Post-Earthquake Haitian Migration to Latin America

AUTHOR

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HAITIAN MIGRATION TO LATIN AMERICA

Glossary

BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CNIg  Conselho Nacional de Imigração // National Immigration Council
CNVJ  Commission Nationale de Verite de Justices
CONATEL  Conseil National des Télécommunications
DTM  Displacement Tracking Matrix
EFA  Education for All
FOIA  Freedom of Information Act
GARR  Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés
HARIFA  Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act
ICE  United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICG  International Crisis Group
IHSI  Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d’Informatique
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INEC  National Institute of Statistics and the Census

Haitians travelling to the marketplace in rural Haiti. Photo by INURED.
FOREWORD

This working paper is based on Document Analysis conducted between February 2019 and July 2020. The documents analyzed in this paper consist of official government reports, state and municipal legislations, national and international organization reports, commissioned scientific reports as well as available quantitative data from Haiti, Brazil and other selected countries in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. This report provides an in-depth understanding of the history, state, patterns, and contexts of Haitian migration to countries in Latin America with particular focus on Brazil.

Historically, Haitian migration has been framed within the dominant South-North migration paradigm that characterizes the global literature on the topic. The lion share of focus has rested on emigration from Haiti to the United States and Canada, with secondary attention paid to destination countries in the Caribbean and elsewhere. As efforts to deepen our understanding of migration have challenged this dominant paradigm by acknowledging the significance of migration within the global South, such as recent migration of Haitians to Brazil, Chile and other neighbouring countries after the January 2010 earthquake, attention has increasingly shifted toward this phenomenon. This paper contributes to this shift by providing a contextual understanding of the potential impact of Haitian migration on development and equality within the Haiti-Brazil corridor.

As immigration policies in the global North become increasingly restrictive in the wake of rising nationalist sentiments in receiving countries and the COVID-19 pandemic that has created or exacerbated existing economic crises, migrants will increasingly look to alternative destinations in the global South. It is this constantly evolving phenomenon that this working paper will continue to examine over time.

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1. CONTEXTUALIZING HAITI IN THE CARIBBEAN AND THE AMERICAS

Sidney Mintz (1995:73), a long-time student of Haiti, suggests that while every nation is unique, Haiti is in a class by itself: “no other nation in world history has ever been created by slaves.” Paradoxically, the revolution from slavery to freedom has resulted in what Fick (1990) called an “unbridgeable gap” between the State and its organization on one hand and the Nation and its configuration on the other hand (also Trouillot 1990). Precisely because of this feature, the historical experience of Haitian society has carried with it unsettled social and political issues that underlie Haiti’s fragility until today. Like all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is fully part of the aptly named “New World.” While it is often masked to the outside observer struck most forcefully by its grinding poverty, unyielding underdevelopment and distinctive culture, Haiti’s modernity is thus one of its quintessential characteristics: Haitian society and culture are young, not old; dynamic, not stagnant; individualized, not collective; and unfinished, rather than ossified. It is truly a work-in-progress, whose future is neither bound nor ensured by either the ancientness or the solidity of any of its so-called “traditions.” Haiti’s internal “frontier,” for example, was not definitively closed until the middle of the 20th century, some 50 years after the U.S. had tamed what remained of its own theretofore uninhabited wilderness. The Haitian population, although overwhelmingly native-born, includes no indigenous peoples. And its culture – although drawing heavily on elements from both Western European and sub-Saharan African traditions that date back thousands of years – is, like all “Creole cultures,” fundamentally nascent and aggressively creative (Chamoiseau & Confiant 1999); indeed, almost voracious in its appetite for virtually anything “new.”

We do well to remember at the outset, then, that as a society and a culture, today’s Haiti is scarcely more than 300 years old; as a polity, only a few years beyond its bicentennial. And as we turn to a consideration of what makes Haiti such an extreme case in the heart of the New World, it must also be noted that the country bears all of the classic hallmarks of the West: here, individualism consistently trumps communality, value is measured almost exclusively in monetary terms; and private property is the overwhelmingly predominant mode of ownership. Moreover, this has always been the case, at least since the first major slave importations by the French – who formally gained control over the Western third of Hispaniola under the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 – created a new model of society and economy upon the tabula rasa of an empty landscape whose indigenous population had been extirpated almost a century earlier, a model based: on the commoditization of human beings themselves, as a factor of production; on the deliberate dissolution, isolation and segregation of families and language groups as an instrument of control; and on the untrammeled pursuit of sheer wealth, whatever its costs (Fick 1990; Moreau de Saint-Méry 1958; Stinchombe 1995).
Certain aspects of Haiti’s distinctiveness in the heart of the Americas today are often rehearsed in the literature. The bad news is very bad: Haiti is, by all measures, the poorest, most corrupt and most fragile nation in the hemisphere; its HDI value for 2018 is 0.503— which put the country in the low human development category— positioning it at 169 out of 189 countries and territories. (UNDP 2019). The corruption perception index developed by Transparency International ranked Haiti No. 168 out of 180 countries and the Fund for Peace ranked Haiti No. 12 in its Failed State Index, which ranks 177 countries starting with the worst case, Somalia (Transparency International 2019). The good news is often forgotten: Haiti was the first nation of free Black people in the history of the modern world. For the formerly enslaved in the Americas, Haiti was a promise land (Ferrer 2012; McKivigan 2008; Nicolay 1909). It has materially and intellectually abetted independence movements on three continents, starting with the United States, then Latin America in the 18th and 19th centuries, and then Africa in the 20th (Fisher 2013; Heinl and Heinl 1978; Trouillot 1995. Haiti’s sons and daughters participated significantly in the development of the newly independent states of West Africa, from the 1960s onward. And its aesthetic contributions to the world at large are notable not only for their irrepressible creative effervescence and cultural distinctiveness, but also for their liberating and universalist spirit.

What is even less remarked upon, much less analyzed, in the standard corpus of literature on Haiti, are the underlying societal dynamics that have made – and continue to make – Haiti what it is today: an extreme case of social fragility, still for all intents and purposes in extremis. Haiti’s brief but tumultuous past has been marked by three determinant factors: (1) endemic violence in the sociopolitical sphere (Fatton 2002; Heinl and Heinl 1978; Marcelin 2012; Trouillot 1990); (2) relative isolation from the economically and socially modernizing currents of the past 200 years (Dupuy 1997; Trouillot 1990); and, somewhat paradoxically, (3) an intensity and continuity of direct foreign involvement in its internal affairs and development that stretches back for almost a full century by even the most conservative analytic standards and, indeed, also lies at the genesis of the country itself (Fatton 2006; Goodman 2004; Trouillot 1990).

The next section will examine how Haiti’s history continues to shape the contexts of Haitian migration in Latin America and the Caribbean to the present day.

2. HAITI: A COUNTRY OF NET EMIGRATION

Since its independence in 1804, Haiti has experienced a succession of crises, some internal and others the result of external factors such as: indemnity payments made to France in exchange for recognition of the country’s independence and US occupation of the island in the early 20th century (Fouron 2020), both factors that have significantly shaped Haiti’s economic development. In more recent decades the country experienced prolonged economic contraction resulting from the forced elimination of native pigs due to an alleged swine flu epidemic that decimated the
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rural economy; the devastation of Hurricane Allen in 1980; the residual effects of the US recession of the 1980’s; and the 1991 embargo enforced by the international community (ibid). In 2006, the agricultural sector, industry, and services posted negative growth rates as the informal economy, representing more than three quarters of the economy in 2001, continued to expand (ibid). Progressively, the majority of the population would be excluded from the nation’s formal economy with a 27.4% national unemployment rate in 2001, a rate 2.7 times higher than the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region (Carrera 2014).

In addition to a favorable policy context, conditions at home also influenced the decision to migrate. In the LAC region, Haiti suffers from the most severe inequality (Banque Mondiale 2014). The wealthiest 20% of the population control more than 64% of the country’s wealth, whereas the poorest 20% control 1% of its wealth (ibid). The inequality and wealth divide between the richest and poorest is an extension of urban and rural inequality. Seventy percent (70%) of rural Haitians live in poverty a percentage that drops to slightly above one-fifth in urban settings (ibid). Further, certain populations such as women, the LGBTQI, and religious minorities are often the victims of discrimination (INURED 2017; OFPRA 2017). These inequalities that characterize Haitian society may, in one way or another, influence the decision to migrate.

2.1 WOMEN AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN HAITI

Representing slightly over half (51%) of the population (IHSI 2015), Haitian women have been systematically marginalized politically, economically, and socially (INURED 2017). Over the past three decades some attempts have been made to facilitate their inclusion, such as through the creation of a Ministry to address women’s issues and concerns, the passage of a Constitutional amendment in 2012 establishing a 30% quota for women’s participation in elections (USAID 2017), and increasing access to education for girls through the Education for All (EFA) global initiative.

In November 1994, the Ministry of the Feminine Condition and Women’s Rights (Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits des Femmes [MCFDF]) was established by the Aristide administration. A decade later, its principal mission would be to establish an egalitarian society for men and women and guide the development and enforcement of equitable public policies at the national level. Since then, the MCFDF has maintained two essential functions: the promotion and defense of women’s rights through the conduct of gender analyses. Unfortunately, the Ministry’s efforts have done little to improve gender equality and equity in Haiti. While the quota system has increased women’s participation in recent elections, it has not yielded greater representation in parliament. By 2017, there was only one female senator out of 30, who is no longer in office, and three female members of the lower chamber of parliament, out of 117.
The global EFA initiative has been successful in reducing the gap in educational attainment between Haitian boys and girls, however much remains to be done. In general, Haitian women continue to trail their male counterparts. Literacy rates among Haitian males is approximately 10% higher than that of females and males average two additional years of schooling than their female counterparts (World Bank 2015). One government study found that slightly under one in five (19%) men had no formal education whereas one-quarter of women had no formal schooling (MSPP 2013).

Haitian customs, reinforced by laws, also contribute to these disparities in educational attainment. Whereas males must reach adulthood in order to legally marry, females may legally marry during adolescence, or at the age of 15 (UNDP 2010) contributing to females marrying younger at almost 9 times the rate of males, or 17% and 2% respectively (World Bank, 2015). This, in turn, propels Haitian girls into traditional domestic roles while making school a competing luxury (IACHR 2009). Married adolescent girls often start a family at a younger age, a fact reflected in Haiti’s 8% teen pregnancy rate (Young et al. 2010).

Other cultural factors have contributed to girls’ underrepresentation in the formal education system, economic constraints often compel families to select which of their children will receive an education, a practice that favours boys. Therefore, while access to education has increased for Haitian girls it is not on par with the access rate among boys and for those fortunate to attend school they do not complete the same amount of schooling which, in turn, reflects women’s low participation rated in the formal labour economy. Haitian women earn one-third less than their male counterparts and have higher unemployment rates (World Bank 2015). They are also much more likely to be employed in the informal economy and to be exploited as evidenced by their disproportionate representation in Haiti’s restavek system in which child labour is used for housekeeping and child rearing in exchange for housing, little to no pay, and meager in-kind compensation such as clothing rags and scraps of food (Abrams 2010; Haydocy et al. 2015; Marcelin 2017; Sommerfelt 2014). In addition, restaveks are often the victims of physical and/or sexual violence (ibid).

