining third had already stayed in Djibouti in the past. Only 33.33% of the migrants interviewed said that they were welcomed on arrival by a member of their personal

network: family members, friends, etc., a network that provided them with assistance in finding accommodation and work. Some of the migrants have already crossed the Gulf of Aden and stayed in Saudi Arabia (20% of those interviewed) and were deported after an average of 9 months. They declared that they had been shepherds or gardeners (see the following testimonial). Fifty percent of the adult migrants interviewed wish to return to Ethiopia after their period of expatriation in Djibouti, a period intended to work to save the means necessary to improve their living conditions in their region of origin. Around 33.33% wish to continue the migration to Saudi Arabia. Only a minority wish to settle permanently in Djibouti.

Others passed through Djibouti on their way to Saudi Arabia, from where they were expelled, and then returned to Djibouti. The majority of migrants interviewed wished to return to Ethiopia, while a minority wished to continue their migration or settle in Djibouti. It is this dynamic of mobility that circular migration helps us to understand. And Djibouti's role is instructive in this respect. This territory offers the opportunity to achieve the social mobility targeted by any migration project. The only downside remains the poor prospects for integration in Djibouti for both men and women. The prevailing law in terms of access to nationality is that of blood. Moreover, Djibouti is relatively cautious about regularizing irregular migrants to prevent any attempt at Ethiopian "annexation" from below. Under these conditions, arrests of migrants are regularly organized. They are sometimes followed by deportations to discourage new candidates for exile. But generally speaking, tolerance is the order of the day.

Transit Migration to the Arabian Peninsula

The analysis of the migrants in transit is based on secondary data from the registration carried out by ONARS in 2020. Entering irregularly by land, on foot, or by car, these long-distance migrants cross Djibouti's territory partly on foot and partly by car and mostly in the hands of smuggling networks to escape the control of the National Police. However, a number of them stop for a time for various reasons.

The analysis of the ONARS sample gives a fairly accurate idea of the nationalities and ethnicities involved in this process of international mobility. The migrants concerned are of both sexes, but men constitute the majority. For example, they represent 89.40% of the total sample. These migrants are also young: 0–26-year-olds represent 82.41% of the total. The most represented ethnic groups are Amhara (23% of the sample), Oromo (44%), and Tigray (30%). The other Ethiopian ethnic groups (Somali, Afar, Dabes,⁶ Siltes, Hadiyas, Guragés) are represented by less than 3%.

This snapshot of international migration from the Horn of Africa shows a mobility that engages an essentially young, male population from Ethiopian regions plagued by safety problems.

Not surprisingly, Oromos are in the majority in the sample (44%), since they also represent the plurality ethnic group in Ethiopia (40% of the total population). They are closely followed by the Amhara (23%), the second most represented ethnic group in Ethiopia (26%). Given the political and security situation prevailing

in their regional state, it's not surprising either that Tigrayans, who account for just 6% of the Ethiopian population, make up 30% of migrants in the ONARS sample.⁷ While Ethiopian women are less involved in international migration overall than their fellow citizens, the data collected by ONARS shows notable differences between ethnic groups. Women of Tigray and Amhara origin account for 46% and 44% respectively of returnees to the Aoura Aoussa camp, and Oromo women for 29%. This may be linked to the particularly high level of insecurity in their region.

The ONARS sample also gives an idea of the conditions under which transit takes place in Djibouti. To begin with, the transit duration is defined by different variables. First, there are the economic aspects. If the migrants preparing for the crossing have the necessary means for their journey, their transit through Djibouti territory will be shorter. It will only last as long as the game of hide-and-seek with the National Police of Djibouti in order to transport the migrants safely to the port of Obock, Djibouti. Conversely, a lack of financial means will slow down the transit process, as migrants will have to work to collect the money needed to continue their journey.

For other variables, transit through Djibouti may also be slowed by logistical or health reasons. The smuggling networks organize convoys and migrants depart upon having enough number of migrants to fill up the vehicles used to transport them. In this case, the waiting time depends on the duration it takes to get enough number of migrants. As the sample data show, this transit is generally relatively long, as it is a mobility that involves poor populations. Sixty-seven percent of the male and forty-four percent of the female migrants in the ONARS' sample had been away from home for six months to one year. This time period reflects the steps necessary to access enough financial resources in order to meet the costs of crossing the Gulf of Aden and the Yemeni territory, the final destination very often being Saudi Arabia. During these stages, migrants take advantage of the employment opportunities available to them locally, as shown by their presence in the various markets of the cities they pass through before embarking on their journey to Yemen: Djibouti, Tadjourah, and Obock (Saïd Chiré 2022).

In Djibouti's capital, long-term migrants also live in poor neighborhoods like other categories of migrants. When they are not in the hands of smugglers' networks, they either rent a room shared by several people or sleep in the street in front of shopping centers, mosques, and stores. The social makeup of working-class neighborhoods is favored by the relocation of owner households due to the dilapidation of housing and the deterioration of sanitary conditions (e.g., Arhiba). After having rented out their housing to migrants, middle-income households have moved to the outskirts where they have been allocated new temporary concessions. Wealthy households, on the other hand, have moved to more upscale areas such as Gabode.