Haitian customs and laws have rendered women extremely vulnerable; they have the highest fertility rate in the region at 4.8 (UNDP 2010), maternal mortality is five times that of the regional average at 380 deaths per 100,000 live births (WHO 2015), and Haitian women have a higher HIV/AIDS prevalence than men at 2.7% and 1.7%, respectively (World Bank 2015). Poor and socially marginalized women and girls suffer various forms of violence and exploitation including quid pro quo exchanges for grades in order to progress in school (Cela 2017; INURED 2010), for university admission (Cela 2017; INURED 2010), to secure money or gifts (Kolbe 2015), employment (Kolbe 2015; Maternowska 2006) and even humanitarian aid (Marcelin & Cela 2017). In the absence of institutional policies against sexual harassment and exploitation and given Rule of Law failure in Haiti (Cela 2017;
INURED 2010; INURED 2012; INURED 2017; Kolbe 2015; OPC 2012) they are left to negotiate these acts of violence on their own leading many to succumb to it.

The exploitation of women and girls is further evidenced by the fact that domestic violence and rape were only criminalized as recently as 2005. Yet, one-third of all Haitian women (ages 15 to 49) have reported experiencing some form of physical or sexual violence (USAID 2017), 29% of married women had experienced intimate partner violence of some form (MSPP 2013), a number that rises to 43% for young women ages 25 to 19 (ibid). One national study of violence found that one-quarter (25.7%) of Haitian women experienced sexual abuse before age 18 and 23.1% described their first experience of sexual intercourse as unwanted (Reza, Marcelin et al. 2014). This same study determined that almost half of all girls ages 13 to 17 believe it is acceptable for a man to hit or physically beat his partner (ibid). That number did, however, decrease among young women ages 18 to 24 but only by ten percentage points demonstrating the entrenched nature of such gender biases in Haitian society.

Sexual violence in Haiti is carried out within intimate relationships but also as a strategy of political oppression. The government commissioned report titled, “Si m pa rele [If I don’t scream],” documents the violation of human rights committed from 1991 to 1995 during Aristide’s ouster from office, via coup d’etat (CNVJ 1997). During the coup, sexual assault was a dominant form of violence carried out against women, however it was the first time it would emerge as a form of political oppression and reprisal in Haiti (ibid). These atrocities were mostly carried out in poor, marginalized neighbourhoods, in victim’s homes, in the presence of terrorized family members (ibid). In more egregious instances, family members were forced to violate one another (e.g., sons assaulting their mothers) or face sudden death (CNVJ 1997; James 2010).

Haitian women’s bodies have become sites of exploitation and violation at home, in schools and universities, in workplaces, in internally displaced camps (IDPs) for disaster victims, and in the streets. Perpetrators of these acts are emboldened by the absence of Rule of Law (INURED 2012). One MINUSTAH (2017) study found that less than half (47%) of sexual assault complaints made in 2013 were investigated. Based on Ministry of Justice and Public Security records, there is an average of 250 rapes per 100,000 inhabitants, however MINUSTAH suggests that those numbers are as much as ten times higher (MINUSTAH 2017: 18).

This complex circumstance has led to an untenable situation for Haitian women. Haitian men are, in many ways, a threat to the health and wellbeing of Haitian women yet it is those very same men that they rely upon for their safety often resulting in victims strategically entering predatory relationships to protect themselves from other men (Cela 2017; James 2010).
2.2 CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMIC CRISSES:
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS, COLLAPSE OF
GOVERNANCE, SOCIAL FRAGILITY, VIOLENCE AND
‘PEYI LOCK’ [COUNTRY LOCKDOWN]

Between 2004 and early 2010, Haiti was plagued by eight natural disasters; seven hurricanes and one earthquake, which claimed over 228,000 lives and affected almost 3.5 million people (Marcelin, Cela & Shultz 2016). These disasters were followed by a cholera outbreak in late 2010 brought to Haiti by a Nepalese unit of the United Nations peacekeeping mission (Pilkington 2020). The cholera epidemic would claim the lives of approximately 10,000 Haitians (ibid). More recently in 2016, Hurricane Matthew would devastate the southern region of Haiti with an official, though disputed, death toll of over 500 affecting one-fifth of the nation’s population of 11 million (Marcelin, Cela & Shultz 2016).

The 2010 earthquake would deliver a final, fatal blow to Haiti’s already fledgling economy claiming more than 200,000 lives and damaging critical infrastructure (Marcelin, Cela & Shultz 2016). With each crisis, living conditions worsened for much of the population forcing many to flee rural areas for urban centers and urban centers for other countries thereby transforming Haiti into a country of net emigration (OECD & INURED 2017).

No stranger to political and economic crises that have occurred with increased frequency and intensity over the course of the nation’s history, Haiti’s most recent crises includes the misappropriation of billions of dollars of PetroCaribe social development funds- of which its current president, Jovenel Moïse is implicated, and a sharp economic downturn caused by the elimination of fuel subsidies (Semple 2019). These crises led to nationwide protests, some of which became violent, calling for the president to step down while shutting businesses and schools for several months in the fall of 2019 (ibid). This period, which began in July 2018 and has persisted, in various ways, through today only to be somewhat overshadowed by the global pandemic. What this report reveals is that these historical events only partially explain the motivation to migrate. The MIDEQ Haiti study sets out to provide comprehensive scientific data illuminating what informs their decision to migrate as well as how potential migrants learn about destination countries, such as Brazil.

Today, emigration is considered a self-sustaining and almost irreversible phenomenon in Haiti. Some estimates suggest that approximately three million Haitians, or 28% of the country’s total population, live outside of the country (World Bank 2015). In 2012, Haiti ranked eighth among countries receiving the most remittance transfers per capita (Marcelino 2012). By 2015, remittance transfers were estimated at one-quarter of the nation’s gross domestic product (OECD & INURED 2017). In this context, the potential role of Haitian migrants in the nation’s development has evidently become the object of many studies. According to
Marcelino (2012), remittances have served as a counterbalance to unattained national development while also calling for more meaningful diaspora engagement in order to maximize those contributions through tourism, human capital and knowledge transfers as well as direct investments. To this end, Marcelino (2012) also explores dual citizenship and the right to social services (e.g., social assistance, health care or pensions transferable to emigrants living abroad) in the country of origin with a view to engaging the diaspora. He cites as examples several developing countries such as Bangladesh, Philippines, India, Cape Verde, and Ethiopia, which have effectively implemented dual citizenship policies that have made it possible to engage diasporas in their development. Haiti's politics, by contrast, have hindered rapprochement between the island nation and members of the diaspora who might otherwise contribute to development efforts. However, one national migration study conducted in Haiti found that although remittance transfers facilitate investments in education and agriculture, it has not resulted in productive investments by emigrants and return migrants on a significant scale attributing this to the government failure to establish migration policies that facilitate development (OECD & INURED 2017).

3. HAITI’S MIGRATION HISTORY IN THE GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH

Located in the Americas, Haiti is characterized by population movement. Populations from the European and African continents arrived in the Americas—most often voluntarily in the former case and involuntarily in the latter—joining indigenous populations across the region. Most of the indigenous population would not survive labour conditions under the European settlers making way for the steady importation of Africans who were enslaved in Saint Domingue, which would be renamed Haiti after independence.

Historically, Haitian migration has tended toward countries in the global North such as the United States, Canada, and France (Audebert 2017; OECD & INURED 2017). During the Haitian revolution (1791-1804), elite Creoles and mulattoes fled the island to France or French colonies and territories (e.g., Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Quebec) while a minority of emigres turned to the United States for refuge (Cesar 2007; Stepick 1998).

In the aftermath of the revolution that decimated much of the population, Jean Jacques Dessalines would issue a decree offering freedom and citizenship to Africans, indigenous people and US blacks willing to declare themselves black and resettle in Haiti (Fouron 2020). These efforts would continue through the mid-19th century as reflected in the 1816 Constitution as well as in direct engagement of English Abolitionist groups and the American Colonization Society in efforts to recruit and resettle freedmen in Haiti and would include enticements such as land, food, stipends among other benefits (ibid). However, of the 15,000 or so successfully recruited freedmen only a handful would remain in Haiti due to political turmoil, public
health emergencies (e.g., typhoid, cholera, malaria, etc.) and local resentment of the newly arrived foreigners (ibid). Once the Emancipation Proclamation of 1865 was adopted and the United States Constitution amended to enfranchise the formerly enslaved population incentive to resettle in Haiti dwindled (ibid).

Following the revolution, the nation now known as Haiti would experience several migration waves beginning in the early 1900s, during US occupation, increasing incrementally, at first, then surging in the latter part of the 20th century maintaining a frenetic pace through today. By the 1970s, the United States would become and remain the destination of choice for Haitian migrants.

3.1 HAITIAN MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL NORTH

3.1.1 UNITED STATES

By the 20th century, the United States’ influence over Haiti would rise during its occupation of the island nation from 1915-1934. Following US occupation, there were small, incremental flows of mostly elite Haitians entering the US, however it was during the Francois Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1971) that these flows began to rise steadily. The 1965 Hart-Cellar Immigration Act aimed to recruit skilled (physicians, engineers) and semi-skilled (cabinet makers, seamstresses, tailors) workers in the Viet Nam War era (Fouron 2020) replacing immigration laws dating back to the 1920’s that favoured European migration to the United States (Fouron 2020; Laguerre 1998; Wah 2013). The United States’ appeal as a destination country was further bolstered by the recent adoption of the Civil Rights of 1964 (Fouron 2020; Laguerre 1998; Wah 2013). Duvalier’s ascension to power at the end of the 1950’s and his repression of a mostly elite and educated opposition, a significant number of Haitian citizens from the wealthy and middle social strata fled the country to settle in the United States, France, Canada and other francophone countries in Africa (OIM 2015) as they were “considered obstacles to Francois Duvalier’s exercise of personal power” (Audebert 2011: 5). It is estimated that during his dictatorship some 50,000 Haitians emigrated to the US’s northeastern seaboard and 3,600 to Quebec (ibid).

Beginning in the 1970s, the rural and urban working classes would follow suit in an attempt to escape impoverishment in the countryside and deteriorating urban living conditions (Audebert 2011; Fouron 2020). In many cases, unable to secure visas, many of these migrants dangerously attempted to reach the state of Florida by taking to the sea in rickety boats (Fouron 2020). Increasing US geopolitical influence over the island nation, the fall of Francois Duvalier’s son, Jean-Claude, in 1986 and failed efforts toward establishing a democracy during Jean Bertrand Aristide’s tumultuous two terms in office would make the US the primary destination of Haitians leaving the country. Plagued by political instability, this period would revive emigration. As the diversity of emigres expanded to include low-income populations
unable to emigrate to North America, new regional destinations emerged while others were reactivated (ibid).

Thus, Haiti’s migration history can be summed up in three major waves of out migration; first, the elite mulatto and middle classes of the population escaping Francois Duvalier’s repression; followed by the urban and rural poor, searching for survival under Jean Claude Duvalier’s fledgling economy and, finally, a combination of economic, political and social disruptions during and following the Aristide regime that would force different segments of society to flee in large numbers at the same time (OECD & INURED 2017). Of note is that, according to the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service Reports, between 1953 and 1979, more than half (53%, or 50,002) of Haitian immigrants admitted into the United States were women (Buchanan Stafford 1984). Yet, among the 40,000 “boat people” recorded to have migrated “illegally” to the US between 1978 and 1981, women represented approximately 30% of these migrants (ibid).

It is during the third wave that illegal immigration to the US began to surge. In the 1980’s, the Reagan Administration would enforce the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operations (Kahn 2019), a policy that forced many “boat people”- mostly poor urban and rural migrants- to return to Haiti based on their categorization as economic migrants. Despite this new policy, migration to the US- both legal and illegal- persisted and would continue to rise. The US’s 1990 Immigration Act, which introduced more rigorous family reunification policies, along with a 1991 coup d’état against the Aristide regime would result in a surge in illegal migration from Haiti to the US (Wah 2013). In the 1990’s, thousands would cross the Caribbean Sea in the hopes of being intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, a strategy that would propel them into “the US asylum bureaucracy” (Kahn 2019: 470). Yet, throughout the 1990’s advocacy and community-based groups challenged the policy of categorizing most Haitians as economic migrants, which precluded them from applying for political asylum, particularly after the coup. Their efforts culminated in the adoption of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HARIFA) in 1998, which allowed Haitians to apply for permanent residency status and provided those denied asylum to seek alternative forms of immigration relief (Wasem 2011).

Haitian population estimates in the US have long been disputed with some estimating that official numbers are underreported by as little as one-quarter and others suggesting that the numbers should be doubled (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2007). The history of undocumented migration to the US, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, lends credence to such claims. According to official census data, by 2010 there was an estimated 881,488 Haitians living in the US representing 0.3 percent of the population with nearly 80 percent of Haitians living in Florida (48.1%), slightly over twenty percent (21.6%) in New York, and under ten percent (8.3%) in Massachusetts.
Following the 2010 earthquake, the US Department of Homeland Security announced the establishment of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for both documented and undocumented Haitians who had entered the country prior to January 12, 2010 (Chishti & Bergeon 2010; Gentile 2010; Wasem 2011). TPS provided temporary legal status and authorization to work in country for 18-months enabling beneficiaries to contribute to recovery efforts through remittances (Chishti & Bergeon 2010). The TPS program has been extended several times and remains in effect through today (USCIS 2019). Over 55,000 Haitian migrants have benefitted from the TPS program (Olsen-Medina & Batalova 2020).

3.1.2 CANADA

Prior to 1962, Canadian migration policy privileged immigrants of British stock, however those policies would be liberalized to meet the demand for professionals in the post-war period (Akbari 1999; Blad & Couton 2009; Icart 2006; Jadotte 1977). As political oppression increased under Francois Duvalier, Canada, or French-speaking Quebec in particular, became an attractive destination for Haiti’s professional class (Jadotte 1977). Between 1963 and 1967, Haitian migration to Canada almost tripled, rising from 19,316 to 53,587 (Labelle, Larose & Piché 1983). The passage of Bill 63, The Law to Promote the Teaching of French in Quebec, in 1969, and Law 22, which made French the official language of government in 1974 (Fontaine 1995), would make Quebec an attractive destination for French speaking Haitian professionals. According to some reports, this immigrant population had higher educational attainment rates than the national average with more than one-third (36%) of them having completed tertiary studies at the time (Jadotte 1977). However, by 1976 as Canada’s labour market needs shifted a new Immigration Act was adopted that had an human rights focus that could attract unskilled labourers thereby changing the
demographics of the Haitian population in Canada (Akbari 1999; Brenner et al. 1992; Icart 2006; ICG 2007). This policy corresponded with the changing demographics of those aspiring to leave Haiti at the time, the urban poor and rural peasantry.

Following the devasting earthquake in January 2010, Canada would adopt the Haitian Special Measures Program which extended the stay of Haitians in Canada at the time of the disaster and expedited family reunification for Canadian citizens and permanent residents with family members in Haiti (Government of Canada 2010). By 2016, an estimated 165,000 people of Haitian descent were living in Canada (Statistics Canada 2019).

**FIG 2. HAITIAN DISPERSION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1919-1976**

Les Haïtiens dans le monde
3.2 HAITIAN MIGRATION WITHIN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Research on Haitian migratory movements traces the first large-scale migratory flows to the beginning of the 20th century (Audebert 2011). Historically, internal migration was marked by the exodus of rural populations to Port-au-Prince and other regional centers, yet externally Haitian migrants emigrated to neighbouring countries, notably Cuba and the Dominican Republic, for work. These agricultural labourers worked on sugarcane plantations in Cuba between 1913 and the 1940’s (Casey 2012) and the Dominican Republic, beginning around the same period and continuing through the present day (Martinez 1999).

Audebert (2011) suggests that this particular wave of migration must be placed in the context of US interventionist policy and the development of its economic interests in the Caribbean. Indeed, these migration flows coincided with American occupation (1915-1934) of the country during a time in which land was expropriated from hundreds of thousands of peasants who were then forced into forced labour in order to promote the development of large plantations. This, in turn, undermined peasant production in Haiti as US companies began recruiting peasants to work in sugarcane plantations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic (OIM 2015). It is estimated that during that time 200,000 Haitian migrants worked on plantations in the Dominican Republic and twice as many in Cuba (Audebert 2011). Such migration to Cuba would eventually wane as circulatory migration across the shared borders of Haiti and the Dominican Republic proved less costly and more efficient for Haiti’s agricultural migrants.

However, in the aftermath of the 2010 disaster, Haitian migration within the global South would enter a new phase. The devastating earthquake would result in the adoption of restrictive immigration policies in countries such as the United States, Canada, and France, and more favourable migration policies in South America. Haitians, naturally, turned toward Latin America, particularly Brazil, in their search for a new home (Audebert 2016). However, if we are to examine Haitian migration within the global South, we must begin with the Dominican Republic, which hosts the second largest Haitian population outside of Haiti following the United States.

3.2.1 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

With the exception of a small group of elites who have pursued post-secondary educational opportunities in the LAC region, Haitian migration within the global South has historically consisted of unskilled migrants in search of employment opportunities (Marcelino 2013; OECD & INURED 2017; Wah 2013). Haitian migrants and their descendants have populated parts of Eastern Cuba where they worked on sugarcane plantations until the early 20th century as the Dominican Republic’s sugarcane industry began to stabilize and experience growth drawing much of its labour pool from neighbouring Haiti (Martinez 1999). Unskilled and low wage labourers from Haiti were now steered away from a competing Cuban sugar
economy toward the bateys (plantations) of the Dominican Republic, a feat partially facilitated by the US’s simultaneous occupation of both island nations- Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924- which share the island of Hispaniola.

Haitians make up 7.4% of the Dominican population, one-third of whom were born on Dominican soil (US Department of State 2019). Haitian migrants have traversed the Haiti-Dominican Republic border both legally and illegally for decades as chronic economic and political instability, particularly under the Duvalier regimes, made the neighbouring Dominican Republic an accessible migratory solution for the rural poor (ICG 2007; Martin et al. 2002; Orozco et al. 2003). The circulation of migrant workers between these two nation’s borders has persisted and in the wake of neoliberal economic reforms which subordinated sugar to the service and tourism industries many Haitian migrants have transitioned to these informal sectors of the Dominican economy (ICG 2007; Jarayam 2010).

Despite the need for low wage labour, Haitians in the Dominican Republic have been the victims of anti-Haitian sentiment which has been exacerbated by state sanctioned violence under President Trujillo (Paulino 2006), forced deportations, as well as labour and human rights violations that continue through today. Several legal decisions have further disenfranchised Haitian migrants and their descendants including the 2006 Supreme Court decision which ruled that Haitian labourers were in transit (ICG 2007). And, in 2013, the same court ruled that children born in the country to undocumented workers were not entitled to citizenship, a decision that some estimate rendered 200,000 people stateless (Archibold 2013).

The circulatory, and often undocumented, nature of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic has made it a challenge to determine population estimates. In 2003, estimates as low as 600,000 and as high as 1.5 million were attributed to Haitians in the Dominican Republic (ICG 2007; Martin et al. 2002; Orozco et al. 2003). Yet, the 2010 census recorded over 330,000 Haitians living in country. In 2012, the Haitian emigrant population was estimated at 259,000 (Migration Policy Institute 2014). These fluctuations in population estimates may be reflective of rapid, circulatory movement between the two countries. Irrespective of which population data one accepts, these numbers suggest that the US and Dominican Republic account for the largest numbers of Haitians living outside of Haiti. This also reflects the Dominican Republic’s standing as the second largest remitting country to Haiti at over USD $271 million in 2017 (Orozco, Porras & Yansura 2019). However, similar to population data, remittance data is also under-reported due to the use of informal and clandestine networks for money transfer.

Immediately following the earthquake in 2010, Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic was estimated to have risen by 15% (Fieser 2010). Initially, the Dominican government offered its support to Haiti, even accepting to provide medical treatment to victims in their country. However, within one year xenophobic
sentiments would resurface culminating in mass deportations (Archibold 2011). In 2015, the Dominican government passed a controversial law of regularization for foreigners placing Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent at risk of statelessness (Human Rights Watch 2017; OECD & INURED 2017). This law limited electoral participation, access to education, employment, financial services, and ownership of land and property (US Department of State 2019). More than 27,000 people were forcibly removed from the Dominican Republic while another 130,000 voluntarily returned to Haiti fearing deportation (Human Rights Watch 2017).

Notably, one study of Haitian migrants in Brazil traces the migratory routes of several participants to the Dominican Republic where they claim to have family (Dias et al. 2020). While this is not unusual, it may be evidence of how immigration policies adopted in one country may affect migration flows to and through other countries. Whereas, Dias et al. (2020) fail to make any potential connection between changes in Dominican laws and hostility toward Haitians in the Dominican Republic to the rising presence of Haitians in Brazil, Kingston (2016) anticipates the potential effects of the Dominican government’s policy on Brazil asserting that the political crisis would qualify Haitian migrants from the Dominican Republic for refugee status. Other studies (Handerson 2017a; Rodrigues Costa de Sá 2015) call attention to the fact that many Haitian migrants in Brazil are Spanish speakers as they had lived in the Dominican Republic while others transited through the island nation en route to South America.

The challenge for those migrants, however, would be proving that they were, in fact, Dominican and not Haitian migrants before this law took effect in a context in which historically many Haitian descended Dominicans have been denied official documentation or had their documents destroyed by Dominican authorities (Katz 2018).

3.2.2 BRAZIL

In the latter part of the 2000’s Latin America’s lure increased as a destination for Haitian migrants (Icart 2017; Louidor 2011). Countries such as Ecuador and Chile, which had no entry visa requirements played pivotal roles as entry points to the region for Haitian migrants (Louidor 2011). Migration to the region intensified after the 2010 disaster, as some authors would note that: “the migratory flow of Haitians to Brazil began immediately after the earthquake” (Fernandes, da Consolacao, & de Castro 2014). Presently, tens of thousands of Haitians are scattered across South America in search of better living conditions (Louidor 2011). Places such as Brazil, Chile and Ecuador have become destination countries for some and sites of transit migration for others. However, Brazil has been the most prominent recipient of Haitian migrants in South America.

Since Brazil’s inclusion in international markets via the coffee industry in the second half of the 19th century, Brazil would receive migrants mostly from Europe (Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Germany and Japan). By the 1930s, international
immigration started to wane while internal population movements increased, persisting until the 1980s when Brazil resurfaced as a country of immigration (Soares et al. 2015). Although a decline of international immigration was cited between 1991 and 2010, Brazil has experienced unprecedented growth in intraregional immigration (and return migration), a result of globalization (ibid). During this period, Brazil would develop opportunities for labour market participation and establish favourable investment conditions increasing international immigration while decreasing outward migration (ibid).