In Tadjourah, migrants in transit can be seen on Badaf, an avenue that runs along the docks and the old port. They work there and often sleep under the stars. Those who are in the hands of smugglers' networks are housed in concessions on the outskirts of the city, out of sight. In Obock, it is mainly on the outskirts of the city, and more particularly in Fantehero, that migrants are found waiting to embark on their journey across the Gulf of Aden to the Yemeni coast. Since employment

opportunities are limited in this city, migrants are forced to sleep outside under trees and beg for food. Only those who decide to forgo the Red Sea crossing are welcomed and assisted at the IOM Migration Response Center (MRC). In general, long-distance migration has led to the development of a smuggling economy that thrives mainly in the north of the country, linked to the presence of a network of smugglers connected to similar networks in Ethiopia and Yemen. These networks move their migrant convoys first through Tadjoura and then through Obock to embarkation points further north.

The various strategies to curb this trafficking put in place by the state with the help of donors (European Union) come up against an inescapable economic reality: the trafficking economy funds a large part of the region's inhabitants. Djibouti is a macrocephalous city-state where the capital is home to more than 60% of the population and more than 80% of the GDP produced. The hinterland, in the south as well as in the north, offers little or no economic opportunities for the youth of these regions. Young workers are often forced to engage in various forms of smuggling of common goods with the neighboring states of Ethiopia and Somaliland. Also, the Djiboutian government is aware of these problems related to the professional integration of workers in the regions. This transit economy offers many job opportunities to Djibouti's youth. More broadly, the revenues from migrant smuggling are generously redistributed to the inhabitants, a situation that contributes to establishing the figure of the smuggler as a new local power alongside the customary and regional authorities (Saïd Chiré and Lauret 2023).

Challenges and Prospects of Migration in Djibouti

The scale of the migrant flows draining the country today poses many challenges for both the Djiboutian population and the State. These challenges are primarily socio-economic. The Republic of Djibouti is a country with limited resources and the presence of a large migrant and refugee population has a financial cost that impacts public finances. Indeed, irregular migrants have access to basic social services in the same way as Djiboutian citizens. Access to education for migrant children has been guaranteed since 2018 if they are of the required age and a (second chance) school is even offered to those who are over the required age.⁸ However, according to the results of the surveys conducted, the exercise of this right to education is not always guaranteed, because, in a context where resources are limited, priority was always given to Djiboutian children. In addition, migrant children often had to work to support themselves and/or their families. Very few of the interviewed migrants had shortly taken advantage of this opportunity before abandoning it to return to earn a living on the streets.⁹

Migrants have access to health care, as children receive free access to health care on the same basis as Djiboutian children, and adults are treated at the same rate as Djiboutian citizens without health insurance especially in polyclinic Farahad and Einguela community health center.

Vulnerable persons are given the necessary protection when law enforcement is alerted to cases of abuse, violence, or trafficking. For example, children are

protected through the National Child Protection Platform and those who are victims of violence can be sheltered at the Transit Center inaugurated in September 2022 by the Ministry of Women and Family with the support of IOM or at the Caritas Night Shelter. However, outside of any legal protection, both adults and children can be subjected to forms of exploitation and abuse that are difficult to detect, especially when they are in the hands of smuggling networks. As such, their protection remains an important challenge.

In terms of access to employment resources, migrants, like one-third of Djiboutians, find employment opportunities in the informal sector, as they do not have the legal status to enter the formal sector professionally. As such, they are not entitled to any form of social protection, as their work escapes the compulsory social contributions that could finance the basic social services to which they sometimes have access and, above all, the social protection that they lack.

In the context of poverty and deprivation, Djibouti remains a poor country despite its good economic indicators. In Djibouti, the overall poverty rate is 35.8% and the extreme poverty rate is 21.1% (EDAM 4, 2017). Its human development index is 0.524. It ranks 171st out of 189 countries and territories in the world (2021). Migrants are sometimes confronted with forms of rejection and xenophobia that undermine their efforts to improve their living conditions, hinder the exercise of their human rights and ultimately aggravate the vulnerabilities to which they are exposed in the labor markets and host societies.

The stereotypes and prejudices of Djiboutians towards Ethiopians are rooted in past antagonisms between the populations of the plateaus and the lowlands, phenomena that have been revived by an urban context marked by poverty and the fear of social decline. Many Djiboutians attribute the deterioration of public services or the increase in insecurity in public spaces to Ethiopian migrants. Raids on migrants are regularly carried out by the police.

Despite these challenges, political management of migration has never been a priority in Djibouti. It has become one since the importance of the flows transiting through its territory placed it at the heart of the European Union's campaigns to prevent so-called irregular immigration. Since then, the European Union has outsourced its management of the migration issue in the region by putting in place various strategies, the most important of which is the "EU Policy towards the Horn of Africa – Towards a comprehensive EU strategy" (Saïd Chiré and Lauret 2023). Given its role in migration between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, Djibouti was impacted by the debates surrounding the establishment of "global migration governance" at the end of the 2000s, when the IOM and the European Union each opened a representation there.

Faced with an increasing number of migration crises and tighter border controls (Pécoud 2015), the challenges posed by this transnational mobility had begun to be debated on an international scale and solutions proposed (Wihtol de Wenden 2013; Pécoud 2015; 2017) (Cairo conference, Migration and Development Forum, etc.). This multilateral approach to migration has not convinced the countries concerned, but it has led to the establishment of bilateral frameworks for action dedicated to specific migration issues, often at the initiative of destination countries. This is the

case of the European Union, which has included the fight against irregular migration in its cooperation with third countries (Tardis 2018), promising to support their efforts in migration management, prevention, and the fight against clandestine migration, among others. From a political and financial point of view, the implementation of these migration governance principles is financed in Djibouti by the EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (ETFA) set up by the European Commission itself in October 2015 for the period 2015–2020 to address various African crises (Sahel, Chad, Horn of Africa, etc.) including migration. Since 2017, this fund has been financing the “Sustainable solutions for the most vulnerable host populations, refugees and migrants in Djibouti” project, the implementation of which has been entrusted to IOM and WFP. The aim of this project is to help Djibouti better manage the flows destined for or passing through its territory, in particular by strengthening the capacities of the institutions involved in their management. The project even received additional funding in July 2021 to support the voluntary return of Ethiopian migrants taking the eastern route.

Highly dependent on the financial manna of donors and international organizations, Djibouti has officially aligned itself with the positions of the EU and IOM. This is evidenced by the development of a migration policy in line with the principles of “global migration governance,” the interventionism of the IOM on the territory, and the leadership it now assumes in migration management, which aims, according to Dini (2018), to “transform the way the Djiboutian state exercises its sovereignty and regulates human mobility.” As early as 2009, IOM developed technical partnerships with civil society organizations and ministerial departments: Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Women and the Family, and Health, to put in place increased surveillance of migrants and strengthen the country's control capacities, particularly for border management: training of immigration officers, training of law enforcement officers, provision of equipment and information systems at borders, rehabilitation of border posts, strengthening of legislation. IOM has taken advantage of the weak capacity of Djibouti's services dedicated to migrant populations to implement increased control of migrants, but only. This increased control also concerns Djiboutian citizens (Dini 2018).

Conclusion

In the context of South-South Migration, this chapter has focused on the emergence of Djibouti as a privileged transit route between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula on the one hand and between the countries of the Horn of Africa on the other. More specifically, this work has analyzed Djibouti's reception function to understand its exact place between migration trajectories of those who cross it to reach other skies, to return, or to return home after a period of expatriation.

To achieve this objective, several avenues were explored. First, the push factors of migrants were examined in order to understand the determinants of international migration from the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. The results of this examination show that migration is mainly determined by macro-structural factors such as insufficient economic opportunities in the regions of origin or a

mismatch between these and the aspirations of the people concerned, and secondarily by situational factors such as the numerous conflicts that are upsetting the destiny of the states concerned.

At the same time, there are micro-individual factors that attract nearby migrants to Djibouti. The emergence of Djibouti as a main transit route has been attributed to various factors: its security, its relative economic development on a regional scale, and its urban development, which are sources of numerous economic opportunities for the would-be exiles, the working conditions and salaries that are practiced there, but also the interconnectivity of the Ethiopian and Djiboutian territories and finally the proximity of the Arabian Peninsula.

Second, a typology of migration was established to not only access the socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants involved, but also the conditions of their transit and their plans for the future. Thus, two types of migration were identified: a so-called circular migration whose stages take place mainly in Djibouti and a transit migration whose final destination is somewhere in the Arabian Peninsula and more particularly in Saudi Arabia.

In the third and final stage, the question of the political management of migration was addressed in order to examine the challenges it poses and the issues it raises. If the challenges are rather economic and legal in nature, the stakes are more in the realm of politics and cultural identity. Indeed, while migration management has never been a priority, Djibouti has been forced to make it a priority under pressure from a major donor, the European Union. The EU has decentralized its management of irregular migration to Djibouti in order to prevent migration around the Red Sea basin from fueling migration across the Mediterranean.

Without refusing the financial incentives offered by donors, Djibouti is trying to resist because of the identity issue that migration represents, the catastrophic scenario being “Ethiopian assimilation” from below. The modes of resistance implemented range from the organization of arrests followed by deportations to the border to a piecemeal integration of the migrants present.

All these elements lead to the conclusion that Djibouti is a central and dynamic place in South-South Migration in general and in circular and transit migration in particular. Indeed, the territory is particularly well positioned to maintain its role as a migratory crossroads because of its interconnectivity with Ethiopia, its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the opportunities it offers migrants to stop there for a while before continuing their journey or turning back. But this situation is not necessarily ideal because of the resistance that remains and especially the economy of passage that thrives in the country and puts at risk the dignity of migrants and the integrity of Djibouti citizens.

Notes

- 1 Data collected through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the International Organization for Migration.
- 2 The mobility transition means that mobility patterns shift systematically as ‘development’ or ‘modernization’ proceeds. Researchers have uncovered an inverted U-shaped relationship between levels of international migration and development using cross-sectional data (Kerilyn Schewel, Legass Bahir Asmamaw 2021, 1073).

- 3 Ethiopia remains one of the least urbanized countries in Africa, with an urbanization rate of 20%, compared to an average of 38% in sub-Saharan Africa.
- 4 Except in areas such as land ownership and the maintenance of state monopolies.
- 5 70.33% of 18–25 year olds (including 44.33% of 18–20 year olds and 26% of 21–25 year-olds) and 12.08% of minors.
- 6 A term meaning a person coming from the South of Ethiopia: Southern nations and nationalities.
- 7 The survey took place in 2020, when unrest had already begun in several Ethiopian regions, notably Tigray. Indeed, the TPLF had already voiced the desire of Tigrayans to secede in protest at the end of the pro-Tigray policy in force since 1994. The ensuing armed conflict spread to the Afar, Amhara and Oromo regions, claiming between 385,000 and 600,000 lives.
- 8 An “Accelerated Education” program funded by Qatar. 2000 students have benefited since December 2022. Ministry of Women and Family, 2022, Qualitative study on children in vulnerable situations in the city of Djibouti, 29p.
- 9 Mainly the Primary School of Notre Dame de Boulaos and schools in the neighborhoods.