While immigrant stock in the U.S. and Canada remains higher than their South American counterparts, international migration to South American states increased significantly between 1990 and 2013 as compared to their neighbours in the North. Several factors have contributed to the increasing presence of immigrants in Latin America: 1) higher growth rates in regional economies and the creation of more job opportunities; 2) various integration systems linking countries in the region (most notably, Mercosur) that have introduced provisions to facilitate migration for citizens of these countries; and 3) loosened restrictions on entry, reduced cost of transportation, better access to information and the influence of diasporas (OAS & IOM 2016).

Of note, in 2008, as Brazil emerged from the foreign debt crisis there was a conceptual shift away from the national security approach to migration as the government adopted a human rights approach to the management of their borders (De Almeida 2012). Between 2011 and 2014, the US and Brazil were cited as issuing the lion’s share of permanent and temporary residence permits to Haitians. However, these figures do not account for the humanitarian visas issued by Brazil, as these visas are considered a “special category” (OAS & IOM 2016).

HAITIAN MIGRATION TO BRAZIL PRIOR TO 2010

Nieto’s study (2014) of Haitian migration to Brazil analyzes it as an historical fact that transcends specific events placing Haitian migration in a broader context that facilitates an understanding of the transnational social space created by this phenomenon. According to Nieto (2014), the 2010 earthquake provoked a crisis with impacts felt across Haitian society and one of its many consequences was increased migration to Brazil. He notes that before the disaster, the few Haitian migrants in Brazil were student beneficiaries of scholarship programs for undergraduate and post-graduate studies in Brazil, a South-South Cooperation initiative benefitting developing nations in Latin America and Africa (Nieto, 2014). Between 2008 and 2012, forty-one (41) Haitian scholarship recipients pursued tertiary studies in Brazil (ibid). However, he suggests that by July 2013, there were approximately 15,000 Haitians living in Brazil (ibid). From there, Haitian migration would take off.

In 2004, Brazil would lead the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) reinforcing Rule of Law, ensuring public safety- particularly during
electoral periods, and supporting the Haitian state (Audebert 2017; De Almeida 2012; Dias et al. 2020; Muira 2014). Constituting more than 45% of MINUSTAH’s military force in Haiti, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake Brazil’s geopolitical and diplomatic influence would expand to include humanitarian assistance, infrastructure repairs, and aiding in the fight against the cholera epidemic. In this context, bilateral relations were strengthened, and Brazil would streamline its immigration policy toward Haitians.

Surprisingly, it was Ecuador, not Brazil, that would facilitate Haitian migration within South America. In 2008, Ecuador would adopt a policy waiving the visa requirement for all Caribbean and Latin American nationals and has, thus, been considered the original gateway for many Haitians into South America between 2008 and 2009 (Audebert 2017). The IOM (2014) cites the following routes taken by Haitian migrants to, if not through, Ecuador: 1) via air from Port-au-Prince to Panama and onward to Quito or Guayaquil; 2) from Haiti to the Dominican Republic by land followed by flights to Panama then Quito or Guayaquil; and 3) via air from Port-au-Prince to Havana, Cuba, then onward to Bogota, Colombia, to San José, Costa Rica, and finally to Quito. However, migration data would reveal that while some Haitians settled in Ecuador, with those who settled consisting primarily of working professionals, for many the country served only as a transit point to other destinations in Latin America. The reluctance of many migrants to settle in Ecuador was reportedly due to lower salaries when compared with other regional economies (Handerson 2015). Evidence of this is revealed by Peru’s National Institute of Statistics and the Census ([INEC] 2013) whose data reveals that 92% of Haitian nationals who entered the country on a 3-month tourist visa in 2013 intended to travel onwards to Brazil and that their profiles were consistent with the Haitian nationals who entered Brazil during that same period (Audebert 2017). Nonetheless, the migrant route that passed through Ecuador yielded a 400% increase in Haitian arrivals from 2012 to 2013 transforming the nation from a point of transit to a destination country for some Haitian migrants (Cárdenas 2015). As a result, in 2013, a Haitian embassy was opened in Quito (ibid).

**DISASTER MIGRATION: HAITIAN MIGRATION TO BRAZIL IN THE POST-EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT**

In terms of territory, Brazil is the largest country with the largest population in South America. Prior to suffering a recession, Brazil had distinguished itself as a regional power after experiencing significant economic growth. Classified as a global emerging market and a member of the BRICS block (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Haitian migration to the country coincided with high GDP growth (Cárdenas 2015).

Large scale Haitian migration to Brazil began in 2010 (Audebert 2017; Cárdenas 2015; Fouron 2020; OIM, 2014) as it emerged "as a regional power, [and due to] its
privileged geopolitical relations with Haiti, and the opportunities of its employment market” (Audebert 2017: 56). However, it is important to note that earlier research on Haitian migrants conducted between 2010 and 2013 found that some entered into paid arrangements with intermediaries to facilitate their migration to the US, France, or Canada, however they were redirected to Brazil by those same intermediaries (Handerson 2015). Other migrants had procured the services of intermediaries to facilitate migration to Suriname and French Guiana transiting through Brazil deciding en route to remain as there were opportunities to make a living (ibid). Further, many Haitians in Latin America carry more than one residency as a key strategy to ensure successful migration and keep possibilities open (ibid). Having more than one document signifies increased mobility and further opportunities to migrate and circulate internationally. These factors suggest for Haitian migrants the destination is not always fixed, hence the circulatory nature of Haitian migration. Migrant decision making can be influenced by intermediaries as well as family and friends at home and abroad, but is always informed by the perceived opportunities that may arise at any moment before departing the country of origin, during the migratory process, and after arrival at a destination. Therefore, today’s destination country can easily become tomorrow’s transit point. As an example, in early 2020 Haitians had become the largest group of migrants traveling north from Colombia through the Darien jungle into Panama (Abdaladze 2020). Some of these migrants had lived in Brazil, where opportunities were on the decline, and now sought to migrate to the US (ibid).

FIG 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS AND IRREGULAR HAITIAN MIGRANTS FROM COLOMBIA DETECTED IN THE DARIÉN REGION (JAN. 2019 TO MAR. 2020)
The data presented in Figure 3 is based on published reports by the Panamanian Servicio Nacional de Migración (National Migration Service from January 2019 to March 2020. During this period, Haitians made up almost half (approximately 48%) of all detected irregular migrants in the region.

Returning our focus to Brazil, Handerson (2015) characterizes Haitian migrants accordingly as: 1) rural dwellers traveling- internally and internationally- for the first time; 2) displaced Haitians who were mobile within Haiti; and 3) migrants with prior experience living abroad. The latter constituted the greatest portion of Haitian migrants, during prior experiences had garnered various forms of capital (e.g., linguistic and expansive social networks. Interestingly, Handerson (2015) argues that having family abroad does not necessarily influence mobility; it is, in fact, social capital- the capacity to mobilize networks and the resources available to the potential migrants that are the essential dimensions to facilitating mobility. Many researchers cite the presence of Brazilian troops in Haiti as contributing to spreading ideas that Brazil was a land of opportunity in which jobs were readily available and unemployment rates were low. The phenomenon coincided with the growth of the Brazilian economy and anticipation of the additional labour that would be needed for the construction of hydroelectric plants in preparation for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic games (Muiru 2014). According to the Chief of Mission at the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the facilities for those events were built by foreign labour: “all the stadiums, […] the whole infrastructure that was budgeted and needed for these two big events were made mainly from workers from Haiti” (Schlabach 2020). Thus, many suggest that employment opportunities and relatively high salaries, when compared with compensation rates in Haiti, influenced the decision to migrate to Brazil, at least in the first years after the earthquake (Nieto 2014).

Haitian migrants are mostly found in Brazil’s urban centers where there are more job opportunities (Uebel & Ruckerft 2017). Although many attribute the rise in Haitian migration to Brazil to the earthquake, evidence suggests that the earthquake may have served as a pretext for migration and not its main cause. In one study of Haitian migrants conducted in Porto Velho, Brazil, between 2012 and 2013, of 117 participants only two cited the earthquake as their reason for migrating to Brazil. Handerson (2017a) reports that in his research most of the migrants were not from the capital region where the earthquake struck, however they acknowledged how the disaster exacerbated preexisting political, economic and social circumstances that had long plagued in the island nation.

When Haitian migrants first arrived in Brazil following the disaster, unemployment rates were low and the need for manual labour was high. By 2012, the vast majority (90%) of Haitian migrants were employed due to the flourishing economy and some argue that their high rate of employment was attributable to the fact that Haitian migrants in Brazil had higher educational attainment than the
average Haitian in Haiti (De Almeida 2012). Most of the Haitian migrants who initially entered Brazil were men who were able to fill the manual labour market void (Handerson 2017a). Thus, in the first years of Haitian migration to Brazil men predominated. One 2012-2013 study conducted in a border town in the Western Amazon region cite job opportunities in civil construction that are generally filled by men, Haitian women’s monolingualism, and significant delays in issuing residence visas that, in turn, delays family reunification as reasons for the low migration rates of Haitian women to the area (Lima Pimentel Cotinguiba & Castro Cotinguiba 2015).

Between 2011 and 2015, the composition of Haitian migrants to the region would change: beginning with bi- and multilingual men with prior migration experience between the ages of 25 and 35 working on construction sites in cities; transforming to younger men and women with lower education levels from urban and rural areas of Haiti; followed by married women and children who had benefitted from family reunification (Lima Pimentel Cotinguiba & Castro Cotinguiba 2015; IOM 2014). Another study reinforces what is known about Haitian women migrants in Brazil, reporting that they are more likely to have access to support networks that facilitate migration and are more likely to enter the country with regular immigration status, having obtained the humanitarian visa before travelling (Baeninger & Peres 2017).

In 2014, men represented 82% of Haitian migrants with working papers in Brazil (Muiru 2014) and the vast majority were single (IOM 2014). They were “recruited to work in the large construction, meat processing, and textile factories in the south, as well as the lumber mills in Roraima (northern state), where monthly incomes averaged R$700.00 (US $330.00)" where some were subjected to “slave-like conditions” (Kenny 2013: 104-105). Some Brazilian companies recruit migrants in Haiti making substantial “initial investment[s] (up to US $25,000) by providing airfare, lodging, and food for about 3 months, which is later discounted from their monthly salary (Kenny 2013: 105). However, such upfront investments are made with profits in mind. The comparatively low cost of hiring migrants and their reluctance to challenge working conditions, particularly if they are undocumented, increases the return on investment over time even when one factors in the costs of enlisting the services of an intermediary to recruit migrants.

Although Haitian migrants had regular status in Brazil through the humanitarian visa, between 2010 and 2015 more than one-third (35%) identified as unemployed or other, the latter suggesting possible participation in the informal economy (Baeninger & Peres 2017). Female migrants, on the other hand, have limited opportunities primarily in domestic services and, to a lesser extent, in the service sector. Handerson (2015) argues that this should be understood in the context of a global increase in the demand for domestic labour coupled with an increase in the supply of this labour from poorer countries. Notably, existing racial hierarchies that associate black or darker women with domestic work in Brazil further limit the opportunities afforded to Haitian women in the labour market. Haitian women, however, tend to
reject these positions given their experience as petty commerce entrepreneurs or in the hotel and tourism industry (IOM 2014; Kenny 2013).

**FIG 4. NUMBER OF WORK AUTHORIZATIONS ISSUED TO HAITIANS BY SEX 2010-2018**

Kenny (2013:107) argues that this context renders them “increasingly vulnerable to the lucrative trafficking of drugs and other goods across the border.” Thus, there has been a clear division of labour in terms of opportunities afforded to Haitian men and women in Brazil. However, the poor labour market insertion of Haitian women also reflect complex interactions between gender, social status, ethnicity and race (Handerson 2015). Thus, understanding the context of reception and experiences of Haitian women migrants in Brazil, specifically, and Latin America, more generally, necessitates the employment of an intersectionality framework.

In terms of education, less than half of male and female migrants, 42.1% and 43.2% respectively, had completed their secondary school studies (IOM 2014). Nieto’s (2014) study led by professors at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais drawing on secondary data from the National Council of Migration (CNIg) found that of 714 Haitian migrants who arrived between 2010 and 2011, 40% had not completed primary schooling confirming that this migrant population consisted of labourers of limited qualifications.

The International Review Board of Canada, reported that by 2017 more than 85,000 Haitians had emigrated to Brazil, most under refugee status (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018). Haitian migrants hailed from different regions of Haiti including: the Port-au-Prince greater metropolitan region; Gonaïves and its
surrounding area in the Center of Haiti; the south, specifically Aquin and its environs; Jacmel and its neighboring villages; as well as from the north of the country. The diversity of areas from which migrants originated reflect the work of recruiters at one time or another who had enlisted the cooperation of local intermediaries which included so-called evangelical pastors allegedly working through foundations (IOM 2014).

**BRAZIL’S FAVORABLE MIGRATION POLICY TOWARD HAITIANS**

Asylum applications are cited as historically rare in Latin America (45 applications per million inhabitants) as compared with the US and Canada, although there were significant increases in applications from 2010 to 2015 in many Latin American states, including Brazil (OAS & IOM 2016). In 2010, only 200 Haitian migrants were recorded as crossing the Amazonian border from Peru to Brazil (UNCHR 2014), a number that would rise to 50,000 by 2014 (Fernandes & de Castro 2014). Recognizing the inapplicability of Brazil's Law 9474/97 and the Refugee Convention of 1951 to the Haitian case, De Godoy (2011) reports that states had to create other channels for temporary migration afforded under regional or national complementary protection regimes in order to relieve pressure on their refuge and asylum systems. Yet, he recognizes that such complementary protections are not internationally recognized and, therefore, can create large legal and practical barriers to affording this type of protection to migrants.

Between 2010 and 2012, Haitians could file for asylum through “Brazil's refugee statute of 1997 (Lei 9.474/97) [which] amplified the definition of refugee to include "grave and generalized violations of human rights," [but] it did not include victims of natural disasters or those fleeing poverty" (Kenny 2013: 100). Further, contradictions with the Geneva Convention’s classification of refugees compelled the Brazilian government to adopt Normative Resolution 97 in 2012 granting humanitarian visas to Haitian nationals. Of note, is that Montinard (2019) reports the use of intermediaries by Haitian migrants to obtain fraudulent documents presenting them as nationals of West African countries such as the Ivory Coast. The advantage of this practice lies in the fact many migrants from these countries were deemed eligible for forms of humanitarian protection, including refugee status, for which Haitians were ineligible. In addition, since many Haitian migrants spoke French, they could blend in more easily as West African nationals and progress through interrogations with border police. This was followed by the adoption of RN 102 in 2013, which eliminated the 100 humanitarian visa per month cap as well as the requirement that the visa be issued in Port-au-Prince (Audebert 2017; Kenny 2013; Moulin & Thomaz 2015; Muira 2014). Humanitarian visas could now be issued to Haitian migrants by Brazilian Embassies in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Ecuador (Muira 2014; Vieira 2017). With restrictive immigration policies in the US and Canada, the adoption of laws rendering Haitians and their descendants stateless in neighboring Dominican Republic, the context was ripe for migration to Brazil. However, the
unique humanitarian status granted to Haitian migrants in Brazil left them in a space of liminality in which they did not have the protections afforded refugees or resident immigrants. According to Moulin & Thomaz (2015: 601),

“The ‘humanitarian immigrant’ is, thus, an ambivalent, hybrid category that builds into the vulnerability of the refugee through its humanitarian qualities while, at the same time, keeping a degree of suspicion as to its economic motivations. By doing so, it attempts to normalize more restrictive boundaries around the refugee regime while at the same time enabling Haitians’ permanence in Brazil through market-oriented terms.”

Haitian migrant presence in Brazil reflected a profound ambivalence; on the one hand a system had been created to draw them to the country yet, on the other, their reception was arbitrary and unplanned rendering them extremely vulnerable. Increased Haitian migration to Brazil despite the challenges of reception in the host country lend credence to Hagen-Zanker & Mallett’s (2020:11) assertion that migrants may disproportionately relying on anecdotal information acquired through social networks that vary in terms of reliability: “where migration policies come into play at all, it is the interpretation and perception of such policies that appears to be of most consequence [emphasis original].”

While rendering Haitian migrants vulnerable, the new resolution adopted by Brazil, ironically, aimed to protect them from trafficking and human rights abuses (De Almeida 2012; Vieira 2017). The Brazilian government engaged Ecuador and Peru in diplomatic talks toward that end advocating for increased police presence along the borders and shared intelligence between the three countries (Vieira 2017). One outcome of the Brazilian government’s efforts was Ecuador’s Executive Decree 248, issued in February 2010, regularizing the status of Haitians who had entered Peruvian territory through January 31, 2010 (ibid). However, this decree only benefitted between 400 and 500 Haitians (ibid).

In the first year following the disaster (2010 to 2011), the first wave of Haitian migrants would enter Brazil via the states of Acre and Amazonas (Vieira 2017). Although official figures suggest that more Haitians entered Brazil via the Amazonas states, Acre garnered significant national attention as hundreds of Haitian migrants (approximately 80 per day) entered a region that was experiencing high unemployment rates, confronting a drug trafficking problem, and facing severe resource constraints (Kenny 2013). Notably, between 2010 and 2015 the vast majority (88%) of Haitians who entered Brazil by land traversed Peru, and to a lesser extent Bolivia, into Acre (Baeninger & Peres 2017). In less than three years, Acre would reportedly spend over USD $2 million on food, lodging and healthcare for Haitian migrants (Nieto 2014). However, early Haitian migrants were faced with immediate disappointment upon their arrival in Brazil. Acre and Amazonas were poor, rural areas that had limited opportunities and poor infrastructure, reminiscent of what they were attempting to escape, and with no resemblance to the Brazil they
had envisaged (Handerson 2015). Between 2012 and 2016, 48,000 humanitarian visas were granted to Haitians allowing them to remain in Brazil for a period of 5 years (Kenny 2013; OAS & IOM 2016). By 2015, an estimated 95,500 Haitians were living in Brazil (OBMigra 2015), however these estimates do not include those without documentation.

The arrival of thousands of Haitians at Brazil’s borders provoked new reflections on the immigration question compelling the Brazilian government to rethink existing policies, such as the Estatuto do Estrangeiro [Foreigner Statute] governed by Law 6.815 of August 1980 which had contradictory aims to stimulate migration in some cases and discourage it in others (Nieto 2014) In this sense, RN n° 97/2012 helped regularize the status of Haitians on Brazilian soil, a sign of welcome to this migrant population, but also revealed a certain ambivalence on the part of the Brazilian government that put in place mechanisms and systems of security which increased military presence at the nation’s borders restricting entry to Brazil (Montinard 2019). Such immigration enforcement measures render direct routes to the country of destination more dangerous thus requiring the services of an intermediary (Crawley et al. 2017; Jones & Sha 2020).

Based on an IOM (2014) study, Haitian migrants have limited, reliable information about Brazil. Much of the information about living conditions in Brazil comes from sporadic media coverage predominantly of sports, anecdotes spread by the Brazilian group «Construtora OAS», a firm contracted to build roads primarily in the southern region of Haiti, and rumors spread by traffickers (IOM 2014). There is also general knowledge that there are employment opportunities for unskilled laborers, that visas are relatively easy to obtain, and the presumption that Brazil does not deport undocumented migrants (ibid). However, some migrants reported a disconnect between expectations of Brazil and the reality both in the initial years and, particularly, in post-recession Brazil (Abdaladze 2020; Handerson 2015). This disappointment is reflected in the reality of migration itself, as successful integration in host countries is not guaranteed. Although migration and mobility can represent social ascension in Haiti, it can also lead to a short-term or permanent decrease in socioeconomic status of Haitians living abroad. One key informant in Handerson’s (2015) study, for example, mentioned having two maids in the Dominican Republic yet in Brazil she was temporarily compelled to work as a housekeeper (ibid).

While the real and perceived comparative political, economic and environmental contexts in Haiti and Brazil harkens back to traditional push-pull factor theories associated with migrant decision making, increasing emphasis has been placed on Haiti’s migration history and the transnational networks that facilitate this process (Cárdenas 2015; Giacomini & Bernartt 2017; Handerson 2017b; Nieto 2014; Rodrigues Costa de Sá 2015). Migration has long been a strategy of advancement, and not simply survival, for Haitian families. The turn toward Brazil is no exception. Studies show that families in the country of origin feature prominently in these transnational networks as the decision to migrate is often made collectively (Nieto
Such collective decisions often result in the family sending someone to Brazil who will eventually help sustain those left behind (ibid). While some suggest that networks, including the family, simply determine the migrant’s destination (De Oliveira 2017), family dynamics are often key in the construction of these transnational spaces as they organize themselves to support migrants sent abroad (Nieto 2014). The family’s role is integral to migration such that it inextricably links mobility and immobility, the family’s immobility facilitates the migrant’s ability to move to Brazil, Suriname and French Guiana, among other places in South America (Handerson 2015). Once migrants reach these countries, they are expected fulfill their obligations to those left behind (ibid). Yet, this transnational network extends beyond the family helping convert one’s aspirations into concrete actions and consists of “a social network that can provide information and other support, access to the migration infrastructure (e.g. brokers) and pathways for migration (Hagen-Zanker & Mallett 2020: 9-10).

CIRCUITOUS ROUTES TO BRAZIL: MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND CIRCUMVENTING REGIMES OF BORDER CONTROL

Haitian migrants who have obtained a humanitarian visa from the Brazilian Consulate generally fly directly into Brazil. However, as Hagen-Zanker and Mallett (2020:12) argue some “[p]eople do not necessarily travel along the easiest or quickest route, constrained as they are by border controls, limits on financial and social capital, the actions of smugglers, and the extent and reliability of available information.” This is certainly the case for Haitian migrants who have not had the fortune of obtaining a humanitarian visa. Handerson (2015) contends that migrant routes are largely determined by their: economic status; level of educational attainment; social and migration networks; and place of origin. Dias et al.’s (2020) study, however, cites the high cost, bureaucracy, and low number of visas issued as obstacles to obtaining a humanitarian visa. Montinard (2019) cites the bureaucratic red tape associated with obtaining a passport in Haiti as a factor that steers many toward the services of a raketè, an intermediary with a questionable reputation, who can help facilitate such processes while also running the risk that s/he may be swindled potential migrants and their families out of their money. In Handerson’s (2015) study of Haitian migrants in South America, many reported disappointments with intermediaries who charged exorbitant fees for services that fell short of what was promised. Yet, despite the precarious nature of their services Haitian mobility is constructed by these complex configurations that include familial, social, humanitarian, and intermediary networks (Handerson 2015).