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11 Forced Migration Life Trajectories and Politics of Contradictions

South Sudanese between Being IDPs and Refugees in Sudan and South Sudan

Mohamed A. G. Bakhit

Introduction

South Sudan is a vivid case of the creation of a new nationality. On 9 July 2011, the geographical region of southern Sudan officially seceded from the Republic of Sudan to establish the independent state of the Republic of South Sudan. The independence of South Sudan was one of the most significant events in Sudanese and African recent history, following the results of the January 2011 referendum in which the overwhelming majority of Southern Sudanese people voted for independence (reported as 98%).

After six decades of struggle for independence and two civil wars, South Sudan became Africa's newest state and the 193rd member of the United Nations. In practice, however, for the Southern Sudanese residents who remained in Sudan, the question of whether an individual becomes a citizen of the new country of South Sudan or remains a citizen of the Republic of Sudan, has been an intricate socio-political question, a complex legal issue, and a practical question of rights, documents, relocation, and personal attachments.

During 1983–1991, more than 3 million people were estimated to have been displaced from Southern Sudan. By mid-1991, an estimated 425,000 of them had taken refuge in neighboring countries of Uganda and Ethiopia. The rest fled to Southern Sudan cities, such as Juba and Malakal, while an estimated 2.3 million Southerners were displaced toward the North, of whom about 1.8 million settled in Greater Khartoum (Geffroy 2007, 6–7).

The aims of this chapter are investigating the processes of forced migration trajectory change for South Sudanese citizens who were previously considered to be Sudanese citizens and have remained residents of Khartoum's shantytowns since South Sudan's independence in 2011. In light of the recent political crisis (since December 2013), the impact of the political situation and current conflict upon the life trajectories, perceptions, and expressions of South Sudanese national identity would be an important part of the chapter.

I employ the concept of 'community citizenship' as an alternative to the conventional concept of legal citizenship, which usually dominates the literature. The main feature of the literature on the citizenship of South Sudanese people in Sudan is its focus on their legal and formal status as non-citizens. However, very little

attention has been paid to the social and cultural aspects of this legal status, and how Southern Sudanese people deal with these in their daily struggles.

The Context of Forced Migration in South Sudan and Sudan

As noted above, the two civil wars displaced so many South Sudanese. When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed a decade later (2005), ending the civil war and paving the way for the independence of South Sudan, the majority of internally displaced Southern Sudanese were still resident in Khartoum's shantytowns. The favored destination clearly shifted toward Khartoum during this period.

South Sudan remains the third largest country of origin for refugees in the Horn of Africa, with 2.3 million South Sudanese refugees reportedly living outside the country, the majority of them in neighboring countries, particularly Uganda (UNHCR 2019). While 62% of the South Sudanese refugee population is under 18; as of May 2017, there were over 75,000 unaccompanied children in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia receiving refugee support services. Ethiopia is the second-largest hosting country of South Sudanese refugees, and has been working to strengthen refugee support, including working toward allowing some refugees to live outside camps, to work, and to enroll in schools. Other countries hosting South Sudanese refugees include the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, and Sudan – in many cases, particularly in DRC, CAR, and Sudan – they are in insecure locations that cannot be accessed by humanitarian workers. Very few South Sudanese refugees have settled beyond the region.

Uganda and Sudan have adopted profoundly different approaches to this crisis. Uganda has maintained an open border for the influx of South Sudanese refugees, and President Museveni's government also provides refugees with land to cultivate and on which to build shelter (Leonardi and Santschi 2016), a much-praised approach. Refugees also have freedom of movement within Uganda, although formal permission is required of refugee camp residents if they wish to travel to other large cities. Uganda's formal refugee policy approach is "local settlement," which allows refugees to settle among their hosts. The Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) means that each refugee family is given food rations as well as a one-time package of non-food items. The household is also given a small plot of land for subsistence agriculture. After a certain period of time, they are expected to have reached a state of self-sufficiency, and are "phased off" food and other humanitarian assistance (Hovil 2017).

Historically, in Sudan, the story of refugee production started with the first civil war, fought over 1955–1972, ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The second civil war, fought between 1983 and 2005, was ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which paved the way for the referendum on secession in 2010 and then the independence of South Sudan in 2011. As soon as the CPA was signed, and the processes of its implementation were underway, South Sudanese people started to move back from Sudan, slowly at the beginning, and then in huge numbers.¹ The referendum to determine the future of South Sudan in January 2011 precipitated a final movement back to South Sudan

for many South Sudanese in the months leading to the independence of the country. But still, a significant number were waiting until making sure the situation is suitable in South Sudan, before deciding to return.

In 2010, UNHCR has collaborated with South Sudan government² to organize a program for ‘voluntary return’ for South Sudanese citizens living in Sudan. The program entails asking South Sudanese in Khartoum to move to certain areas called “gathering points,” mainly open areas inside many shantytowns where South Sudanese were living and owned houses. Most South Sudanese who already sold their houses and bought furniture and construction materials to take with them to South Sudan. The program expected to help about 200,000 South Sudanese to move to South Sudan, but managed to move only about 70,000 South Sudanese citizens, during the period between 2010 and 2013. After the eruption of civil war again in South Sudan in 2013, the program has stopped, and South Sudanese continued to live in those “gathering points,³” while the Sudanese government started to describe them as “suspended people”. In Khartoum, two of the biggest gathering points were Jabrouna and Wad Elbashir, where the high density and temporary construction materials made it impossible for the South Sudanese or host community to survive in peace. As a result of complaints from the host community, and the official designation of South Sudanese as refugees by the Sudanese Government in 2016, the decision was made to open a refugee camp in western Omdurman, officially called “Nivasha⁴ camp.”

For the majority of South Sudanese people, the new nation’s insecurity and economic collapse since 2013 have necessitated a return to the longstanding practice of forced migration, mostly into neighboring countries. Many South Sudan cities, including the capital Juba, are increasingly depopulated, with approximately 2.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 212,000 people in Protection of Civilians (POC) camps run by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) across the country, and more than two million displaced persons outside the country since December 2013.

The Sudan and South Sudan governments have a very fluctuating political relationship. As the latter seceded from the former country, both had many controversial issues including over border demarcation, oil revenue sharing, hosting rebel groups, and the status of former citizens. As a result of the December 2019 uprising in Sudan, and the removal of Al-Bashir dictatorship, the relationship between the South Sudan government and the transitional government formed in Sudan has become more cordial and trustful, at least for the time being.

Sudan’s Approach to the South Sudan Refugee Crisis

For the Government of Sudan, South Sudanese refugees were and continue to be regarded as a security threat. This is a very much expected, if difficult, trajectory. South Sudanese refugees have an ambiguous status in Sudan (Bronwen 2012: 2). Sudan was their former country, in which successive regimes in the capital Khartoum maintained economically predatory and politically exclusionary policies toward the South, contributing to two successive civil wars (Bützer, 2011).

For most people who were living in South Sudan's states located on the Sudan border, and who have previous experience of living in Sudan, deciding to move back to Sudan – when the war reached their areas – was a difficult decision. After 2011, a small number of South Sudanese had decided to stay in Sudan and maintained their houses in Khartoum's shantytowns. But the majority had sold all their assets in Khartoum and other urban and rural areas in Sudan, and used the money to finance their return journey or to buy furniture and building materials to help them settle in their new life in South Sudan. But because of the return of war in South Sudan, in less than two years, they have been forced to flee back to Sudan.

The government of Sudan has refused to apply the legal terms refugees (*la-gaeen*), IDPs (*nazeheen*), asylum seekers, the stateless, or 'other people of concern' to these new arrivals. Instead, President Omer el-Bashir's government officially calls these refugees 'arrivals,' (*wafedeen*) largely to deny them any legal rights and protections (El Hassan 2016: 7), and because such labels don't exist in the international conventions of refugees. Thus, in Sudan, South Sudanese refugees are not entitled to enjoy the benefits that are usually granted to ordinary refugees as stipulated by international conventions (e.g., rights of education and health, food, or financial assistance). They have to put up with host communities who have their own resources and interests. The 'arrivals' cannot deal with the host communities under the new circumstances as equals or on a legal refugee basis. In terms of practical policy, the Sudanese government does not have a strategy to deal with this situation. After long and arduous negotiations in 2013, the UNHCR has reached an understanding with the government of Sudan in order to mitigate the hardships to which the 'arrivals' are subjected and treat them as 'other people of concern' (a term which is also not well-defined in UNHCR's conventions). This continued to be the official designation of South Sudanese in Sudan until 2016, when the Sudan government officially recognized South Sudanese as refugees, and handed their file to the Commission of Refugees (COR).

Research Methodology

The data in this chapter forms part of a research project entitled 'Identity, Nationality, and Citizenship for South Sudanese Communities in Khartoum,'⁵ the aim of which is to examine the processes of identity, nationality, and citizenship changes for a group of South Sudanese people resident in Khartoum since the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The emphasis of the study was on the everyday experiences and practices of South Sudan communities in Khartoum in light of the recent political crisis that has devastated the newly established country of South Sudan since December 2013. The study assessed the impact of the political situation and current conflict upon the perceptions and expressions of South Sudanese national identity, Southern Sudanese settlement preferences, relations among the neighboring nationals, and the decision of Southern Sudanese in Khartoum to stay or return.

In this study I spent six months of fieldwork in 2016–2017 in Al-Baraka shantytowns, Khartoum, while three other research assistants covered other parts of Khartoum (Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North). Some of the fieldwork

materials used in this chapter were mainly collected during the annual fieldwork trip organized by the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, and on fieldwork trips in August-September 2021.

Legal Citizenship versus ‘Community’ Citizenship for the Southern Sudanese in Khartoum

This chapter proposes to apply the concept of ‘community citizenship’ as its primary theoretical framework. This concept was initially developed to explain the situation and predicament of South Sudanese refugees in Khartoum (Bakhit 2016b). This concept builds on what migration studies have begun to describe variously as liminal, interstitial, marginalized (Martins 2016), limbo (Marko 2016), fragile (Oosterom 2011), and denizen (Turner 2016) citizenship.

More importantly, it is vital to test this concept in comparable refugee communities in order to examine its theoretical and practical utility and its scholarly and policy implications. As such, this chapter looks toward the local language of citizenship on the legal and social fringe, looking further to African theories of belonging, interconnection, and social security in semi-legal politics and economics on the borders of multiple authorities, as argued for by Beneduce (2015) and Nyamnjoh (2015).