Haiti’s travel agencies also serve as intermediaries. These private establishments sell travel-related products and services, tourism-related or not, and provide ancillary services that make success travel to one’s destination possible. These agencies provide assistance with obtaining the legal documents necessary to facilitate one’s trip. They provide services that are comparable to those offered by a
raketè for a negotiated sum of money that is often renegotiated as “unforeseen” expenditures arise. Though raketè is a pejorative term often associated with theft and illegality, whereas travel agencies evoke that which is professional, the latter helps disguise the organization of illegal trips. Some, therefore, prefer to use a travel agency to facilitate this process rather than a raketè because of the latter’s poor reputation. However, both raketè and travel agencies form part of a set of networks that facilitate the securing of official documents (e.g., passport, visa, among others) and thus facilitate the mobility and circulation of migrants. As Jones & Sha (2020: 12-13) contend, intermediaries “influence patterns of migration as well as migration outcomes. What they do, what they are, and how and why they do what they do is highly context-dependent.” However, other resources or networks can be activated through families, friends, neighbors, or even within the corridors of public institutions, to increase the chances of successful migration. In these spaces, information, a constituent element of these networks, will be passed from one person to another (Montinard 2019).

The alternative strategy employed by migrants without visas is to take more circuitous routes to Brazil as 27% of Brazil’s territory shares a border with another country (Cavalcanti & Tanhati 2017). The costs of migration routes vary widely, for example on foot through the mountains can range from USD $1,000 to USD $1,200, by truck or bus can cost between USD $1,500 to USD $1,800, or by boat via Los Chiles- a dangerous route- is the least expensive while posing the greatest risk at USD $900 (Montinard 2019). In addition to the clandestine, and often dangerous, nature of these routes, they also subject transmit migrants to shifting migration statuses as they traverse anywhere from three to four countries in Central and South America in their attempts to reach Brazil (Audebert 2017; Busse & Vasquez Luque 2016). Their Latin American journey often begins in Panama, where they were once able to obtain a visitor’s visa upon entry¹ and secure a connecting flight to Ecuador. In Ecuador, Haitian migrants are also granted a tourist visa upon arrival en route to Peru, where their undocumented status requires the assistance of smugglers who facilitate their entry into Brazil (Busse & Vasquez Luque 2016; Dias et al. 2020).

According to a study of migrant smuggling commissioned by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ([UNODC] 2018), in 2016 smuggling operations earned an estimated US $5.5 to $7 billion globally. Yet, intermediaries who facilitate migrant journeys across various terrains and national borders, also referred to as gatos (Kenny 2013), pasadores (Nieto 2014) and coyotes (Dias et al. 2020) in the Latin American context, cannot be neatly characterized as either positive facilitators of migrant movement or migrant exploiters, their role in the migration process is complex. One study suggests that in the Americas 80% of trafficked persons report being of the same nationality as the trafficker (OAS & IOM 2016). Most migrants

¹ On June 24, 2020, the Ministry of Public Security in Panama issued an Executive Decree requiring non-resident Haitians to obtain a tourist visa prior to entering the country.
experience a severe deterioration in mental and physical health due to the process of uprooting, the long journey, fear of authorities, impact of intermediaries and, in some cases, long periods of detention (IOM 2016). For Haitian migrants to Brazil who are not represented by a consulate or embassy, lack of access to information on their rights and challenges in obtaining legal assistance render them particularly vulnerable (OAS & IOM 2016).

Evidence of the complex role played by intermediaries can be found in Dias et al.’s (2020) study of Haitian migration to Brazil which found that coyotes help facilitate the journey for visa holders and undocumented alike. On the face of it a USD $200 humanitarian visa obtained at a Brazilian Embassy in Haiti or the Dominican Republic plus flight costs (which even in peak season would not exceed USD $2500) would appear to be the least costly (and most efficient) route to Brazil, as suggested by Muira (2014). However, knowledge of the Haitian context would yield a very different understanding of migrants’ decisions to invest in coyotes as for many it is the only viable option. Study participants cite the high costs associated with obtaining official Haitian documentation (ranging from USD $200 to USD $2,000) and bribes paid to immigration officials before boarding a plane to Brazil as barriers to migration (Dias et al. 2020). These processes not only made the direct route more expensive given the unexpected fees, they explained that the legal route still required the assistance of an intermediary who could help expedite the process of obtaining official documents or paying bribes to immigration officials in Haiti (ibid). This made alternative routes more appealing to many aspiring migrants. Various studies suggest that the cost of the journey for Haitian migrants range from USD $3,000 to more than USD $5,000 (IOM 2014; Kenny 2013; Nieto 2014). For the majority of migrants who have left Haiti without a humanitarian visa in hand (Muira 2014), there is the daunting task of circumventing regimes of border control instituted by states (Papadopoulos et al. 2008) requiring the services of:

“Brokers [who] charge them about [USD] $4,000 to take them through an arduous and circuitous trek that requires numerous buses, boats, and airplanes to the jungles of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, where they cross porous borders in remote parts of the Amazon region into Brazil. Depending on resources and route, the journey can take from a week to a month (Kenny 2013: 100).” (Kenny 2013: 100).

What the literature reveals is that intermediaries are integral to facilitating the circulation of Haitian migrants from the point of departure, Haiti- and in some cases the Dominican Republic, to the intended destination in South America. Shifting, more restrictive immigration policies have facilitated the emergence of new intermediaries in Latin America (Nieto 2014). As one legal expert explained: “powerful people, both Haitian and Brazilian, orchestrate trafficking while an international network, from the Dominican Republic to Peru, facilitates transit” (Kenny 2013: 107). Financed by family members, their voyages are an investment they hope will pay off for migrants
and their families in Haiti (Nieto 2014). As regional migration policies changed, Haitian migrants and their networks adapted by developing new strategies and creating new migratory routes to reach their destination, constituting new territories of mobility (Handerson 2015).

Various strategies are employed while in transit, including having one or several people wire money in small amounts that corresponded with various legs of the trip (Nieto 2014). By only having the amount of money needed for each leg of the trip, migrants protect themselves against exploitation such as avoiding paying exorbitant bribes and robbery. Busse and Vasquez Luque (2016) refer to these strategies as forms of migrant capital which demonstrate their access to social networks of information that provide critical pre-departure knowledge as well as their access to resourceful family members or friends who can financially support their journey.

Immigration policy changes attest to the status shifts experienced by Haitian migrants. For example, between 2010 and 2011, migration officials in Peru reported a threefold increase in Haitian migration at 1,895 and 6,576, respectively, with the majority of these migrants transiting onward to Brazil (Busse & Vasquez Luque 2016). However, by 2012, those numbers would significantly decrease as changes in Peruvian immigration laws now required that they obtain a tourist visa which many could not (Busse & Vasquez Luque 2016; Cárdenas 2015).

In a more recent development, in June 2020, the Panamanian government would issue Decreto Ejecutivo No. 451 [Executive Decree No, 451], singling out Haitian nationals requiring that they obtain a transit tourist visa prior to entering Panama. The visa is valid for 24 hours and restricts circulation within Panama to the transit area of the international airport. Further, to apply for the transit tourist visa the applicant must furnish: 1) proof of address in the country of destination; 2) an invitation letter from a resident in the destination country; 3) a copy of the resident’s official identification; 4) as well as proof that the invitee resides at that address. As one of the principle ports of entry for Haitian migrants into Latin America, this newly issued decree will certainly impact Haitian migration to Brazil and other nations in South America. Whether this migration policy will simply re-route Haitian migrants’ paths to Brazil and further entrench them in smuggling networks remains to be seen. However, it is possible that this decree is part of the US’s influence on the migration policies of Latin American countries as Panama is also an important transit point for Haitians headed north to the US border (Abdaladze 2020) and accounted for 72.5% of all illegal migrants intercepted crossing the Darien jungle from Colombia into Panama in the first three months of 2020 (Panama National Migration Services 2020). Thus, as Dias et al. (2020:13) contend, “it is essential to examine the in-between, and the negotiations involving border controls, people, knowledge, skills and struggle present within the routes,” if we are to understand the migration systems created by Haitian migrants and their networks within Latin America.
Haitian migrant mobility in Latin America should not be reduced to physical movement as it also encompasses the circulation of ideas, knowledge, resources as well as the influence of social networks in Haiti, Brazil and beyond (Dias et al. 2020; Marcelin, Cela & Dorvil, 2017). As Dias et al.’s (2020) study revealed, though Haitian migrants had settled in Brasilia that city was not necessarily their intended destination it was simply where they were situated at that time. The study further revealed that practices of mobility are about how Haitian migrants experience the world as they search for better opportunities (Dias et al. 2020). These practices are influenced as much by border controls as they are by intermediaries. They are negotiated with family members in Haiti, the United States, Dominican Republic, Brazil, and beyond, as much as they are with friends who, at a moment’s notice, can re-route a migrant’s path in new directions.

**ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, RISING XENOPHOBIA IN BRAZIL, AND ONWARD MIGRATION**

Within three years (2010-2013), Haitians made up the principal immigrant nationality in Brazil’s formal labour market (Dutra 2017). However, the welcome mat laid out by the Brazilian government to Haitian migrants began to fade from view by mid-2014 as Brazil’s economy began to spiral downward. Between 2010 and 2018, approximately 129,000 Haitians had entered Brazil and well over 90,000 of them were granted work authorization permits (OBMigra 2019). In 2015 and 2016, Brazil’s economy contracted by nearly 7% with unemployment nearly doubling affecting 7.6 million in 2012 and 13.4 million in 2016 (Gallas & Palumba 2019). As the economy receded, some 30,000 Haitians began migrating elsewhere in searching of better opportunities (Wejsa & Lesser 2018).

For those migrants who remained in Brazil, they were often looked upon with disdain and even blamed for taking jobs away from Brazilians. In some instances, they became victims of violence. In August 2015, six Haitian nationals were shot at in front of a São Paulo church that provides services to foreigners (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2018). They were targeted for having stolen jobs away from locals.

Of note is that prior to the recession Haitians faced significant difficulties integrating into Brazilian society (De Oliveira 2017) though there have been efforts to provide settlement and integration support as well as basic services mostly through religious organizations (De Paula 2017; Handerson 2015; Nieto 2014; Vieira 2017), non-governmental organizations (Vieira 2017), and universities such as the Federal University of Parana (De Oliveira et al. 2017). Diehl (2017) sheds light on the commonplace stigmatization of Haitian migrants in Lajeado, in the Southern State of Rio Grande do Sul, through gestures, looks, indifference and in their dialogue. Negative portrayals of Haitian migrants propagated by the news media has also been cited as an impediment to large scale integration (De Oliveira et al. 2017; Diehl
According to one study of Haitian migrants in 2015, failure to socially integrate produced two competing reactions: 1) the desire to show a different reality; and 2) the desire to migrate onwards to the US or Chile, evidence of Chile’s rise as a destination country in recent years (De Oliveira et al. 2017). Interestingly, as Haitian migrants are stigmatized as black immigrants, they also engage in regimes of differentiation with other migrants of color (e.g., Senegalese, Bengali) in which they perceive themselves as superior linguistically, due to their ability to speak multiple languages, religiously, due to their communal values (Ferreira 2017).

FIG 5. NUMBER OF HAITIANS HIRED/FIRED BY TRIMESTER 2016-2018

In addition to the economic recession which fostered resentments toward Haitian migrants, in October 2018 Brazil would elect its 38th president, Jair Bolsonaro, a conservative former military officer. Within his first two weeks in office, President Bolsonaro would withdraw Brazil from the United Nations Migration Accord proclaiming that migration was a matter of national security that should not be dictated at a global scale (Londono 2019). Driving home his point via social media, Bolsonaro would tweet, "If we decide who we let into our own houses, why would we do any differently when it comes to our Brazil?" (Paris, 2019). Bolsonaro’s stance reflected rising anti-immigrant sentiment and the outright rejection of the agreement in many countries around the world.