While in practice the current challenge for citizenship of Sudan and South Sudan is the presence of thousands of Southern Sudanese in Sudan with no legal citizenship⁶ status, I argue here that there is a need to differentiate between two types of citizenship for Southern Sudanese people in Khartoum – legal citizenship and ‘community’ citizenship.

From a theoretical standpoint, the differentiation between legal citizenship and ‘community’ citizenship can be traced back to the influential work of Mamdani (Mamdani 1996), who argues that colonialism in Africa created two categories of people – citizens and subjects or, as they are sometimes referred to, citizens and natives. While natives were bound to their rural ‘ethnic groups’ and spoke the language of tradition and custom, citizens were usually those living in urban areas and ruled by rights, duties, and privileges. Mamdani claims that these particular historical and political formulations came to define the way citizenship was perceived in post-colonial Africa: on the one hand, African central states are governed by civil law and formal institutions – the domain of the national elites – while on the other, the local state or native authorities enforce laws based on custom. The former is the realm of the rights and duties associated with legal citizenship, while the latter is the realm of culture and custom. Therefore, Mamdani and Comaroff argue, natives are engaged by the state as subjects, and as such are not entitled to the rights and benefits of citizenship, which means that “life as national citizen and life as ethnic subject are as likely to run up against one another – often in contradictory ways – thus making political personhood a fractured, fractal experience” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2010). If one adopts this approach, it appears that there has been little change in the relationship between the African state and its citizens since the time of colonization, as Mamdani has emphasized. I would argue that

this dual type of citizenship (legal citizenship and ‘community’ citizenship) has allowed considerable numbers of people to be excluded from legal citizenship and to survive and sustain their social and economic life through ‘community’ citizenship. Whether this ‘community’ citizenship status is able to substitute – or even perhaps complement – legal citizenship, and more importantly, the ways in which the community of Southern Sudanese in Sudan have been able to construct and negotiate this ‘community’ citizenship.

The chapter proposed that community citizenship form a meaningful substitute for legal citizenship, which would enable South Sudanese to resume parts of their former lives in Khartoum’s shantytowns.

Legal Citizenship

Legal citizenship is the legal status of being a member of a state according to international and national legal procedures and as evidenced by state institutions, which grants certain rights and obligations, largely involving state institutions. Of course, many South Sudanese living in Khartoum currently lack this type of citizenship. Frederick Cooper argues that discussions of citizenship must be historicized, as contemporary studies risk painting an overly static post-colonial picture that over-focuses on legal and state rights and obscures a longer history of other forms of claim-making and political order (Cooper 2016).

The estimated numbers of Southern Sudanese affected by this form of possible statelessness (if both states refused them citizenship) range between 500,000 and 700,000, a figure that includes those who are currently estimated to be affected as well as those who are ‘obviously’ South Sudanese according to the normative interpretation (Manby 2012: 4). If the most recent amendments to the Sudan Nationality Act (2011) were to be applied on a comprehensive scale, they would lead to a loss of Sudanese nationality for a very significant number of people,⁷ including those with weak links to South Sudan, who have developed close links to the Republic of Sudan.

The Sudanese nationality law ignores the distinction between ethnic origin and the rights granted by the State. Accordingly, the law lays emphasis on ancestry (*jus sanguinis*), while citizenship by naturalization is legally considered to be an inferior status. Sudan and South Sudan still use ethnic belonging as a primary basis for citizenship claims, although they are both among the most multicultural and ethnically diverse countries in Africa. Having a Sudanese or South Sudanese national birth certificate is generally considered to be insufficient proof of ethnic or territorial belonging. It is also harder for members of ethnic groups and minorities living near national borders to obtain nationality certificates or other identity documents, especially if they maintain links with neighboring countries.

According to the Sudanese Nationality Law of 1957, which was amended in 1974 and 1994 (Manby 2012: 25), nationality is based on descent, with the possibility of naturalization. Under this law, it will now be extremely difficult for Southern Sudanese people to gain citizenship of Sudan (Sikainga 2011: 17). In South Sudan, on the other hand, according to Section 8 of the 2011 Nationality

Act, South Sudanese nationality by birth can be considered citizens based on five separate grounds. The Act states that South Sudanese citizenship can be automatically obtained by eligible individuals regardless of their current residence (Scherr 2012: 101).

The combined effect of both laws is to ‘renationalize’ individuals with ethnic and familial affinities with South Sudan to South Sudanese nationality. It is not uncommon to denationalize someone following his or her voluntary acquisition or retention of a foreign nationality. However, it is very unusual to denationalize someone following his or her involuntary acquisition of a foreign nationality.

(Sanderson 2014: 74–75)

It is widely acknowledged that there is a lack of proper population registration systems in both South Sudan and Sudan, including with regard to birth certificates, identity papers, and marriage certificates. This makes it difficult to provide proof that a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent was born or lived in South Sudan, which is one of the conditions for acquisition of nationality in the new state of South Sudan (Manby 2012: 4).

‘Community’ Citizenship

‘Community’ citizenship refers ‘to all kinds of protections and services that individuals may acquire by being a recognized member of a local community’ (Bakhit 2016b). This type of citizenship does not necessarily bear any relationship to a person’s legal citizenship, in the sense that if individuals have acquired ‘community’ citizenship status, it might entitle them to satisfy all their rights and requirements without the need for legal citizenship. In my view, many members of the South Sudanese community in Khartoum have acquired community citizenship by living in Khartoum (mainly in peripheral shantytowns) for many decades before the secession of South Sudan (Bakhit, 2013).

This urban⁸ environment required many resources and newly acquired knowledge of the displaced Southern Sudanese people, who had to change the way in which they built their homes and planned their streets, and also needed to learn how to deal with paperwork and bureaucratic procedures (e.g. birth certificates, house ownership papers). Furthermore, they had to work collectively to provide their areas with basic services, besides learning different ways to protect ownership of their new urban homes. The residents of the Southern Sudanese shantytowns were also forced to deal with the challenges of adapting to new livelihoods: many had been farmers, pastoralists, or a combination of the two in their areas of origin. The only way they could survive in Khartoum was to learn how to become part of the informal economy and work as small traders. The informal economy is the only economic arena in which the capacity for recruitment is unlimited, despite the risks of financial stress and the restricted opportunities for advancement, but for many, there are often no other options. South Sudanese people frequently switch

between informal activities, with careers that are often dependent upon trial and error. When a new, profitable business opportunity opens up, large numbers of people will switch to it, thereby swamping the market and reducing profits. Recent estimates of the size of the informal economy in Khartoum have put the figure at 45% of the working population (Pantuliano 2011: 15).

The majority of the workforce is women; they work by selling food and drinks (tea and coffee) inside and outside the shantytowns and camps, in big markets in Omdurman, and also brewing and selling local alcohol, which is considered one of the main sources of income in the camp. The advantage of selling alcohol products in the camp is the fact that it is the only place where it is legal to get access to alcohol in Khartoum, and because of that, the camp is a big market for drinking alcohol and exporting it to outside consumers. Also, women work as cleaners and clothes-washers in nearby areas, which are dominated by Sudanese people from North Sudan.

For men, the work options include work in building, brick-making, vending in big markets of Omdurman and seasonal work in agriculture schemes in the harvest season, usually in the Eastern and Middle regions of Sudan. There is also an opportunity of industrial work on a soap-making factory in the Omdurman industrial area, but many interlocutors expressed dismay at working in this factory. The working conditions in this factory are very exploitative, with long working hours, low payments (between 24,000–34,000 SDG, about 40\$–60\$).

Even as the economic situation became very challenging for most of the refugee population in recent years, the COVID-19 restrictions made movement and work even more difficult. In addition to political instability in Sudan since December 2018, where the popular uprising led to the removal of Al-Bashir regime, economic hardship and a high rate of inflation hit the entire country and affected refugees harder. Generally, NGOs offer very few development programs, except for a few courses on basic mechanics for men, perfume making, soap-making, and sewing for women, but without any capital or raw materials to start small businesses.

The Impact of Political Crisis on South Sudanese' Belonging

It is possible to understand the processes of identity change by following a historical trajectory. I argue, based on empirical research in Khartoum, that the imagination of the South Sudan state in the minds of South Sudanese people in Khartoum prior to the referendum on South Sudan's secession in 2011 was shaped by heavy political rhetoric (as a negative nationalism). This rhetoric depicted South Sudan as an ideal state, a space where everything is and would be the opposite of what was experienced in the long history of living under the exclusionary and often violent Sudanese state in Khartoum. For example, one respondent, Saymon described to me how he imagined the life in South Sudan would be:

In my small village in Upper Nile state near to Wau town we don't need anything from outside except sugar and salt, everything is available in abundance, we produce all our needs of food and drinks, and it's better than

here. We don't need money at all. I have visited my village a few months ago. People live in peace and happiness, they don't worry about anything. I was working here [in Al-Baraka] for more than 20 years as a head of the local committee and I am a prominent member of the National Congress Party[ruling Islamist party in Sudan] in Al-Baraka, but after the referendum results they[the NCP] kicked me out without saying just thank you for your services. For that soon I will leave this place, I will sell my two houses and go back to my small village in Upper Nile, I am an old man now, I want to spend the rest of my life in my ancestral homeland.⁹

When South Sudanese moved back to South Sudan (after 2011) this romantic imagination was shattered by the experience of further discrimination and violent actions from the South Sudan government. Thus, when the same people returned to Khartoum as refugees after the civil war ignited in 2013, what they had imagined as an exploitative state (the Sudan government) became a new idealized state, while the South Sudan government became the newly understood exploitative state.

This is exactly what happened to Saymon Ushan. After he returned to South Sudan, suddenly the conflict erupted and reached his village, so he ran away with his wife and family. They moved toward Abu-Gebiha (South Sudan- Sudan border) by foot for several weeks where they had to drink from rivers. Then Saymon became sick and was moved to a hospital there. He called one of his previous colleagues in a local committee in Al-Baraka, and she then sent money to him and informed all the people who knew him. Through that, he received a considerable amount of assistance, which enabled him to return to Khartoum, and rent a small old house in Al-Baraka. He was still so ill and the doctors informed his son that he was suffering from cancer. With time, less and less assistance channeled to the family, and at the end only his son took the responsibility until he died in 2016.