A combination of economic, social and political factors contribute to Haitian migratory experiences that begin with one point of origin, Haiti, yet cannot always claim any particular destination. As De Oliveira et al.’s (2017) study on migration policy changes in Brazil, Peru, Chile and Panama elucidate there is not necessarily one, or any particular, destination in mind for Haitian migrants, as they are constantly...
searching for better opportunities. Such opportunities are determined by the context of reception, local economies, and migration policies adopted by various governments. This reality may draw them to numerous South American countries at any point in time and even much further north through Panama toward the Mexico-US border.

As an example, as opportunities began to dwindle in Brazil the Haitian migrant population in Chile rose exponentially. Between 2002 and 2017, the Haitian population increased from 50 to just under 65,000. And according to official reports by Chile’s Policía de Investigaciones, by 2018 there were over one hundred thousand Haitian migrants living in Chile (as cited in Montinard 2019). In response to the rising number of Haitian migrants in Chile, the Chilean government introduced a new policy requiring tourist visas for all Haitian migrants in 2018 (Ziff & Preel-Dumas 2018). The new policy requires that the visa is obtained in Port-au-Prince and provides no possibility for employment or family reunification (ibid). Between 2018 and 2019 there was a 29% decrease in visas issued to Haitian migrants (Abdaladze 2020), the effect of which will leave many, including those emigrating from Brazil, with undocumented status in Chile exacerbating the vulnerability of this migrant population.

In the post-quake context, Haitian migration patterns, which in the 20th century disproportionately flowed to countries in the global North, such as the United States and Canada, with some migration within the Latin America and Caribbean region. These countries have included Cuba and the Dominican Republic- in search of agricultural labour opportunities, and, to a lesser extent, countries such as Mexico for tertiary educational opportunities and the Bahamas- en route to the United States, and have now expanded deep into the South American continent (see Map 1). The map shows key countries of destination for Haitians in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2010 and includes peak population estimates from a variety of sources. The arrows in the map are not intended to illustrate exact migration flows but rather, trajectories from Haiti, and in some cases the Dominican Republic, to key destination countries.
MAP 1. COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION FOR HAITIANS IN THE LAC REGION (2010-2020)

4,000+ Haitians in Tijuana (2018)

179,338 Estimated Haitians (2018)

128,968 Registered Haitian Arrivals (2010-2018)
MAP 2. HAITIAN MIGRATION ROUTES TO THE LAC REGION (2010-2020)
Facing political, economic and social upheaval and environmental degradation, the Latin America and Caribbean region seemingly offered opportunities for economic advancement in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 disaster. And as opportunities for advancement waned, Haitian migrants would continue their search for a better life within the region and beyond. Haitian migration patterns illustrate this ongoing search that has transformed destination countries into places of transit and vice versa. Thus, many twenty-first century Haitian migrants embark on a journey of circulation that begins in the origin country, which may be Haiti or the Dominican Republic, and may have multiple destinations (see Map 2). At each destination a determination is made about existing economic opportunities and migration policies that make certain countries favourable for short- or long-term settlement and other sites of transit for Haitian migrants. The following map illustrates key migratory routes and the circulatory nature of Haitian migration, particularly in Latin America. Distinct flows are color-coded. The highly mobile nature of Haitian migrants is made evident by the circuitous trajectories to and within the continent.

It is important to note that many of the routes represented in the map reflect travel in both directions, with the exception of the route through Central America towards Mexico where migration is, generally, unidirectional with the United States as the intended destination. Moreover, the map does not represent an exhaustive picture of all migration routes but includes those most commonly followed by Haitian migrants. These flows are based on a collation of data gathered from official government sources, scientific reports, mainstream media investigative reports and previously published maps.

What can be ascertained is that while international migration provides Haitian families with hope for a better future, the journey toward that future is often filled with uncertainty as well as exploitation and disappointment. Therefore, the Haitian government has a role to play in protecting Haitian migrants through diplomacy, policy interventions, and support services that can help alleviate, and not further compound, their vulnerability.

4. MIGRATION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

Our understanding of people’s movements across borders has evolved over the past two decades as reflected in the migration, transnationalism and diaspora literatures. Further, during this time policymakers and international organizations began recognizing the need to understand diaspora remitting practices (Orozco et al. 2003); human capital transfers (Brinkerhoff 2008; Lowell and Findlay 2001; Meyer 2001) and entrepreneurship (Newland and Patrick 2004) as potential drivers of economic development in origin countries and how political and social activities carried out by diasporic groups (e.g., supporting political parties, advocacy work, and
civil society mobilisation) influence homeland events (Glick-Schiller & Fouron 2001; Shain 1999; 2002).

What we know about the nexus between migration and development policy in Haiti remains limited (OECD & INURED 2017). Much of the literature on migration and development in Haiti is focused on remittances (César 2007; Fagen et al. 2009; Orozco 2006; Orozco & Burgess 2011) with some focus on the diaspora’s political activity (Gammage 2004; Laguerre 1984, 1998, 2006) and philanthropy through professional and hometown associations (Cela 2016; Fagen et al. 2009; Pierre-Louis 2006). The disproportionate emphasis on the remitting practices of the Haitian diaspora is, to a certain extent, justified as remittances represented over 25 percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product in 2004 (Caroit 2012; Chishti & Bergeron 2010; Clemens 2010; Gentile 2010; ICG 2007; Sanon 2012; Wah 2013) and continues to increase. However, it is estimated that well over two-thirds of Haiti’s skilled human resources live abroad (Mendelson Forman, Lang & Chandler 2011; Wah 2013) and the country has yet to take full advantage of the skills and technologies its diaspora has to offer.

Though the Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad was established in the mid-1990’s (initially as the Ministry of the Tenth Department) following the critical role played by the diaspora in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Haitian government began taking particular notice of the diaspora’s buttressing of the Haitian economy in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. The diaspora’s financial support has historically been acknowledged as vital to the country’s survival (Caroit 2012; Fagen et al. 2009; Orozco 2006; Pierre-Louis 2006; Sanon 2012; World Bank 2011) and thus remained welcome. However, other forms of diaspora engagement have been met with ambivalence, if not outright resistance, underlying the contentious relationship between the diaspora and homeland (Cela 2016).

The contentious relationship between Haiti and its diaspora was first nurtured by the Duvalier dictatorship that established the term dyaspora- as it is spelled in Haitian Creole- as a pejorative term classifying those who had turned their backs on the homeland (ICG 2007). Distrust between the homeland and its diaspora has persisted presenting real challenges to the establishment of development policies that capitalize on Haiti’s substantial out-migration, particularly of skilled migrants and the professional classes, hampering the potential contributions of the diaspora. In the post-disaster context, efforts to engage Haitians living abroad in the nation’s recovery and rebuilding continued the tradition of extracting material resources from them while publicly advocating for skills transfer and capacity building initiatives which were never institutionalized.

In 2011, under President M. Joseph Martelly, the Haitian government established the National Fund for Education to cover school fees for all primary school aged children through a USD $1.50 tax levy on all wire transfers sent to Haiti and a USD $0.05 levy on all international telephone calls to and from Haiti (Durandis
In December 2012, over one million school children had reportedly benefitted from tuition waivers underwritten by USD $16 million raised through these tax levies (Charles & Green 2012). However, allegations of corruption were made by the two regulatory agencies in charge of collecting funds, Conseil National des Télécommunications (CONATEL) and the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (Durandis 2013). Funds went missing and several school administrators made bitter claims against the program as they had not received tuition payments for scholarship students (Papillon 2012; Strom 2012).

The post-disaster context significantly increased the visibility of the diaspora who were deemed a vital intermediary in the transnational rebuilding effort. The Haitian diaspora simultaneously served as a resource to their adopted countries (or institutions in those countries) that sought to engage in Haiti rebuilding efforts and for homeland actors seeking to access resources from other nations. This became an ideal moment to re-assert diasporic claims to dual citizenship. In June 2012, after much resistance, President Martelly had a Constitutional Amendment approved authorizing dual citizenship for members of the diaspora carrying with it the right to: vote in elections; hold political office, with some exceptions (e.g., Presidency, Primature and Parliament), and own property (Caroit 2012; Sanon 2012). To date, dual citizenship has yet to be fully institutionalized as those living outside of Haiti are unable to vote in elections from abroad.

4.1 PROTECTING HAITIAN MIGRANTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

The adoption of tax levies that provide access to basic education has contributed to development in Haiti and such access may be positively correlated with combatting child trafficking as victims tend to have low school enrollment rates (US Department of State 2019). Yet, it is evident that the migration policy and development nexus has not been sufficiently exploited by the Haitian state (OECD & INURED 2017). However, migration policies exist not simply to facilitate development or securitize borders but can also serve to protect the human and labour rights of migrants who have left the country.

According to the 2019 Trafficking in Persons report, Haiti made some strides in addressing human trafficking between 2018 and 2019 including “investigating, prosecuting, and convicting more traffickers, passing a national action plan, closing several abusive orphanages, and increasing law enforcement training” (US State Department 2019: 222). Yet, in order to eliminate trafficking, particularly as it relates to Haitian migrants, it was recommended that laws and policies be developed to protect against exploitative foreign labour recruitment practices, potential labour migrants be educated about exploitative practices, and a database on trafficking and law enforcement efforts to combat it be established (ibid). Much of the efforts to curb trafficking have focused on the 286,000 child victims trafficked internally in Haiti to
serve as restaveks (child domestic servants) in semi-urban and urban areas as well as those smuggled across the Haiti-Dominican border for domestic servitude or sex trafficking (ibid).

Unfortunately, these efforts have not received the necessary financial commitments from the Haitian state to provide protection, shelter, medical and mental health services, as well as other necessary supports to eliminate human trafficking. Though more than 850 migrants were screened for vulnerability to smuggling at the four Border Resource Centers established along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border, adult trafficking, a phenomenon already obscured by the rightful focus on child victims, has received limited attention in the absence of sufficient resources and support (ibid). Yet, Haitian migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitive labour recruitment practices and trafficking when traveling to or from countries in Latin America and the Caribbean such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico, among others (ibid).

5. HAITI AND FORCED RETURN MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19

By August 6, 2020, there were over 7,544 confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection and 171 deaths in Haiti (MSPP 2020). However, Haiti only has the capacity to serve a few hundred infected patients (UNSC 2020) which also reflects the country’s limited testing capacity and the reasonable assumption that infection rates may be much higher. The combined aggravating effects of the ongoing political crisis that began in summer 2018, subsequent economic recession and the global pandemic has resulted in rising unemployment, reduced tax revenues and foreign direct investments, the plummeting value of the Haitian gourde, with the economy expected to contract by 4% in 2020 (ibid). In the midst of these multiple crises, Haiti’s suffering has been compounded by the migration policies adopted by foreign governments. As the global pandemic rages on, and with no foreseeable end in sight, some governments have taken this opportunity to securitize their borders by shutting them down, instituting new immigration policies, and/or deporting migrants, both documented and undocumented.