Throughout interviews and conversations with South Sudanese refugees in Khartoum, there was a constant comparison between the two experiences of living under these regimes. There is an apparent appreciation for the Khartoum government allowing people to come back, as well as expressions of regret from many refugee people (especially from the Upper Nile Region in South Sudan) for voting for separation in 2011. This drastic change in the imagination of South Sudanese people about the two essentially equally brutal states is the result of a traumatic response to what happened in South Sudan (memories of horrific experiences, loss of family members, and so on).

The Politics and Contradictions of Forced Migration Life Trajectories

Apparently, 'community' citizenship status for Southern Sudanese people in Khartoum is operating as a substitute for their lack of legal citizenship. On the one hand, the South Sudanese in Khartoum are not legal citizens, but nor do they have clear refugee status, which places them in a very ambiguous situation not only for senior politicians but also for the low-level officials with whom Southern people usually

interact in government institutions, as legally South Sudanese viewed as not Sudanese, but still not having the same status of other refugees in Sudan (like Ethiopian refugees, Eritrean refugees). On the other hand, however, the Southern Sudanese who have returned to Khartoum from South Sudan or have stayed all along are benefiting from their long experience and the social networks they have been able to build in Khartoum while they have been living in the city. Through their knowledge of the city's geography, culture, and economic opportunities, therefore, it is not especially hard for Southern Sudanese people to navigate their lives, albeit with rather more difficulty than was the case before the independence of South Sudan. They have now largely lost ownership of their homes, and have lost their jobs in public and private institutions, although they still have the ability to work in the informal economy, as is especially the case with women who work as domestic workers in neighboring areas.

I argued elsewhere (Bakhit 2016a) that in shantytowns of Khartoum the population from multi-ethnic backgrounds including the South Sudanese manage to develop a different and unique shantytowns identity, not similar to the rest of Khartoum identity. This shantytown identity for South Sudanese continued to be present since not all South Sudanese moved back to South Sudan after or before the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

All of this suggests a reliance on the part of the Southern Sudanese on a new type of status that does not belong to any formal set of legal definitions (such as citizen, refugee, or IDP), but has been appropriated and established through their lengthy social and economic experience in Khartoum. This 'community' citizenship status therefore differs in terms of its dynamics and evolution, in that it is negotiated, constructed, and communicated on a daily basis through the interactions among different, but related, groups (returnees from South Sudan, South Sudanese who stayed in Khartoum, old neighbors in shantytowns, old friends from Sudan, and old work colleagues).

'Community' citizenship status, therefore, gives Southern Sudanese people fewer rights than they had when they were citizens of Sudan, but has still enabled the Southern Sudanese in Khartoum to live and survive with at least the minimum standards of Khartoum's shantytowns, and more importantly has provided the South Sudanese people with the security and protection from violence they lack in South Sudan at the current time.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to look at the processes of forced migration trajectories change for a group of South Sudanese people who have remained or returned as residents of Khartoum. Issues of legal and personal belongings, nationality, and community citizenship for South Sudanese people suffering exile in a third civil war are collectively critical in determining the survival and continuity of such communities, especially on South Sudan's refuge in Sudan. This chapter takes up this challenge, investigating the comparative and deeply contrasting experiences – and thus, it is theorized, contrasting ideas of citizenship rights, belongings, and documentation practices – for South Sudanese refugees in Sudan.

The chapter employed the concept of ‘community citizenship’ as an alternative to the conventional concept of legal citizenship, which usually dominates the literature. ‘Community citizenship’ refers to all kinds of protections and services individuals might acquire by being a recognized member of a local community. This type of citizenship does not necessarily have a relationship to a person’s legal citizenship, in a sense that if individuals acquired ‘community citizenship’ status this might entitle them to satisfy most of their rights and needs in the local community without the need to have legal citizenship. In my view, many members of the South Sudanese community in Khartoum are able to acquire community citizenship through their living in Khartoum (mainly in peripheral shantytowns) for many decades before the secession of South Sudan, by being part of the shantytown identity.

The chapter concludes that community citizenship forms a meaningful substitute for legal citizenship, which enables South Sudanese to resume parts of their former lives in Khartoum’s shantytowns, as they share the same identity and social position of other communities of Khartoum’s shantytowns.

Notes

- 1 Some statistics estimated that more than 4 million people of South Sudanese origin were IDPs in the current Sudan. See for example Nilsson, 2000: 9.
- 2 At that time, it was semi-independent government of South Sudan, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005.
- 3 Places where South Sudanese gather in different neighborhoods of shantytowns waiting for transportations toward South Sudan.
- 4 The reference is Nivasha Peace Agreement in 2003, which paved the way to signing of CPA in 2005.
- 5 The project is funded under the Africa Initiative of the Volkswagen Foundation “Knowledge for Tomorrow – Cooperative Research Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa” the junior Fellowship Group in the Social Sciences. The Fellowship lasted for the period between 2015–2020.
- 6 Whether South Sudanese citizenship or Sudanese citizenship,
- 7 This Sudanese Nationality Act suggests denying any individual with any ethnic belonging with South Sudan regardless of time of residence in Sudan, or having maternal ethnic belonging to Sudan.
- 8 In a rural environment there are less challenges to adapt for South Sudanese refugees, because most of them come from similar environments.
- 9 Interview with Saymon Ushan Ding, the head of the popular committee of Quarter 4, member of the legislative assembly of East Nile locality; he was also a tribal leader of the Shilluk in the area, he was the most senior official in Q4,3. Al-Baraka, Khartoum, 17 October 2011. This interview was part of my PhD fieldwork.

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