Identified as a key feature of Haitian mobility, many Haitian migrants face multiple deportations during their lifetime. In one study of Haitian migrants, a key informant reported being deported from more than four countries throughout his life (Handerson 2015). In Haitian society, deportation is understood as an issue of morality and looked upon with disdain. Handerson (2015) suggests that deportation is considered a: 1) failure that signifies a lost opportunity to fè lavi (make it) aletranje (abroad) that, in turn, 2) brings dishonor to family, friends and neighbours. The integral role played and sacrifices made by family members, and in some instances friends and neighbours, to facilitate the migrant’s journey makes deportation a loss on an investment which was expected to result in financial support through
remittance transfers but also had the potential to facilitate the migration of additional family members and friends. Thus, deportation is conceived of as collective failure.

The United States, which as of August 6, 2020 had more than 4.8 million COVID-19 confirmed cases and approximately 158,000 deaths (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] 2020), has deported thousands of migrants to Central America and the Caribbean; eighteen thousand in March 2020 and approximately three thousand during the first half of April 2020 (Blitzer 2020). Between March and June 2020, more than 200 deportation flights have been executed by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) globally and these flights included infected migrants (Kassie & Marcolini 2020). By July 2020, eleven countries had confirmed receiving deportation flights from the US with infected migrants (ibid).

According to Haiti’s Director of the National Office of Migration (ONM), after officially declaring the pandemic in the United States, the US government deported more than 500 migrants to Haiti. More troubling is that these deportations were effectuated as the US faced a severe national testing crisis that has disproportionately affected institutions such as prisons and migrant detention centers where the virus has been rapidly spreading. During the first two weeks of May 2020, of the 30,000 migrants held in detention centers, 1,800 were tested for COVID-19 of which approximately 55% (or 1,000) yielded a positive result (Weiss 2020). Not surprisingly, by June 2020, several of the countries that received deportees from the US had reported cases of COVID-19 infection among returned migrants; including 200 deported to Guatemala, at least two to Mexico and three to Haiti (Sieff & Miroff 2020; Weiss 2020).

Though the policy of deportation enforced by the US government during this global pandemic is troubling, it is the return migration—both voluntary and involuntary—from the Dominican Republic that poses the greatest immediate public health threat for Haiti. The porous border shared between the two island nations simultaneously offers the opportunities and risks associated with human circulation. As of August 6, 2020, the Dominican Republic is the Caribbean country most affected by the pandemic with more than 75,000 COVID-19 cases and 1,222 confirmed deaths (US Embassy 2020). This situation necessarily has consequences for Haiti as, in addition to sharing a border, the Dominican Republic hosts the second largest Haitian migrant population following the US (OECD & INURED 2017). With an estimated 500,000 Haitians working in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican government suspended the temporary legal status of 150,000 Haitian migrants while many undocumented workers have lost their jobs (Sieff 2020), delivering yet another blow to the families in Haiti that depend on them for economic support.

*These figures are from official 2010 U.S. census data.

**These figures are from official 2010 Dominican Republic census data.

***This total reflects IOM’s Flow Monitoring Report published on 28 June 2020 and does not include deportation by air. IOM monitors around 100 other informal border crossing points between Haiti and the Dominican Republic’s porous border. According to the Director of Haiti’s National Office for Migration (ONM), by mid-May 2020, 21,000 migrants had returned or been deported across the five official points of entry shown on the map.

In addition to these impromptu deportations enforced by the Dominican government, during the pandemic thousands of Haitian migrants have voluntarily fled the country for fear of reprisal during the crisis. According to the Director of the ONM, 21,000 migrants had already returned to Haiti by mid-May 2020. However, these numbers are severely underreported as the Haitian government only monitors the 5 official points of entry along the border although there are at least 100 points of passage. Further, many migrants have crossed unofficial points of entry without being tested (Sieff 2020). According to the IOM, 210,788 Haitians have returned to Haiti from the Dominican Republic over land through four official and 46 unofficial entry/exit points between March 17th and June 12th, 2020 (IOM 2020). Of these return migrants, the majority were men (58.2%), 27.9% were women, 8.5% were
boys, and 5.4% were girls (ibid). The large number of return migrants from the Dominican Republic suggests that this may become one of the principal vectors of virus spread in Haiti.

While the cases cited here do not pertain to Haitian migrants in or from Brazil or South America, what they reveal is the vulnerability of Haitian migrants in countries in the global North and South and the absence of government action and failure to adopt policies that protect migrant rights while living abroad. What these numbers signal is that the Haitian government’s failure to adopt effective migration policies may prove costly during this global pandemic, there is a larger problem that these data unveil. Of note, is that the US government has not published any data regarding deportations, the data we refer to in this report have been published by reputable US news outlets that sued the US government through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in order to obtain these data. Further, information has been obtained anecdotally during an official radio interview of the Director of Haiti’s ONM. No official data has been published or made available to the public by either the US or Haitian governments, a troubling fact with potentially grave consequences.

With respect to forced return migration from the Dominican Republic, official aerial deportation records have been published by the Dominican government but no government data is available on the most common form of forced return migration, terrestrial deportations. Given the historic tensions between the two island nations, many international and national organizations have been involved in monitoring the situation of migrants given rampant xenophobia- specifically anti-Haitian sentiment, acts of violence perpetuated by the government and civilians alike, as well as the human and labour rights violations suffered by Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. The IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) has been actively monitoring migrant circulation along the official and unofficial entry and exit points along the border, in partnership with local organizations such as Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés (GARR), making data more readily available on the circulation of Haitian migrants between the two countries. However, the data presented here speaks to three major issues: 1) lack of transparency on the part of the host country governments as it relates to the politically contentious act of deporting migrants, 2) the absence of official Haitian government data that could inform and catalyse the actions of stakeholders and advocates around the world in support of Haitian migrants, and 3) the Haitian government’s failure to engage in meaningful diplomacy and policy development that protects its citizens both at home- with respect to the COVID-19 public health crisis- and abroad.

This is emblematic of an even greater issue that Haiti faces. If any actions are to be taken on behalf of Haitian migrants, those decisions will necessarily be oriented by other entities- in this specific case, the Dominican government, US journalists, and IOM- outside of the government. While on the one hand it can, and has been, argued that these entities are supporting a resource poor government in carrying out its duties towards its citizens by collecting data that can inform their decisions, yet on
the other hand, it may reflect lack of political will while creating enabling environments for the government’s lack of accountability to its citizens. Ultimately, lack of official data from the Haitian government’s raises serious questions regarding national sovereignty that extend beyond the issue of migration. The question must be asked, how does the government serve its people if it cannot account for them at home, as Haiti has not conducted a national census in well over a decade, or abroad?

5.1 THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC AND REMITTANCE LOSSES IN ORIGIN COUNTRIES

According to the World Bank, it is estimated that in 2019 people from low and middle income countries living and working abroad remitted USD $554 billion to their home countries, "an amount greater than all foreign direct investment […] and more than three times the development aid from foreign governments” (Emont 2020). Many developing countries, such as Haiti, depend on remittance transfers to cover basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing as well as medical expenses and, in the best of circumstances, for investments in land, real estate and businesses. The LAC region disproportionately relies on these resources which totaled almost USD $100 billion in 2019 (Orozco 2020b).

In 2015, remittances to Haiti represented one-quarter of its Gross Domestic Product (OECD & INURED 2017) rising to more than one-third (36.2%) in 2019 (Orozco 2020a). In a country where public spending on social programmes is half the regional average (IMF 2020), remittances have been vital in sustaining families in Haiti. One economist cites Haitian migrant remittance data in the month of July 2017, in which transfers from Brazil to Haiti totaled USD $5.15 millions dollars (Thomas 2018). Brazil represented the 6th highest transfer amount for that month behind the US (USD $115 millions), Chile (USD $8.74 millions), France (USD $7.48 millions), Canada (USD $7.45 millions) and the Dominican Republic (USD $5.52 millions) (ibid). Between 1999 and 2019, remittances to Haiti rose significantly from slightly below USD $500,000 million to USD $3.3 billion, the latter representing 37% of its GDP making it the second largest recipient in the world following Tonga at 38% (Olsen-Medina & Balatova 2020).

Yet, the damaging impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy has affected migrants, their families and the communities that benefit from their migration tremendously. The World Bank estimates that in 2020 the pandemic will result in remittance losses of approximately 20% (Orozco 2020b). Haiti has already started to feel the effects of the economic meltdown brought on by COVID-19. During the first few months of the pandemic Haiti suffered an 18% decline in remittances when comparing transfers from March 2019 with those of March 2020 (Borjarski 2020).
With the majority of Haiti’s remittances coming from the US, Haiti has suffered the ripple effects of the shutdown of much of the US economy. Prior to the pandemic, many migrants in the US lived on the margins; 35% earned under USD $20,000 per year and one-fifth were uninsured (Orozco 2020a). These numbers suggest that migrants in the US are financially unstable, job insecure, and vulnerable in terms of health. As many as 595,000 migrants in the US are expected to lose their employment during the pandemic (ibid). This will most certainly impact Haitian migrants and, in turn, deliver a blow to the remittance dependent Haitian economy.

What remains evident is that Haitians living abroad have contributed substantially to Haiti’s fledgling economy and as out-migration has remained constant and, in some cases, increased, they will remain vital to the survival of Haiti’s families, communities and, thus, its economy. This aspect of diaspora engagement in the homeland, remittance transfers, is and will remain the focus of the Haitian government policy for some time to come. However, remittance dependence is an insufficient strategy if the nation is to chart a path towards development. Haiti will require substantially more material resources, skills and technological innovation which will necessarily require the adoption of policies that draw on the resources and know-how of Haitians living abroad and institutionalize efforts that channel these investments. At present, the Haitian government has not shown any signs that it has the political will to do so. Yet, the argument can be made that the Haitian government has taken its cues from the development community which has disproportionately focused on remittance economies. The paucity of scientific data on other aspects of the relationship between migration and development policy in the homeland has necessarily contributed to limited policy development in this arena.

6. CONCLUSION

International migration has been part of Haiti’s history dating back to the colonial period and persisting through the present day. However, the changing demographic of Haitians leaving the island beginning in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s has altered the experiences of Haitians living abroad. Migration facilitates both the survival of vulnerable Haitians and social ascension of others. It helped emigres absorb the shocks of war during the Haitian revolution, then served as a strategy to contend with political, economic and social instability, while also facilitating social mobility for others.

However, post-earthquake migration has added yet another dimension to Haiti’s migratory history, expanding South-South Migration within the LAC region, particularly for unskilled laborers, creating new opportunities and introducing new risks for this migrant population. Unlike migration to the North, regional migration is characterized by a constant search for better opportunities that transform destination countries into points of transit in an instant. The Haitian government’s failure to adopt migration policies that capitalize on out-migration in order to facilitate national
development as well as protect migrants by addressing inequalities that increase their vulnerability have been lost opportunities for Haiti’s rebuilding effort in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake.

Through the MIDEQ project, we aim to facilitate the migration, development and equality nexus through scientific inquiry that can inform policy and praxis both in Haiti and the host countries that receive Haitian migrants. As Haiti engages in a long-term rebuilding effort, this endeavor is one that necessitates the inclusion and contributions of those living abroad, including those in the global South. Understanding the opportunities afforded abroad, identifying the challenges that render migrants vulnerable in these contexts, and adopting policies that capitalize on the opportunities while attenuating migrant inequalities will set Haiti, and Haitians living abroad, on a path toward development. Ultimately, critically addressing national development as well as the human and labor rights needs of migrants living abroad through effective policy prescriptions will compel Haitian leaders and stakeholders to look outward while looking within and re-establish the social contract between the nation and its citizens, a citizenry that extends far beyond its borders.
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